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106 OVERVIEW
107 The H-2A Temporary Foreign Worker Program al-
107 lows U.S. farmers to hire immigrant labor on a seasonal
basis if 1) a shortage of domestic farmworkers exists and
2) the employment of the immigrant labor will not "ad-
108 versely affect" the wages and working conditions of U.S.
workers "similarly employed." The program recognizes
110 and attempts to accommodate growers' interests in ob-
112 taining foreign workers to meet their labor needs.Farmworkers may dispute whether that interest reflects
116 a genuine labor shortage or simply a managerial, profit-
116 driven preference for cheaper, more reliable, and more
controllable workers. But the regulatory program and
117 the statute enabling it presuppose a Congressional de-
termination that at least some growers' interest in this re-
117 gard is legitimate, otherwise the program would not
exist. In short, the regulatory program by definition is
119 premised on the existence of competing sets of
119 interests.
However, this regulatory acknowledgment of
122 growers' interests is subject to two limitations. First,
governmental protection of growers from the vicissi-
123 tudes of a competitive domestic labor market or from
the risks inherent in producing a perishable product
123 does not necessarily follow from the recognition of a le-
126 gitimate grower need to obtain foreign workers in times
129 of true labor shortages. Second, that an interest is a
* Sarah deLone graduated from Yale Law School in 1991.
She is currently employed by the Juvenile Law Center and Phila-
delphia Citizens for Children and Youth, both in Philadelphia.
The author wishes to thank Greg Schell, Mary Ellen Beaver, Rob
Williams and everyone else at Florida Rural Legal Services, Shelly
Davis, the Migrant Legal Action Program, Bruce Goldstein of the
FarmworkerJustice Fund, Professor D. Marshall Barry of the Flor-
ida International University, and Professor Peter Schuck of Yale
Law School.
1
deLone: FARMERS, GROWERS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR: THE INEQUALITY OF B
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1992
The Inequality of Balance
premise does not necessarily make it a purpose of the statu-
tory mandate. As illuminating legislative history is
scarce, one must look to the history of the regulations
and their enforcement to discern what the scope of pro-
tection afforded to growers and the overriding purpose
of the temporary foreign worker program have been.
While Congress had struck a general, and rather impre-
cise, balance between competing grower and worker in-
terests in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
("INA"), between 1964 and 1981 the Department of La-
bor ("DOL"), in developing and enforcing the regula-
tions to implement the INA's guidelines, had construed
its function to be the affirmative protection of only one
set of the interests in that balance-farmworkers'.
A number of courts challenged DOL's focus on
farmworker protections during the 1970s, but it was not
until the Reagan Administration took office that DOL
itself directly and comprehensively challenged this in-
terpretation and ultimately discarded it. As designed
and operated today, the H-2A program ostensibly bal-
ances growers' and farmworkers' conflicting interests to
reach a "fair" resolution. Under this apparently reason-
able guise, the program has come to function funda-
mentally as a mechanism to assist growers in obtaining
foreign labor. Whereas the absolute number of certifi-
cations had been declining steadily throughout the
1960s and 1970s, that number has increased considera-
bly during the 1980s; equally important, both the
number of growers seeking H-2A certification and the
diversity of crops and areas in which the foreign workers
are found have risen notably in the last few years.
Does the employment of temporary foreign work-
ers depress wages and other working conditions? This
is a difficult question to answer, and it raises the issue of
who should bear the cost of uncertainty. In the regula-
tory framework developed by DOL in the 1960s and
1970s, this cost fell primarily on the growers (although
some courts were receptive to growers' petitions to
overturn DOL decisions not to certify temporary for-
eign worker requests). In other words, growers bore
the burden of demonstrating that adverse effect would
not result from their employment of the foreign work-
ers; if they failed to meet that burden, DOL would deny
certification.
This cost allocation reflected two basic premises.
First" throughout the 1960s and 1970s, DOL considered
protection of farmworkers against adverse effect as its
primary responsibility in administering the program-a
responsibility it should not sacrifice to growers' business
interests or market imperatives, however compelling
they may have seemed. Second, until Reagan took of-
fice, DOL accepted as a given that the employment of
foreign workers depressed-i.e. "adversely affected"-
the wages and working conditions of domestic workers.
Starting from these premises, the clear regulatory goal
was to rectify past and dampen future adverse impact
resulting from the importation of foreign workers.
With the inauguration of the Reagan Administra-
tion, however, the Department of Labor's position
changed and growers' interests gained a new centrality.
With this change came a new allocation of the costs of
uncertainty. The vast majority of the studies done sug-
gest that, even if the extent of wage depression is uncer-
tain, some degree of depression is far more likely than
not. Yet uncertainty does exist, and inevitably will re-
main. For twenty years the Department of Labor had
focussed its regulatory lens primarily on protecting the
interests' of farmworkers. During the 1980s, the De-
partment of Labor switched to a wide-angle lens to in-
clude the U.S. economy, labor markets, workers at large,
and growers' interests within the scope of its regulatory
gaze. As the additional interests were considered, the
net impact of an infusion of foreign labor became in-
creasingly difficult to ascertain. Thus, while the net im-
pact on farmworkers who do not have the skills or
resources to move into a different economic sector is
certainly adverse, the impact on U.S. workers generally
in a particular locality from an infusion of foreign
farmworkers may be unclear. DOL used the uncertainty
of adverse effect at the macro level not only to justify
the cessation of any serious effort to prevent prospective
wage depression, but to abandon a long history of aug-
menting minimum wage guarantees to compensate for
past depression.
This article argues that the net result of the new
policy orientation is that the regulatory wage and other
minimum guarantees no longer provide a floor, below
which farmworkers' earning power and working condi-
tions cannot fall. Rather, these so-called protections
create a ceiling, demands above which farmworkers are
hard pressed to make if they hope to secure employ-
ment. These workers cannot afford to bear the cost of
uncertainty and, with scant resources, should not bear
the burden of performing the difficult, perhaps impossi-
ble, task of proving that the importation of foreign
workers has or will upset the labor market to their detri-
ment. That burden is far more appropriately placed, as
it once was, on growers, who have more resources and
access to pertinent wage and employment information,
and are in a far superior position to minimize uncer-
tainty and absorb its costs.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA) authorizes the Attorney General of the United
States to grant temporary visas to foreign agricultural
workers (called "H-2A" workers, after the section of the
statute governing their importation) in order to meet
the labor demands of growers confronting a shortage of
domestic workers. Before such a visa can be issued, the
Secretary of Labor must certify that
(1) There are not sufficient [U.S. workers] who
are able, willing, and qualified, and who will
be available at the time and place needed, to
perform the labor or services involved in the
[grower's] petition [for temporary foreign
workers]; and
(2) [T]he employment of the alien in such labor
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or services will not adversely affect the wages
and working conditions of workers in the
United States similarly employed.'
Prior to IRCA, the temporary foreign worker, certi-
fication program was administered under the Depart-
ment of Labor ("DOL") regulations promulgated
pursuant to IRCA's predecessor, the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA"). With the passage of
IRCA, Congress elevated the language of the DOL reg-
ulations to statutory status.
2
To obtain foreign labor certification, a grower
must file an H-2A application and an Agricultural and
Food Processing Clearance Order ("job order") with
the Regional Administrator (RA) of the Department of
Labor in charge of the area in which H-2A workers are
sought and with the local office of the state employment
service. The H-2A application must contain the wages,
terms, and conditions of employment to be offered to
the foreign workers. The job order also contains this
information and is the form used by the employment
service to recruit domestic workers on behalf of the
grower. The employer must file both forms at least 60
calendar days prior to the beginning of the contract pe-
riod for which foreign workers are sought, although
emergency applications are permitted.
In order to prevent adverse effects to domestic
farmworkers, the H-2A regulations require that in the
job orders, the growers offer at least the so-called "ad-
verse effect wage rate" (AEWR), which is the minimum
wage DOL has determined must be paid -to prevent the
employment of foreign workers from depressing agri-
cultural wages in the state. In addition, growers must
offer terms and conditions of employment no less
favorable than those prevailing in the area and make
certain other contractual guarantees and assurances.
3 If
the RA approves the job order, the grower can begin to
recruit U.S. workers, and the state employment service
will circulate the job offer throughout the "interstate
clearance system." This system consists of Job Service
offices located throughout the country operated by state
employment agencies under the aegis of the U.S. Em-
ployment Service.
4
If a sufficient number of'qualified and available
U.S. workers are not found, the employer has fulfilled
its recruitment obligations and has not offered foreign
workers higher wages or better working conditions than
those offered to U.S. workers, and the RA determines
that the employment of foreign workers at the wages
and working conditions of employment offered will not
adversely affect the wages and working conditions of
similarly employed U.S. workers, the RA will grant certi-
fication for the number of foreign workers requested
less the number of domestic workers successfully re-
cruited. The RA must make a determination at least 20
calendar days prior to the beginning of the requested
H-2A contract period.
5
Farmworker advocates have criticized the two-
month time frame allotted for the processing of H-2A
applications and job orders as far too short for DOL to
make reliable prevailing wage and practice findings,
against which a grower's job order must be measured,
and to recruit U.S. workers, particularly those residing
outside the state and/or currently travelling in a migrant
stream. Not only does such a short time frame inhibit
adequate evaluation of U.S. worker availability and the
H-2A workers' impact on the local farm labor market,
but it renders virtually impossible meaningful judicial
review of DOL's determinations under the program.6
1.. 8 U.S.C. § I 186(a)(1)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(1952) of the INA authorized
the Attorney General to approve visas for temporary foreign
workers "if unemployed persons capable of performing" the
needed labor "cannot be found in this country." Following this
directive, the Attorney General promulgated regulations requir-
ing employers seeking such temporary foreign workers to secure
certification from the U.S. Department of Labor that (1) qualified
domestic workers were not available and (2) the terms and condi-
tions of employment offered to the foreign workers would not
"adversely affect" the wages and working conditions of domestic
workers "similarly employed." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(3)(A). The
Department of Labor, in turn, adopted regulations to execute this
mandate to protect U.S. workers from being displaced or ad-
versely effected by the employment of foreign workers.
Under the pre-IRCA regulations the foreign workers were
commonly referred to as "H-2 workers," after the section of the
INA authorizing the program. I generally will refer to the tempo-
rary foreign worker program, and the foreign workers employed
through it, in the years prior to IRCA as the "H-2 program" and
"H-2 workers." "H-2A program" and "H- 2A workers" generally
refer to the program and workers after IRCA, but may refer to
both the pre- and post-IRCA temporary foreign workers and
program.
3. For example, if it is the prevailing practice in the area to pay
workers on a weekly basis, H-2A growers must pay their workers
at least that frequently. Growers must also guarantee work for
three-fourths of the work days covered during the contract period,
and must hire available and qualified U.S. workers through the
first half' of the contract period. For current contractual obliga-
tions and assurances,'see 20 CFR § 655.102(b), 655.103 (4/1/90).
The particular obligations and assurances required over the years
will be discussed in detail below.
4. Actually, the job order is only circulated throughout the so-
called supply states in which available farmworkers are likely to be
found, as determined by the RA.
If the RA does not approve the order, s/he is required to
notify the grower of the reasons for the denial within seven calen-
dar days and afford him/her an opportunity to amend the order.
Similarly, if the RA finds any deficiencies in the H-2A application,
s/he is required to notify the grower within seven days so that the
grower can amend that application.
5. 20 CFR §§ 655.101, 655.102(a), 655.104, 655.106(b)(1) (4/
1/90).
6. Growers often have succeeded in obtaining a preliminary
injunction ordering DOL to grant certification, asserting that they
will suffer substantial crop loss if they are denied foreign labor.
Judges, often with scant information and records before them, do
not have the expertise to make the labor-market and worker-avail-
ability determinations necessary to evaluate a certification denial.
Unable to determine with any certainty that U.S. workers are avail-
able, judges have been reluctant to ignore growers' dire appeals.
Some judges also have viewed DOL's labor market expertise and
administrative authority with remarkable disdain, reinforcing their
proclivity to grant growers preliminary injunctive relief. More-
over, the merits of DOL's actions are seldom reached, since by the
time the case is docketed for a hearing on the merits, the season
usually has come and gone, and numerous cases have been dis-
missed as moot. See "Note: Overcoming Mootness in the H-2A
Temporary Foreign Farmworker Program," 78 Georgetown LJ.
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B. STATEMENT OF THESIS
DOL's execution of its responsibilities under the
temporary foreign worker program have come under
particularly harsh fire from farmworker advocates in re-
cent years. The general thrust of the criticism is not
new-that the AEWR and prevailing practice determina-
tions have not prevented wage depression or the deteri-
oration of other working conditions; that the
recruitment efforts of U.S. workers required of growers
and those made through the employment service have
proven inadequate to locate the many unemployed,
available, and qualified domestic workers these advo-
cates insist do exist; and that circulation of H-2A grow-
ers' job orders through the Employment Service's
interstate clearance system consistently has been a fruit-
less, pro forma exercise. Nonetheless, the intensity of
these criticisms has escalated over the last decade as the
Department of Labor's relationship to farmworkers and
growers has changed.
The mid-to-late 1960s had witnessed a period of
aggressive efforts on the part of the U.S. Secretary of
Labor to limit growers' access to foreign workers; rela-
tions during those years between DOL and growers
generally were strained. 7 The 1980s, on the other hand,
have witnessed consistent DOL approval of grower re-
quests. Variation in the administration of the program
also has resulted from different Regional Administrators
approaching the certification process differently.8
Since Reagan's inauguration in 1981, DOL has ef-
fected a major overhaul of the H-2A regulatory pro-
gram. The Department's opponents offer two basic
critiques of the new (post-IRCA) H-2A regulations in
particular. First, IRCA strikes a balance between the in-
terests of employers and workers. By definition, the
statute recognizes a grower interest in securing suffi-
cient workers at non-depressed agricultural wages;
otherwise the H-2A program would not exist. But IRCA
explicitly charges DOL with protecting the employment
opportunities, wages, and working conditions of U.S.
farmworkers.
DOL's duty is to carry out the statutory mandate
that foreign workers not adversely affect the wages
and working conditions of U.S. workers. This is an
irreducible minimum which must be met, whatever
balance point between worker and grower inter-
ests DOL may think is preferable.9
DOL, these critics charge, has begun to consider grower
interests in striking its own balance, one which is funda-
mentally at odds with IRCA's clear statutory directive.
IRCA's legislative history is silent on precisely how
Congress would define "adverse effect." But its adop-
tion of the exact language of the H-2 regulations devel-
oped pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952, it is argued, clearly reflects general Congres-
sional approval of the policies and standards applied by
DOL for almost two decades prior to IRCA's passage.
Those long-standing policies, in turn, reflected DOL's
recognition of such an "irreducible minimum" neces-
sary to prevent adverse effect, which growers' needs,
however acute, could not override.
Second, farmworker advocates argue, DOL's fail-
ure to effectively administer and enforce the regulatory
program has been particularly acute in recent years.' 0
In other words, while few farmworker advocates had
contended that the administration of the H-2 program
by the pre-Reagan Departments had been a panacea for
workers in the field, at least the official policy motivating
197 (October 1989); H. Michael Semler, "Overview: The H-2
Program: Aliens in the Orchard," I Yale Law & Policy Review
187, 222- 228 (Spring 1983). As the number of grower appeals
dropped during the 1980s, however, this dynamic (certification
denial followed by a lawsuit and preliminary injunctive relief) has
disappeared from the judicial record.
7. See infra Section II.C.
8. Legal Services attorneys have found the RA currently re-
sponsible for the New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware,
Virginia, and West Virginia region, for example, to be relatively
cooperative and responsive to their complaints and requests.
Farmworker attorneys have been received by the RA for the
Southeastern states, on the other hand, with substantial hostility;
from their perspective, that office clearly has identified itself with
growers' interests. Similarly, the political proclivities and compe-
tence of state administrators and local officials vary widely across
the country. Personal interviews with Florida Rural Legal Serv-
ices' attorneys Greg Schell and Rob Williams; Migrant Legal Ac-
tion Program attorney Shelley Davis; West Virginia Legal Services
Plan attorney Garry Geffert; Farmworkers Justice Fund attorney
Bruce Goldstein. In the case of the Southeastern Regional Ad-
ministrator and his office, my own experience confirmed this view.
9. H-2.4 Temporary Foreign Worker Program Litigation 1Manal (Mi-
grant Legal Action Program and FarmworkerJustice Fund: Wash-
ington, DC) (1989), 9. See also AFL-CIO v. VcLaughlin, 702
F.Supp. 307 (D.D.C. 1988) (District Court judge finding new reg-
ulations "do nothing to protect American workers and thus are
not in accordance with the law.")
10. Data on this issue is not readily available-Freedom of In-
fornation Act Requests, which would produce thousands of pages
of documents at substantial cost, would be necessary. However,
in a December 5, 1990 letter responding to former Secretary of
Labor Elizabeth Dole's solicitation of comments on the Job Ser-
vice, Florida Rural Legal Services (FRLS) detailed numerous cases
in recent years in which growers found guilty of egregious viola-
tions of the regulations by the Department of Labor and/or a fed-
eral court nonetheless were granted certification by DOL. In the
same letter, FRLS also detailed a number of instances in which
DOL had fallen far short of fulfilling its oversight responsibilities
for prevailing wage surveys and the interstate clearance and re-
cruitment process. Conversations with eight attorneys who repre-
sent farmworkers in H-2A related cases confirm the impression
that DOL's efforts to enforce the conditions imposed by the regu-
lations on growers requesting foreign labor certification, as well as
its operation of the interstate clearance system, plummeted with
Reagan's inauguration. A GAO study of the recruitment of work-
ers for H-2A tobacco growers in Virginia "showed that DOL's
practices provide weak protections for U.S. workers," and its re-
view of fifteen prevailing wage surveys led it to conclude that
"some surveys included practices not generally considered techni-
cally sound." The H-2A Program: Protections for U.S. Farmworkers,
GAO/PEMD-89-3 (U.S. General Accounting Office: October
1988), at 5, 35.
For additional confirmation of this interpretation see,
"Note: Overcoming Mootness in the H-2A Temporary Foreign
Farmworker Program," 78 Georgetown L.J. at 197 (Noting, for
example, one seasoned farmworker attorney's observation that
the "Department has recently approved nearly all grower requests
for certification, and growers' resistance to the certification pro-
cess has dwindled.")
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the regulations had been one of protecting
farmworkers; the Reagan-Bush DOL has gutted what
minimal protection the regulatory program had
afforded.
From the early 1960s through the Carter years,
the basic policy orientation of the H-2A program had
been for government to act as advocate and protector of
the economically powerless and politically disen-
franchised-in this case, farmworkers. Although largely
silent during the Nixon Administration, the regulatory
record during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter Ad-
ministrations is replete with evidence that the Depart-
ment of Labor had considered wage depression linked
to foreign workers to be axiomatic; at least at the policy-
making level, DOL consistently had asserted that the
prevention of an inevitable, depressive effect was the
regulatory program's fundamental and overriding con-
cern. In short, there can be little doubt, at least on pa-
per, of whose interests these DOL policymakers had
intended the H-2A program to protect, and what forces
they had intended to combat. iI
The reality, unsurprisingly, was not so heroic, and
the fulfillment of the policy far from complete. DOL of-
ficials, scattered across the country, interpreted their
roles and viewed the legitimacy of certification requests
differently. The adequacy of resources and competence
of staff also varied. At the operational level, many deci-
sions adverse to the immediate interests of U.S.
farmworkers were made.i 2 But the inauguration of the
Reagan Administration signaled a major ideological
shift vis-a-vis public programs for the economically dis-
advantaged. From the perspective of farmworker advo-
cates, policy as well as operational decisions sacrificing
the interests of their clients increased in severity and
frequency. As the Reagan DOL abandoned the govern-
ment-as-protector role and adopted interest "balanc-
ing" as its raison-d'etre, the temporary foreign worker
program assumed a policy posture unaligned with
farmworker interests.
This article focuses on the wage protections pro-
vided by the H-2A program and argues (1) that for
many years DOL's official policy was to correct for past,
as well as to prevent future, wage depression from the
employment of foreign workers by U.S. growers; (2) that
available evidence suggests that such depression has in-
deed occurred; but (3) that the Reagan and Bush Ad-
ministrations nonetheless have worked a major shift in
the goals and execution of the temporary foreign
worker program which is at odds with IRCA's statutory
mandate and DOL's own history in administering the
program, and which seriously undermines the
farmworker interests the Department is charged with
protecting. In developing this argument, the paper will
follow the evolution of the regulatory program from its
inception, survey the judicial response to the Depart-
ment of Labor's administration of it, analyze the studies
relied upon by DOL in its recent overhaul of the regula-
tions, and finally present two case studies on wage de-
pression in the Shenandoah Valley and in the Hudson
Valley based on my own research.
C. THE AGRICULTURAL LABOR MARKET
The Immigrant Reform & Control Act gives the
Department of Labor an impossible task. IRCA creates
a mechanism for bringing foreign labor into the U.S. la-
bor market and then charges DOL with preventing this
influx from lowering U.S. wages. Elementary economic
analysis explains that when the supply of a commodity
(labor) increases, the equilibrium price it commands on
the market (wages) falls. There is a fundamental contra-
diction in the H-2A program's allowing an infusion of
foreign labor while requiring that this market dynamic
be overcome through administrative gymnastics. Un-
derstanding the effect of this tension on U.S. workers
requires knowledge of both the more general way in
which labor markets function and the particular struc-
ture of the H-2A program.
Supply and demand operate in any market. The
impact of additional workers on the equilibrium wage is
exacerbated in the H-2A context for two reasons. First,
the new foreign workers are willing to accept wages and
working conditions inferior to those demanded by the
"old" domestic workers. This is the case for both H-2A
and undocumented foreign workers, as the wage these
workers will accept is determined by the labor market in
their home countries, which invariably suffer higher
under-employment and unemployment rates and lower
wages than the United States. Second, because under-
employment and unemployment in the primary H-2A
supply countriesi 3 is quite high and because the DOL-
approved wage invariably exceeds the rate attractive to
the foreign workers, there are many more foreign work-
1I. See infra Section II.
12. For a detailed discussion on the dysfunctionality of the Em-
ployment Service in administering a wide range of services to
farmworkers (not just regarding the H-2 program) in the 1970s,
see Goldfarb, .4 Caste of Despair (Iowa State University Press: Ames,
Iowa) (1981), 60-113; AAACP v. Brennan, 360 F.Supp. 1006
(D.D.C. 1973) (Class action suit on behalf of migrant farmworkers
against the Employment Service for a wide range of discrimina-
tory and unlawful practices in administering farm labor services.)
Goldfarb served as chair of the Special Review Committee, estab-
lished pursuant to a consent order in the NAACP v. Brennan case
in an effort to reach a settlement of that case. Final settlement of
the case was reached in January 1980. Goldfarb at 109.
.4/so see, Letter from Florida Secretary of Labor Wallace E.
Orr to U.S. Secretary of Labor Raymond Donovan (October 27,
1982), a frank assessment of the Job Service's failure in its recruit-
ment functions. In that letter the Florida Secretary noted: "Cur-
rent experience with this system raises serious questions about its
effectiveness... The realities experienced by Florida crewleaders,
migrant crew members, individuals and state and local employ-
ment office staff confirm the urgency of a complete review of the
clearance process at the national level." The Secretary continued,
"Quite frankly we feel that many of the 315 criteria orders re-
ceived in Florida were issued on a pro forma basis and that a
number of the 6,389 openings listed were not bona fide open-
ings. . .The Interstate Clearance System is cumbersome, and
there are ways employers can use the system to insure that they
qualify to obtain off-shore workers." The Secretary then detailed
the ways in which his staff had experienced such behavior on the
part of H-2 growers.
13. Most H-2A workers are recruited from Mexico and the
Carribean.
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ers eager to fill H-2A jobs than there are positions avail-
able. The result is that H-2A employers in the United
States have access to an essentially infinite labor supply
available at the certified wage.
The number of foreign workers an employer can
actually hire is, of course, limited by the number of cer-
tifications DOL approves. But growers are not required
to offer domestic workers wages higher than the DOL-
certified wage offered to H-2As. U.S. workers interested
in a particular job, but demanding a higher wage, are
not considered "available" for purposes of the regula-
tions. Since any job openings unfilled by domestic
workers as of 20 days before the beginning of the con-
tract period constitute a labor shortage for which DOL
will certify H-2A workers, the grower can meet its entire
labor demand with workers to be paid at the certified
wage. Once DOL approves a specific wage rate, the
H-2A employer need not respond to unexpected, short-
term, or other market pressures which otherwise would
push the equilibrium agricultural wage up. The result
of this system is that the adverse effect wage rate, rather
than establishing a protective floor below which U.S.
farm wages cannot fall, imposes a wage ceiling above
which H-2A growers need not make offers in order to
meet their demand for labor. This dynamic also applies
to the other terms and conditions of employment gov-
erned by the H-2A regulations.
In analyzing the impact of foreign workers on the
domestic labor market, it is critical to identify the partic-
ular sector of the labor market at issue. Workers in a
given location will face different kinds ofjobs, each re-
quiring particular skills and each offering particular
wages, benefits, and other conditions of employment.
Each category of employment can be said to constitute a
different sector of the labor market. Some sectors com-
plement each other, so that the expansion of employ-
ment in one will bolster employment and wages in the
other as well. For example, an influx of undocumented
workers willing to accept dishwasher, food preparation
and other kitchen jobs at below (then-prevailing) market
wages might stimulate expansion in the area's restau-
rant industry generally, thereby increasing the demand
for other workers to fill additional restaurant positions,
such as waiters, bartenders, hosts, and chefs; this in-
creased demand, in turn, would mean not only an ex-
pansion of employment opportunities in these
complementary jobs, but increased wages to attract
workers to them.
However, the influx of new workers willing to work
as dishwashers may have a negative effect on people al-
ready employed as dishwashers. More generally, since
workers within a particular sector will compete with
each other for available jobs, an influx of new workers-
especially those willing to work for a lower wage-will
cause the wages of all workers in that sector to decline.
This depressive impact will be tempered only to the ex-
tent that (1) the addition of the new workers causes the
overall economy in the area (and to that extent the sec-
tor in question) to expand and (2) the old workers can
move to jobs in a different sector of the labor market.
Enhanced economic activity and/or job mobility
might compensate for the depressive effect an infusion
of foreign workers otherwise would have within a partic-
ular sector of the labor market. This is a complicated
issue, and economists have reached no definitive conclu-
sions on the net impact of foreign workers either on do-
mestic farmworkers who have sufficient skills and
flexibility to move into alternative jobs or on domestic
workers as a whole.
However, it is neither mobile workers nor domes-
tic workers in general that the H-2A regulations are
designed to protect. IRCA charges the Department of
Labor specifically with protecting the wages and work-
ing conditions of domestic workers "similarly em-
ployed" to H-2A workers; the H-2 regulations prior to
IRCA also specifically protected "similarly employed"
U.S. workers. On its face, this language plainly suggests
that the scope of DOL's inquiry into adverse effect is
properly limited to that sector of the domestic labor
market in which the H-2A workers are employed, and
that differentiating between the impact of foreign work-
ers on the wages and working conditions of domestic
workers in distinct sectors of the labor market is critical
to assessing DOL's success in running the temporary
foreign worker program.
DOL's administration of the H-2 program from
roughly 1952 to 1980 is consistent with this interpreta-
tion of its regulatory role. i4 The issue of which sec-
tor(s) of the labor market DOL considers in assessing
adverse effect began to gain importance toward the end
of the Carter Administration and assumed a central po-
sition in the regulatory changes effected during the
course of the Reagan and Bush Administrations.15
In assessing the sufficiency of both the adverse ef-
fect wage rate and the recruitment efforts required, it is
also important to understand that the domestic farm la-
bor market is national in scope. Most migrant
farmworkers travel substantial distances from their
"permanent" homes to a number of jobs during the
course of a year. According to DOL, in 1977, nearly
half of all migrant workers held farm jobs that were over
500 miles from their home base; roughly 20 percent
held jobs in excess of 1500 miles from their home
base. 16 Moreover, contrary to conventional wisdom,
the experience of farmworker attorneys and representa-
tives today suggests that the bulk of migrant workers in
any given area do not travel in the same "migrant
stream," but in many different crossing, merging, and
diverging streams.
It is migrant workers who constitute the segment
of the agricultural work force most directly affected by
H-2A workers. Migrant workers are concentrated in the
seasonal, labor intensive fruit and vegetable crops
where H-2A workers primarily are found, and they work
more days per year performing farm labor than
14. See in/a Scction II & IV. 
16. 46 Fed. Reg. 4568, 4571 (t/16/81).
. See infa Section 11 & IV.
15. See infra Section V.B. 16. 46 Fed. Reg. 4568, 4571 (1/16/81).
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nonmigrants, even if they constitute a numerically
smaller group.' 7 Since many of the migrant workers in
competition with the foreign workers travel extensively,
to wherever work is available, the wage and working
condition guarantees as well as the recruitment efforts
should reflect the interstate nature of this labor
market. 1
8
D. WAGE DEPRESSION AND THE AVAILABLE WAGE DATA
I Data from which one can measure wage depression
is incomplete, and analyzing it is problematic. These
problems are discussed below. Nonetheless, some data
exists, and it provides tentative empirical support for
the contention that the employment of H-2A workers
has depressed domestic farm wages and enables us to
gauge the extent of that depression. It is important to
recognize the context of uncertainty in which decisive
interpretations and analyses cannot be made. Nonethe-
less, the Department of Labor has a clear mandate: pre-
vent adverse effect. The question facing DOL is, given
the inevitability of some ambiguity and uncertainty sur-
rounding wage depression and adverse effect, on which
side should DOL err? A partial response to this ques-
tion would be to require DOL to improve its data and
survey techniques in order to reduce the uncertainty to
a level acceptable to DOL implementation of its man-
date; the New York wage surveys for the Hudson Valley
during the 1970s and early 1980s, discussed below, 19
offer one model for this kind of response. But for the
present, and until such surveys are conducted, DOL's
administration of the H-2A program must rely on analy-
sis of existing data.
This article argues that IRCA implicitly strikes a
balance between grower and farmworker interests, but
that DOL's function in the regulatory structure is to
protect farmworkers against adverse effect within that
balance, not to strike a new balance. In addition, I ar-
gue that the balance struck by Congress in IRCA, and
DOL's H-2A regulatory role pursuant to it, are consis-
tent with the development and operation of the H-2
program under the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952. In a context of uncertainty, DOL should err on
the side of protecting workers and therefore should
compensate for adverse effect where existing data sug-
gest, even if somewhat tentatively, the existence of wage
depression. From this perspective, even qualified con-
17. Id.
18. The regulations require the Employment Service to circu-
late the grower's job order in those states in which the Regional
Administrator determines there is a good possibility that domestic
workers can be successfully recruited. That RAs generally instruct
the Employment Service to circulate the job order at least to sev-
eral states in the region reflects a recognition on the part of DOL
that the farm labor market is at least a regional one. 20 C.F.R.
§ 655.105 (a)(4/1/90).
19. See infra Section VI.C.
20. The H-2. Program: Protections for U.S. Farmworkers, GAO/
PEMD-89-3 (U.S. General Accounting Office: October 1988), 62.
21. Id.
22. Apple growers throughout New England and in New Yorki
clusions based on available data help to evaluate
whether or not DOL has satisfied its duty.
There are two approaches to measuring the extent
of wage depression resulting from the H-2A program.
First, one can make "snap-shot" comparisons between
the wages offered for similar work by employers who
utilize temporary foreign workers and those who do not.
Second, one can compare changes over time in the pre-
vailing wages and average earnings of domestic workers
employed by H-2A growers to changes in other wage
indices. Other such wage indices include the prevailing
wages and average earnings of domestic workers em-
ployed in similar crops but working for employers who
do not utilize foreign workers; the earnings of a larger
pool of agricultural workers, including both H-2A and
non-H-2A workers and crop areas, in which the propor-
tion of H-2A to all workers will be diminished; and the
earnings of non-agricultural workers.
Unfortunately, extensive data enabling sophisti-
cated snap shot or growth comparisons does not exist.
As the Congressional General Accounting Office has
noted, most crop areas using H-2A or undocumented
workers have been doing so for a long period, making it
"hard to find strong contrasts of U.S. workers' wages
with and without the influence of alien penetration.
'20
New H-2A growers have been emerging in the last few
years-but the time line for these growers is not long
enough to provide the necessary "strong contrasts" to
which the GAO referred. In addition, "Many other
human-capital[,]... contextual... [and other] labor cost
factors" would have to be measured and accounted
for.2 1 Thus, any conclusions drawn must be qualified by
the limited nature of the data as well as the numerous
exogenous and dependent variables that exist.
DOL collects and records farmworker data
through two instruments: prevailing wages surveys and
In-Season Farm Labor Reports. I turn first to the pre-
vailing wage surveys. A basic data problem for making
wage comparisons across time is that neither the state
nor federal Labor Departments are required to maintain
prevailing wage surveys and records for more than a few
years, and most have not done so. 22 In addition, prior
to a new piece rate regulatory provision promulgated in
1987, discussed below, 2 3 which requires state employ-
ment agencies to survey any crop activity in which H-2A
workers are or will be employed, DOL had required that
states conduct a wage survey for particular crop activi-
ties only in certain specific circumstances. 24 The result
Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia, for example, have em-
ployed H-2A workers for some or all of the years since the pro-
gram's inception in 1952 up to the present time; many of these
states have had such workers in every year. Maryland has one of
the few labor departments which has retained prevailing wage
surveys for more than two or three years. Most of New York's
older surveys, discussed below, were obtained from Legal Services
files.
23. See infra Section V.A.
24. DOL required prevailing wage surveys when (I) at least one
hundred workers were employed during the previous season and
were expected to be employed in the future, or (2) the "crop activ-
ity had an unusually complex wage structure or there [were] other
factors" suggesting that a survey was necessary in order to arrive
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is that prevailing wage surveys for many areas and crops
in which H-2A workers are not employed simply do not
exist, rendering impossible comparisons between wages
in similar crop activities in areas in which H-2A workers
are employed and those in which they are not.
While the reliability of prevailing wage surveys has
been challenged repeatedly by farmworker advocates
and questioned by agricultural economists, the surveys
are superior to DOL's other source of agricultural wage
data, the In-Season Farm Labor Reports. The In-Sea-
son Farm Labor Report is a monthly survey in which lo-
cal Employment Service offices estimate the number of
workers employed and the wage rates paid in various
crop activities in their area. No particular procedure is
followed in making these employment and wage deter-
minations; rather, Employment Service field representa-
tives estimate the figures, based on contacts they may
have with local growers, crew leaders, and workers, as
well as on their own knowledge of the area. Every
farmworker advocate, labor economist, grower repre-
sentative, and employee of the Florida and U.S. Labor
Department whom I interviewed readily dismissed these
reports as highly inaccurate and unreliable.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (U.S.D.A.)
"Farm Labor Reports" offer another source of informa-
tion on agricultural wages. This data also has several
shortcomings for the purpose of calculating wage de-
pression. First, the data published by U.S.D.A. is too
aggregated to permit comparisons between wages paid
in different crop activities in the same state or region, or
between wages paid in the same crop activity in different
states or regions. Second, the U.S.D.A. does not gather
data on actual piece rates, the method by which most
H-2A workers are paid; rather, it asks growers to report
the number of workers paid by the piece (as well as by
other methods), their total hours worked, and gross
wages during the sample period; U.S.D.A. then pub-
lishes the average earnings of these workers. Third,
U.S.D.A. periodically has altered its methodology and
changed the aggregation or grouping of data it has
gathered. For example, until 1981, average wages for
all hired farmworkers were published for each state; af-
ter 1981, average wages were published on a regional
basis, making comparisons across the two time periods
difficult.
Philip Martin, a professor of agricultural econom-
ics at the University of California-Davis, has noted a
number of other problems with the U.S.D.A. data. The
surveys conducted prior to 1974 "relied on 'volunteers'
at an objective, acceptable wage necessary for a grower to recruit
workers through the inter and intrastate clearance systems. ETA
Handbook No. 385, "Domestic Agricultural In-Season Wage
Finding Process."
Like the U.S. DOL in approving interstate clearance orders
accompanying H-2A certification applications, state agencies over-
seeing intra and interstate job clearance systems may accept ajob
order into the clearance system only if "[tihe wages and working
conditions offered [on the job order] are not less than the prevail-
ing wages and working conditions among similarly employed agri-
cultural workers in the area of intended employment[.]" 20
C.F.R. § 653.501(d)(4), (e)(4/l/90). Thus, it is not only when
to report their farm employment and wages each
month," leading to questionable reliability of the data
obtained. In 1974, the USDA implemented a
probability survey approach and conducted quarterly
surveys, but budget cuts in the early 1980s resulted in
limited data collection for several years; U.S.D.A. re-
sumed the quarterly surveys in mid-1984. An additional
problem "is the accuracy of total hours worked; Fair La-
bor Standards Act investigations show that hours
worked, especially for piece rate workers, are often
under-reported in employer records[,]" further exacer-
bating the dilution of the weight of piece rate earnings
in calculating the average field and livestock earnings
and hencein the AEWR.
25
Finally, two additional, non-data factors impede
rigorous analysis of wage depression due specifically to
foreign H-2A workers. First, numerous factors, in addi-
tion to the presence of H-2A workers affect farm wages:
weather and crop conditions, different varieties of the
same fruit, commuting distance, the price of the fruit on
the market and the costs of inputs, to name a few. Con-
sequently, it is hard to find two groups of workers who
truly are similarly situated (or even largely so) except
for the presence of 'H-2A workers. Other variables
which might explain a given wage differential inevitably
exist; economics is an inexact science, and apparent cor-
relations are generally far from conclusive.
Second, the large presence of undocumented
workers performing agricultural labor at sub-minimum,
subsistence wages poses both a methodological problem
forwage depression analysis-how to isolate the impact
of H-2A workers on domestic workers' wages when the
number of H-2A workers pales in comparison to the
number of illegal workers-as well as a policy dilemma
for the H-2A regulatory program-should the program
protect U.S. workers from the adverse effect of all for-
eign workers, illegal as well as legal?
II. EVOLUTION OF THE H-2 PROGRAM:
1964-1977
A. BACKGROUND
Beginning with the Contract Labor Act of 1885,
U.S. law generally barred the importation of unskilled
temporary foreign workers ("contract workers") into
the United States. Agricultural employers were given
frequent exemptions, however, 26 and in the wake of
World War II Congress enacted two pieces of legislation
authorizing the creation of official contract worker pro-
temporary foreign workers are sought that prevailing wage
surveys must be performed.
25. See Philip L. Martin, Haivest of Confusion: Migrant Workers in
U.S. .Agriculture (Westview Press: San Francisco, 1988), 38. Such
under-reporting of hours, of course, also exaggerates the piece
rate actually being paid.
26. To address the labor shortages experienced during World
War lI, for example, the War Manpower Division of the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture was given authority to import foreign
workers, mostly from Mexico and the British West Indies. See
Semler, supra note 6, at 190; W. Rassmussen, "A History of the
Emergency Farm Labor Supply Program 1943-47," U.S.D.A.
Monograph No. 13 (1951).
107.
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grams. The first, Public Law 78 passed in 1951, pro-
vided the formal legal foundation for the Bracero
Program, under which as many as 500,000 Mexican
workers were admitted to the United States each year,
on a seasonal basis, to harvest fruit and vegetable
crops.2 7 The second, the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, created the legal foundation for the devel-
opment of the H-2 program.2, From their inception,
both the Bracero and H-2 programs required that rea-
sonable efforts be made to attract and secure U.S. work-
ers, who would receive hiring preference over foreign
workers, and that the employment of foreign workers
would only be permitted if the wages and working con-
ditions of U.S. workers would not be adversely
affected.29
Until 1964 the H-2 program, through which
roughly 7,000 to 14,000 temporary West Indies, Baha-
mian and Canadian workers were imported annually,
paled in comparison to the massive scope of the Bracero
program, which oversaw the importation of as many as
500,000 Mexican farm laborers each year. The Bracero
Program, however, came under widespread criticism for
the severe exploitation of the Mexicans working under
its auspices; consequently Congress, rather than re-
newing the program's enabling legislation, allowed it to
expire in 1964.30 It was at this point that the H-2 pro-
gram, now the only vehicle for hiring foreign contract
workers, began to develop in earnest.
The abolition of the Bracero Program and the en-
suing policy battles that shaped the H-2 Program sug-
gest an "original intent" to create a regulatory
framework whose focus would be to safeguard the inter-
ests of U.S. farmworkers. Certainly, the INA H-2 provi-
sion as a whole recognized-indeed catered to-
growers' interests in an adequate (and cheap) work
force. However, having enabled growers to hire foreign
workers, the regulatory apparatus that DOL developed
27. The Bracero Program began as a series of executive agree-
ments between the United States and Mexican governments in re-
sponse to the labor shortages experienced by U.S. growers during
WWII; the first such agreement was concluded inJuly 1942. Simi-
lar to the temporary foreign worker programs of future years, the
agreements provided that Mexican workers would not be used if
U.S. workers were available and that their wages were to be at
least as high as those prevailing in the area of intended employ-
ment. The Bracero Program continued through these informal
bilateral agreements until 1951, when Congress passed Public
Law 78, formalizing the procedure and the international agree-
ments through which U.S. growers would continue to hire Mexi-
can Braceros. Galarza, Merchants of Labor: The Mexican Bracero
Story, 41-78 (1964).
The purpose of the law "was to assist 'in such production of
agricultural commodities and products as the Secretary of Agri-
culture deems necessary, by supplying agricultural workers from
... Mexico' " and it permitted foreign labor contracting "only on
certification by the Secretary [of Labor] that domestic workers
were not available, that their wages and working conditions would
not be adversely affected by alien contract workers, and that em-
ployers had made reasonable efforts to attract domestic laborers."
Id. at 72-73 (citations omitted). Following Public Law 78's enact-
ment, the U.S. and Mexico established a Migrant Labor Agree-
ment, updated periodically, which contained the minimum wages,
conditions, and other employment guarantees required of
Bracero employers.
was designed to protect U.S. farmworkers from the type
of abuse and adverse affect the Bracero Program had
engendered and which any employment of exploitable
foreign workers threatened.
B. CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTION AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Following the INA's passage in 1952 and the
Bracero Program's termination in 1964, Congress did
little to clarify its broad, relatively vague, policy direc-
tive that temporary foreign workers be admitted only "if
unemployed persons capable of performing such service
or labor cannot be found in this country." The House
Committee Report accompanying the 1952 bill empha-
sized that the restriction was designed to insure that for-
eign workers be admitted only to "alleviat[e] labor
shortages" and only under conditions providing "strong
safeguards for American labor." Following the INA's
passage, the only very clear signal emitted by Congress
was its decision to discontinue the widely-criticized
Bracero Program.
In the early 1950s, the Department of Labor began
to develop its policy on adverse effect and the standards
to be applied, pursuant to its responsibilities under both
Public Law 78 and the INA. In 1951, DOL officially in-
corporated the "adverse effect" terminology into its
regulatory code. In 1956, and again in 1958, the Bureau
of Employment Security issued an Employment Service
Program Letter stating that DOL would find adverse ef-
fect where growers who employed Mexicans paid lower
wages than those who did not. A 1960 Program Letter
announced a policy and procedure for taking corrective
action when wage surveys revealed wage differentials
between user and non-user growers. In addition, in
1958, DOL established an absolute minimum 504 per
hour wage for Mexican workers, and in the spring of
1962, it established statewide minimum rates.
3 1
Merchants of Labor provides an excellent account of the
Bracero Program in general.
28. 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(1952).
29. In the case of the Bracero Program, these criteria came di-
rectly from the statute, see supra note 27. In the case of the H-2
program they drew clear support from the INA. Section
101(a)(15)(H)(ii) of the INA authorized the admission of tempo-
rary foreign workers if qualified unemployed U.S. workers "can-
not be found," and the House Report for this provision explained
that foreign workers should be admitted only to "alleviat[e] labor
shortages" under terms providing "strong safeguards for Ameri-
can labor." H.R. 1365, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 44, 50, reprinted in 2
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1653, 1698, 1705 (1951). But the
specific H-2 standards were adopted through policy and regula-
tory statements, discussed immediately below.
On the history of the H-2 and Bracero programs generally,
see The Ilest Indies (B117) Tempora-v Alien Labor Program: 1943-
1977, Subcommittee on Immigration, Committee on the Judici-
ary, U.S. Senate, 95th Congress, 2d Session (U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1978) (hereinafter, "B117 Report"); Semler, supra
note 6; Rassmussen, supra note 26; R. Craig, The Bracero Program
(1971), as cited in H-2A Tempormy Foreign Wlorker Program Litigation
.aual, supra note 9, at 10-12.
30. For a detailed description of the abuses of the Bracero
workers, see Galarza, .Mferchants of Labor (1964).
31. Howard N. Dellon, "Foreign Agricultural Workers and the
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Following the expiration of Public Law 78 in 1964,
growers lobbied vigorously to maintain the Bracero Pro-
gram, in all but name, through an immediate, rapid ex-
pansion of the H-2 program. Secretary of Labor Willard
Wirtz, however, opposed the expansion, arguing that
Congress, having terminated the Bracero program for
the abuse rampant under its auspices, could not have
intended that it be reincarnated under another statutory
guise. Furthermore, Wirtz concluded, its decision not
to renew the legislation indicated Congress' desire not
only 'to terminate the large-scale importation of Mexican
contract workers, but to reduce the country's depen-
dence on all imported contract labor.
32
'DOL had issued specific adverse effect wage deter-
minations relatively infrequently in the early years of the
Temporary Foreign Worker program. In general, the
Department of Labor required only that growers pay
temporary foreign workers the wage rate for the crop
activity prevailing in the area. Adverse effect wage de-
terminations, where either Bracero or H-2 workers were
employed, had been made sporadically, on a crop-by-
crop basis, whenever DOL had found (1) that Braceros
had so infiltrated a crop that it was impossible to deter-
mine a prevailing domestic wage or (2) that there had
been adverse effect. In 1962 this began to change, when
Secretary Wirtz set statewide AEWRs for 24 states. 33 In
December 1964, following the termination of the
Bracero Program, DOL promulgated new regulations
which imposed significantly higher minimum wage
levels on employers seeking to hire foreign workers and
institutionalized the statewide adverse effect wage as a
pillar of DOL's regulatory policy. 34
In addition to strengthening the adverse effect de-
terminations, the 1964 regulations codified several
other requirements which were to provide the basic
framework of the H-2 program for the next twenty
years: Growers would be required (1) to exert reason-
able efforts to recruit domestic workers throughout the
contract period for which H-2 workers were sought; (2)
to provide family housing "where feasible and neces-
sary;- and (3) to provide reasonable round trip trans-
portation costs between the place of recruitment and
employment.
35
Wirtz did enjoy the Congressional support he as-
serted, although it was not as pervasive as he seemed to
contend. Following the promulgation of the 1964 regu-
lations, agricultural growers had lobbied for an amend-
ment to the INA which would transfer DOL's
certification responsibility to the Secretary of Agricul-
ture. Growers and their Congressional allies not only
perceived the Secretary of Agriculture to be more sym-
pathetic to their interests and more likely to approve
their certification requests, but they also argued that he
was in a better position to gauge and evaluate their
needs.
36
Senate debate on the amendment focused largely
on the question of whether or not Wirtz's program to
minimize, if not eliminate, the employment of foreign
agricultural labor accurately reflected the will of Con-
gress. Led by Florida Senator Spessard Holland, the
growers argued that Wirtz had "consistently miscon-
strued Congressional intent" in attempting to minimize
the employment of foreign workers. Opponents of the
amendment countered that the growers were trying to
reverse Congress' decision to terminate the Bracero
Program.3 7 The amendment lost in the Senate-but
only on the tie-breaking vote of Vice President Hubert
Humphrey-providing "clear, although exceedingly
narrow" Congressional support for Wirtz's policies.
38
In addition to the amendment proposing to trans-
fer responsibility of the certification determinations to
the Department of Agriculture, two other amendments
to the INA were before Congress in 1965. Together,
these amendments would have terminated the authori-
zation provided by the INA to import seasonal foreign
labor, thereby killing all legally-sanctioned contract la-
bor programs. This proposal was defeated, indicating
that Congress was not prepared to eliminate all foreign
contract labor immediately.
3 9
But beyond rejecting all three amendments, Con-
gress provided little guidance for DOL to follow in de-
veloping and administering the H-2 program. Congress
did not provide any clear directives by way of specific
statutory language or legislative history in 1952, and it
did little to alleviate that deficiency over the years. Be-
sides the Senate debate just described, the closest Con-
gress seems to have come to articulating a policy
directive for the program was in the House Judiciary
Committee Report accompanying the 1965 amend-
ments. That report elusively stated:
The committee has given much thought to
the practice of importing foreign labor to work in
agricultural endeavors. Inasmuch as the [Bracero
Prevention of Adverse Effect," 17 Labor LawJournal 739, 740-42
(December 1966).
32. See 29 Fed. Reg. 19101 (12/30/64) (Expiration of Public
Law indicated "a Congressional intent to end reliance on Mexican
Braceros for agricultural work in the United States.") See also B117
Report, supra note 29, at 22-24.
Wirtz also cited President Kennedy to support his interpre-
tation of DOL's policy mandate. Kennedy, recognizing the "clear
and cumulative" adverse effect the Bracero program had had "on
the wages and employment conditions of domestic workers," had
agreed in 1961 to a three-year extension of the Bracero Program
only "with the assurance that the Secretary of Labor will by every
means at his disposal, use the authority vested in him . .. to pre-
scribe the standards and make the determinations essential for the
protection of the wages and working conditions of domestic agri-
cultural workers." U.S. Department of Labor, Farm Labor Develop-
ments (August 1966), p. 21; Dellon, 17 Labor LawJournal at 744.
33. B117 Report at 21.
34. 29 Fed. Reg. at 19102 (12/30/64).
35. Id. at 19101-19102 (12/30/64).
36. Temporay l'orker P ograms: Background and Issues, Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, United States
Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Stock No. 052-
05222-8 (U.S. Government Printing Office: Feb. 1980), p. 67
(Hereinafter, "Temporary Wlorker Prograams").
37. 111 Cong. Rec. 23,512 (Remarks of Senator Holland, for
the amendment), 23,515 (Senator Williams, opposed), 23,527-
528) (Senator Bass, opposed) (1965), discussed in Semler a( 196.
38. Semler, supra note 6, at 195-96.
39. Id. at 196.
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Program] . . .has not been extended, it is the firm
position of the committee that the provisions of the Immi-
gration and NVationality Act, pertaining to temporary ad-
mission of laborers, shall not be abused...
.Likewise, the committee states that the ex-
ercise of discretion by the Attorney General in the
temporary labor field will be scrutinized
thoroughly.
The bill makes specific provision that skilled or
unskilled labor of a temporary or seasonal nature is not
entitled to any preference...40
Notably, the report made no mention of the truly con-
troversial actor at the center of the debates, the Secre-
tary of Labor, nor commented on his actions. in other
words, the House Report gave virtually no helpful gui-
dance at all. The Senate Report, even less instructive,
noted only that:
The bill specifically provides that skilled or un-
skilled labor of a temporary or seasonal nature is
not to be entitled to any preference under the se-
lection system for the allocation of immigrant
visas.
4 1
In short, Congress did not provide clear policy
guidelines in 1952, 1965, or in the years which followed,
and the absence of any discernible directive from Con-
gress during the vigorous debate that took place in the
mid- 1960s is notable. Thus, it was left to the Depart-
ment of Labor to develop and refine the contours of the
H-2 program, and to articulate in more detail the policy
embodied by it.
C. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S INTERPRETATION OF
THE H-2 PROGRAM
The Secretary of Labor had articulated a strong,
clear policy direction in 1964, and developments over
the next several years indicated that he intended to stay
his course. 4 2 Regulations promulgated in March 1967
(which neither followed nor sparked any Congressional
action) enhanced the recruitment provisions, requiring
an employer seeking H-2 certification to submit "a de-
tailed report of labor availability [and] recruitment ef-
forts undertaken" and expanding the scope of the
"reasonable efforts" required to recruit domestic
workers.
43
The March 1967 regulations contained several
other new provisions designed to strengthen the protec-
tion afforded farmworkers, and to diminish the benefits
to growers of hiring H-2 workers: (1) H-2 employers
would have to offer foreign workers, as well as domestic
workers, the minimum wages and working conditions
specified in the regulations;4 4 (2) Growers would have
to design piece rates to produce hourly earnings at least
equivalent to the adverse effect rate established for the
relevant state. (This represented an important protec-
tion for workers paid by the piece, who constituted the
vast majority of seasonal farm laborers.); (3) Where
workers were not covered by the state's workers com-
pensation system, H-2 growers would have to provide
alternative insurance for injuries and diseases arising
out of and in the course of employment; (4) Employers
would have to provide all tools, supplies and equipment
needed to perform the job; (5) Permissible deductions
from workers' wages were explicitly specified, and a cap
placed on the amount deductible each week; (6) A ceil-
ing was placed on meal charges; (7) Employers would be
required to guarantee each worker employment for
three-fourths of the working days offered in the con-
tract; and (8) Employers would be required to keep "ac-
curate and adequate" wage records.
4 5
The adjustments made to adverse effect wage rates
provide a murky picture of the extent of DOL's determi-
nation, or perhaps its political ability, to persistently
strengthen restrictive measures unpopular with grow-
ers. Until 1968, DOL periodically had calculated and
recalculated adverse effect wage rates for states employ-
ing H-2 workers using various ad-hoc methodologies.
By far the most progressive method, from farmworkers'
perspective, was that selected by Wirtz in December
1964: to set the 1965 rates, which were calculated by
increasing a given state's 1950 average agricultural
wage by the 1950-1962 increase in manufacturing
wages. New adverse effect rates were determined in
1967 by adjusting a state's 1965 figure by the 1963-1965
increase in the average national agricultural wage.
46
40. H. Rept. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess, 1965, 14-15 (emphasis
added).
41. S. Rept. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, 16.
42. The course Secretary Wirtz had laid out in the 1964 regula-
tions survived its first legal challenge when, in the spring of 1965,
Florida celery growers filed suit in federal district court, challeng-
ing DOL's regulatory authority. See infra Section III.
43. Such efforts were to include full use of workers who com-
mute daily between their home and the place of employment, use
of the interstate clearance system, full participation in special
vouth recruitment programs, and other measures which "which
have produced or are expected to produce effective results." 32
Fed. Reg. 4570 (3/28/67).
44. The 1964 regulations specifically required that the various
wage and working conditions guarantees be made to domestic
workers. That foreign workers receive the same guarantees was
indirectly implied through the adverse effect prohibition. The
1967 regulation made the requirement vis-a-vis foreign workers
explicit.
45. 32 Fed. Reg. 4569-71 (3/28/67). The record-keeping time
frame was increased to three years in June 1970. 35 Fed. Reg.
9016, 9017 (6/11/70).
DOL did make two modifications in the March 1967 regula-
tions which, arguably, lowered the minimum housing and trans-
portation guarantees required of all H-2 growers: (1) H-2 growers
would continue to be required to provide free housing to workers,
but family housing would be required where it was the prevailing
practice in the area of intended employment to do so-as opposed
to where it was "feasible and necessary," as the 1964 regulations
had required; (2) Employers would have to continue to provide or
pay for transportation between the place of recruitment and em-
ployment, but only for those workers who completed fifty percent
of the season. 32 Fed. Reg. at 4570-71 (3/28/67). But the over-
whelming thrust of the regulatory requirements was to strengthen
the protection extended to farmworkers and to minimize the
windfall growers received in employing foreign workers.
46. It seems likely that DOL's purpose in indexing the 1967
rates to the marginal change in the national farm wage was to dissi-
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Beginning in 1968, Secretary Wirtz made a signifi-
cant change in the the methodology used to set the
AEWR. First, he moved to adjust the adverse effect
rates annually. Second, he invited comments on "what
criteria or self-executing formula could be instituted" to
set the subsequent rates. 4 7 The methodology adopted
indexed each state's AEWR to the growth in the state's
average agricultural wage for field and livestock workers
in the previous two years. 48 DOL's institutionalization
of an automatic, annual process for updating the ad-
verse effect rates clearly enhanced the protections on
the books for farmworkers, and reflected both an ad-
ministrative recognition of chronic wage depression as a
problem as well as an institutional commitment to reme-
dial action. However, the methodological choice se-
lected in 1968 was not nearly as strong, from
farmworkers' perspective, as those used in 1965 or
1967, suggesting that there were limits beyond which
DOL policymakers would not-or could not-go in run-
ning the program.
Wirtz had only barely succeeded in gutting the
Bracero program and in defeating the growers' chal-
lenge to his jurisdiction over the H-2 program. He had
continued to strengthen the adverse effect wage and
other regulatory requirements to protect farmworkers
and to make hiring H-2 workers less attractive. And he
did terminate many existing uses of H-2 workers. For
example, after finding either adverse effect or domestic-
worker availability, he refused to certify West Indian
H-2s in the Midwest, Japanese workers in California, Ca-
nadian potatoes workers, shade tobacco pickers in New
England, as well as the routine use of foreign .vegetable,
strawberry and citrus workers in Florida.49 Indeed, dur-
ing the first few years of the post-Bracero regime, em-
ployment of foreign contract workers dropped
dramatically. Whereas 177,736 Mexicans had been im-
ported under the Bracero program in 1964, that
number was limited to 20,284 (admitted as H-2s) in
1965, and by 1968 had been reduced to zero. Mean-
while, the number of foreign contract workers admitted
through the H-2 program fell from 22,286 in 1964 to
13,323 (the decade's low) in 1968.50 Since growers' ap-
plications for H-2 workers had not declined, this dra-
matic reduction must be attributable at least in part to
DOL's policy decision to strictly adhere to Wirtz's inter-
pretation of the agency's statutory mandate as well as to
strictly apply the regulations it had promulgated pursu-
ant to it.
5 1
By 1968, then, the basic apparatus to regulate the
importation of foreign agricultural contract workers had
been constructed. For almost ten years thereafter, DOL
proposed no major changes in either the AEWR or
other provisions of the regulations. 52 The tenure of two
Republican Administrations between 1968 and 1977
pate the wage depression in any particular state's farm labor
market.
47. 33 Fed. Reg. 700 (1/19/68). Again, Wirtz's actions neither
followed, nor were themselves followed by, Congressional action
on the H-2 Program.
48. The method adopted was not described in the Federal Reg-
ister until June 1976 (although it was adopted in 1968). See 41
Fed. Reg. 25017, 25018 (6/22/76).
The methodology is as follows: Assume AEWR., and
AEWR., are the adverse rates in years 2 and 3, respectively, W is
the percent increase in the agricultural wage from year I to year 2.
AEWR, = AEWR, x W. For example, the 1968 AEWRs were set
by increasing the 1967 AEWR by the change in the average agri-
cultural wage in each state from 1966 to 1967.
49. Semler at n. 50, 196.
50. Department of Labor, United States Employment Service,
Division of Foreign Labor Certifications, 1989 Annual Report: La-
bor Cerifications for Temporary Foreign Agricultural Workers (H-2A Pro-
gram), 17 (June 1990) (Hereinafter 1989 Annual Labor Certification
Report).
The number of workers admitted through the H-2 program
initially increased to 35,871 in 1965, from which height it fell to
13,323 in 1968, rose to 17,474 in 1970, and fell back to 12,526 in
1972. The initial and substantial rise in H-2 admissions in 1965 is
almost certainly a result of the necessity to phase down (rather
than immediately terminate) the Bracero growers' reliance on
Mexican labor. If the number of Mexican admissions is subtracted
from the total number of H-2 admissions, total H-2 admissions
fell from 22,286 in 1964 to 15,587 in 1965. Id.
51. One political price of Wirtz's persistence in strengthening
the regulations and scaling back utilization of the H-2 program
had been leaving the two largest H-2 users-Florida sugar and
East Coast apple growers-alone. It would not be surprising if
Wirtz's persistence in this regard also had depleted his political
capital to the extent that he was unable to adopt a more stringent
adverse effect wage formula in 1968. Semler, supra note 6, at 196-
97.
52. Regulations updating AEWRs and other charges (e.g. for
meals and transportation) were published periodically. See, e.g.,
32 Fed. Reg. 4569-71 (March 1967) , 34 Fed. Reg. 17770 (11/4/
69), 35 Fed. Reg. 12393-4 (8/4/70), 36 Fed. Reg. 13140 (7/15/
71), 37 Fed. Reg. 18725 (9/15/72), 38 Fed. Reg. 21920 (8/14/
73), 39 Fed. Reg. 29918 (8/19/74).
In addition, there were two developments regarding the
AEWRs during this time, but neither represented a substantive
change or signaled a change in policy. First, until November
1969, DOL had published AEWRs only for those states where
H-2s were employed. In 1969 Secretary of Labor George Shultz
published AEWRs for each of the 48 contiguous states. 34 Fed.
Reg. 17770 (11/4/69). The noteworthy point is that, in setting the
AEWRs for the new states, DOL followed the same methodologi-
cal path that had been followed in arriving at the AEWRs for the"old" states (i.e. those already employing H-2 workers)-i.e.,
DOL began with the higher of the state's and the nationwide aver-
age farm wage for 1950, increased that figure first by the 1950-
1962 growth in the manufacturing wage, second by the growth in
the national average agricultural wage from 1963-1965, and fi-
nally, following the standard methodology adopted in 1968, in-
dexed it to the increase in the average state agricultural wage in
the two previous years. Thus, the enhancement over the average
agricultural wage yielded in most user states as a result of this
method was applied to all states-not just those to those then em-
ploying H-2 workers.
Second, in 1974 USDA began to phase out surveying and
calculating annual state average hourly farm wage rates, to which
states' AEWRs were pegged. Instead, USDA began to survey and
calculate quarterly rates, categorized by method of pay (per hour,
by the piece, and cash only) and type of work performed (field and
livestock, packinghouse, machine operators, etc.) This forced
DOL to select a different data base to which AEWRs could be in-
dexed in future years. DOL selected movements in the average
national farm wage for Field and Livestock workers, as calculated
by the USDA, which, it asserted, was the USDA category which
most closely resembled the work for which growers sought H-2
workers. Whether or not field and livestock workers is the most
appropriate USDA category is a disputed issue-one which has
gained particular importance in recent years and is discussed be-
low. But, because DOL only used the relative changes in the
USDA-determined wage in adjusting the AEWRs from year to
year-the absolute level of the average earnings measured by
12
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may explain the absence of regulatory activity during
these years or perhaps, once the details of the regula-
tory program had been hammered out to a significant
degree, time was needed before a meaningful evaluation
could be made. Or perhaps the H-2 revisions proposed
in 1977 were part of the general overhaul of the U.S.
Employment Service executed in response to a class ac-
tion suit brought on behalf of migrant farmworkers,
which had revealed a wide range of discriminatory and
unlawful practices on the part of the U.S. Employment
Service in administering farm labor services in gen-
eral. 53 In any case, no major review of the regulations
occurred until the end of the Ford Administration,
when, in January 1977,just as the Carter Administration
was assuming office, the Department of Labor proposed
substantial revisions to the H-2 code. This development
will be discussed after examining how federal courts
handled cases brought under the H-2 regulations in the
1970s.
III. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE IN THE 1970s
Decisions of the federal courts offer one of the few
"official," if not scientific, records of the Department of
Labor's administration of the H-2A program. Thejudi-
cial record indicates that growers did not always have an
easy time securing DOL's approval of foreign worker
certification. The court decisions of the 1970s also pro-
vide some insight into the framing of the legal issues
that have crystallized during the Reagan-Bush years.
The U.S. Department of Labor's Employment Ser-
vice has never been noted for its effective or enthusiastic
administration of farmworker services in general.
54
Nonetheless, during the 1970s, DOL seems to have ad-
ministered the H-2 certification process fairly compe-
USDA was irrelevant at this point-and the relative movement in
the old versus new USDA wage rates were comparable, this
change did not substantively affect the AEWRs calculated by
DOL. 41 Fed. Reg. 25017, 25018 (6/22/76) (proposed rule); 41
Fed. Reg. 35169 (8/20/76)(final rule).
Some farmworker advocates, it also should be noted, ar-
gued that the new USDA survey method resulted in lower average
hourly earnings for most states. Again, because DOL utilized only
the relative movement in the USDA wage, DOL's decision to in-
dex AEWRs to changes in the average national wage for field and
livestock workers did not result in lowering the absolute level of
the AEWRs, although it did result in a greater disparity between
the AEWR and the average wage as reported by USDA, an issue
which also gained importance in future years, when the Reagan
and Bush Administrations began to overhaul the H-2 program,
and is also addressed later in this paper.
53. NAACP v. Brennan, discussed supra at note 12. On the im-
plementation of the consent decree pursuant to the NAACP litiga-
tion, see Altman, "Implementing A Civil Rights Injunction: A
Case Study of NAACP v. Brennan," 78 Colum. L. Rev. 739 (1978).
54. See Goldfarb, supra at note 12, at 60-113; NAACPv. Brennan,
supra at note 12.
55. Freedom of Information Act Requests filed with DOL,
which would produce thousands of pages of documents (if the
documents have been maintained) at substantial cost, would be.
necessary and have not been done. It also is likely that the
records no longer exist.
56. 1989 Annual Labor Certification Report, supra note 50, at, 1.
57. See, e.g., Migrant Legal Action Program and Farmworker
Justice Fund, H-2.4 Tempormy Foreign Il'orker Program Litigation Van-
tently, in a manner consistent with the policy established
early on by Secretary Wirtz. Certainly granting H-2 cer-
tification requests was not an automatic affair, although
hard data on the absolute or relative numbers of denials
and approvals is not readily available. 55 That the total
number of jobs certified declined steadily during the
1970s (from 21,893 in 1971 to a low of 15,231 in 1976
when the number leveled off for a few years) provides
evidence of this considered approach. The 1980s wit-
nessed a reversal of this trend, with the number of H-2
jobs certified rising steadily throughout the decade-
reaching a high of 26,607 in 1989.56 The shared per-
ception of farmworker advocates seems to be that, for
the most part, DOL administered the program during
the 1970s with the objective of keeping the number of
foreign admissions to a minimum.
5 7
The federal courts gave the Department of Labor's
administration of the H-2 program a lukewarm recep-
tion at best. While the courts upheld DOL's approval of
certification requests in every reported challenge filed
by farmworkers in the 1970s, 58 and while DOL had re-
ceived some initial judicial support against challenges to
its certification authority, the late '70s witnessed the be-
ginning of a sharp decline in the deference that courts
were willing to give to DOL's certification decisions.
DOL won a somewhat backhand victory against
growers' first legal challenge to its regulatory authority
in the spring of 1965. Pursuant to the new December
1964 regulations, DOL had granted Florida celery
growers' initial certification application for H-2 workers.
But when the growers requested an extension of the
certification dates, DOL refused. The Court denied the
growers' appeal on the grounds that the Attorney Gen-
eral, not the Secretary of Labor, had the authority to
grant or deny the workers' admission. 59
ual (Washington, DC: 1989), 19 ("The Carter Administration also
went to great lengths to recruit U.S. workers for H-2 jobs and
limit the use of the program.) On the perceived contrast between
the Carter and Reagan years, see supra Section I.B.
58. See Hernandez Flecha v. Quiros, 567 F.2d 1154 (1st Cir. 1977)
and Galan v. Dunlop, 411 F.Supp. 268 (D.D.C. 1975) (Upholding
Secretary of Labor's certification that Puerto Rican farmworkers
were not available for work within the meaning of the statute);
lWilliams v. User-,, 531 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1976) (Upholding Secre-
tary of Labor's refusal to determine a prevailing piece rate for
sugar cane cutting and to require the employer to file his request
for workers in advance of the date of need, thereby certifying a
shortage of domestic workers without recruitment through the
employment service being activated); United Farmuorkers v.
Kleindeinst, No. 72-1439 (S.D.Fla. 2/26/73), as cited in Semler at n.
19 (UFW union unsuccessfully challenged DOL's decision to cer-
tify Florida sugarcane cutters.)
The only case farmworkers appear to have won involved a
suit filed in 1978 by the Secretary of Labor for the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico for a declaration that the actions of east coast apple
growers violated the legal employment preference granted to do-
mestic over foreign workers. The case the court heard, however,
was not on the merits, but on whether Puerto Rico's Secretary had
standing to sue. The Supreme Court held that he did..-Ired L.
Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico, 102 S.Ct. 3260 (1982), aft'g, 632 F.2d
365 (4th Cir. 1980), rev g, 469 F.Supp. 928 (W.D.Va. 1979).
59. Chase Glades Farms v. ll'irtz, Civil No. 65-86 (M.D. Fla., filed
5/5/65), as cited in Tempormy ll'orker Prog'ams, supra at n. 36, at 66-
67.
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Judicial affirmation of DOL's regulatory authority
continued when, in 1974, the First Circuit reversed a
New Hampshire District Court's decision ordering DOL
to certify the H-2 application of Elton Orchards, one of
a number of New England apple orchards which had
submitted certification requests.60 While granting certi-
fication to the other New England orchards, the Depart-
ment of Labor had refused to certify Elton's request
based on the availability of a group of Louisiana workers
who had been referred to Elton through the interstate
clearance system. Elton Orchards complained that the
Louisiana workers were unskilled, and thought they
should be apportioned between all the growers; DOL's
refusal to deny only Elton Orchard's certification appli-
cation was "arbitrary, capricious, invidiously discrimina-
tory, and a deprivation of property without due
process." 6' The District Court agreed, concluding that
the orchard was "entitled to its fair proportion of the
foreign pickers," and ordered DOL to make an "aliquot
proportion of the foreign pickers" available to it.
62
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the De-
partment's actions were subject only to "rational basis"
review and overturned the lower court's decision. The
First Circuit acknowledged that Elton Orchards' busi-
ness interest in hiring the experienced foreign crews
may be significant, but its job order revealed no skill
prerequisites, and the court found that Elton's prefer-
ence for foreign workers "collides with the mandate of
Congressional policy" and is therefore overridden by it:
To recognize a legal right to use alien workers
upon a showing of business justification would be
to negate the policy which permeates the immigra-
tion statutes, that domestic workers rather than
aliens be employed wherever possible.
63
This position was approved, verbatim, by the Fifth
Circuit in Florida Sugar Cane League, Inc. v. Usety,64 a case
in which the Florida Sugar Cane League had filed suit
challenging the AEWR set by DOL for Florida in 1976.
Until 1974, the legal wage required of Florida sugar
cane growers, who had been hiring roughly 9,000 to
10,000 H-2 workers from the West Indies for the previ-
ous 30 years, had been established by the Secretary of
Agriculture pursuant to the Sugar Act. Since sugar cane
growers were the only 'Florida employers at the time hir-
ing H-2s and since DOL only published AEWRs for H-2
60. Elton Orchards, Inc. v. Brennen, 508 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1974),
revg Civil Action No. 74-276 (D.N.H. 1974).
61. Id. at 496.
62. Elton Orchards, Civil Action No. 74-276, at 5.
63. Elton Orchards, 508 F.2d at 500.
64. Florida Sugar Cane League, Inc. v. sery, 531 F.2d 299 (5th Cir.
1976).
65. Id.
66. See also .-lfred L. Snapp & Sons, nc.zi. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S.
592, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 3263, 73 L.Ed. 995 (1982) ("The obvious
point of this somewhat complicated regulatory framework is to
provide two assurances to United States w'orkers ... [that they] are
given job preference over foreign workers... [and that] the work-
ing conditions of domestic employees are not to be adversely af-
fected...") (emphasis added).
user states, DOL did not make annual AEWR determi-
nations for Florida. However, the Sugar Act expired in
1974, leaving DOL with the responsibility to set an ad-
verse effect wage rate applicable to the sugar growers.
For the 1975-76 season (the first following the Sugar
Act's expiration), DOL set the Florida AEWR at the
level established by the Secretary of Agriculture under
the Sugar Act for 1974. This rate significantly exceeded
the rate DOL would have arrived at had it employed the
USDA indexing formula used to calculate the AEWR in
every other user state. The growers demanded that the
USDA-indexing approach be used, arguing that to util-
ize another method was an abuse of discretion, beyond
the Department's authority. The Fifth Circuit dis-
agreed, finding the Secretary well within the bounds of
his regulatory authority.
65
For the Department of Labor, Elton Orchards and
Florida Sugar Cane League represented significant victo-
ries in bolstering its regulatory authority and its ability
to limit expansion of the H-2 program, even in the face
of compelling business interests. For domestic
farmworkers, Elton Orchards represented strong judicial
endorsement both of DOL's interpretation of its statu-
tory mandate to give their wages, working conditions,
and employment interests non-negotiable priority over
growers' business interests and of its policy that the em-
ployment-preference and adverse-effect guarantees pro-
vided by the statute are absolute minimums, which
neither DOL nor courts can waive, however desperate
or compelling an employer's needs may seem. 66
Following Elton Orchards and Florida Sugar Cane
League, however, judicial deference to DOL's adminis-
tration of the H-2 program dropped. Michael Semler
has argued that a number of courts showed "surpris-
ingly little regard for the purpose of the H-2 program,
DOL's labor market expertise, or even the normal limits
ofjudicial review" in hearing such grower-initiated H-2
certification appeals. 67 Indeed, a few judges demon-
strated remarkably open disdain for the agency.
68
At least three district courts overturned DOL deci-
sions to deny certification to H-2 growers in the late
1970s. Two of these cases involved the question of
whether or not H-2 growers would have to provide ad-
vanced transportation costs to domestic recruits. 69 In
Patterson Orchard v. Marshall DOL had refused to ap-
prove Patterson's clearance order for interstate recruit-
ment because it did not offer advanced transportation
67. -Semler, supra note 6, at 222.
68. A District Court judge in Colorado, for example, remarked
that he had "already heard enough evidence ... to know that what
the regulations say and what the [DOL Secretary and Regional
Administrator] claim the regulations say may be two entirely dif-
ferent matters." W1estern Colorado Fruit Grou'ers Ass "n v. Varshall, 473
F.Supp. 693 (D. Colo. 1979).
69. This is a critical issue for migrant farmworkers, very few of
whom are likely to have sufficient resources to pay their own trans-
portation costs before receiving their first pay checks:
farmworkers not attached to a crewleader (or wanting to leave the
crewleader for any reason) have no other way of travelling to the
next job.
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costs. DOL determined that providing advanced trans-
portation costs was the prevailing practice in Vermont,
where the grower was located. Since Patterson had ap-
plied for H-2 certification, an interstate job clearance
order offering at least the terms and conditions of em-
ployment prevailing in the region had to be circulated
throughout the clearance system. Because the clearance
order did not offer all such terms, DOL refused to ac-
cept it, thereby preventing Patterson's H-2 certification
application from being processed. The Vermont district
court found that DOL had abused its discretion "in rig-
idly interpreting the transportation provision with the
harvest season rapidly approaching," and ordered DOL
to accept Patterson's job clearance order.
70
In Frederick County Fruit Growers' Association v. Mar-
shall, the second case involving the advance transporta-
tion issue, a number of apple growers' clearance orders
had been rejected as not containing the minimum terms
and conditions required of H-2 growers. The Virginia
court found DOL's interpretation to be "inconsistent
with the plain meaning of the regulation" and ordered
that the job orders be accepted.
7'
A third case, in which the court reversed a certifi-
cation denial, involved onion, melon, pepper, and cot-
ton growers in Presidio Valley, Texas. These growers
sought H-2 certification for the first time in 1977. Be-
cause they refused to offer domestic workers the mini-
mum wage and housing required by the H-2
regulations, DOL did not certify that a shortage of U.S.
labor existed. Nonetheless, INS, which had control of
actually granting the visas, approved the growers' re-
quests for temporary foreign workers. The Presidio
Valley growers sought H-2 certification again in 1978.
Again DOL found their offers deficient and refused to
certify that a domestic labor shortage existed, and this
time the INS denied the visas. The growers petitioned
the district court, and received a preliminary injunction
enjoining both DOL and INS from denying H-2 certifi-
cation and visas. 72 The agency's appeal was dismissed
two years later as moot. 7
3
These cases show that DOL was certainly not con-
trolled by growers' interests in its administration. of the
H-2 program.7 4 Of course, these cases also do not re-
flect a consistently pro-farmworker H-2 operation, nor a
uniformly anti-grower one, as the continued existence
of 15,000 plus certifications annually attest. And, as
Semler suggests, the cases do suggest an unusual judi-
cial disregard for the Department of Labor's sphere of
discretion.
The cases also suggest the ease with which judges
can identify and understand the seemingly urgent eco-
nomic constraints of growers and the difficulty they have
in recognizing the equally high interests of farmworkers
at stake. The Frederick County court, for example, had
emphasized the "irreparable harm" faced by the grow-
ers in the event DOL's denial of certification were not
overturned. 7 5 Similarly, in Patterson Orchard, the District
Court in Vermont placed its finding of an abuse of dis-
cretion in the context of the "rapidly approaching" har-
vest season and the injustice which would befall the
growers given the late date of DOL's certification
denial.
76
However, the financial impact of a labor shortage
depends on a multitude of economic issues, and the
problem with courts' automatic deference to the ur-
gency and dire nature of growers' pleas is particularly
problematic when, as is generally the case, "[r]ather
than delving into these [economic] issues, the. courts
have accepted the employer's financial claims at face
value." 
7 7
In contrast to the ease with which judges seem to
comprehend growers' pleas, the judiciary has been rela-
tively unresponsive to the immediate and substantial
harm caused farmworkers-loss of employment oppor-
tunities, depressed wages, and lowered working and liv-
ing conditions-when H-2 certification denials are
overturned. 78 The court seldom explicitly minimized,
or indicated its indifference to, farmworkers' interests.
Rather, farmworker interests are notably absent from
many of the courts' decisions.
79
A relatively explicit example of one judges per-
spective is found in the District Court opinion in Alfred
Snapp & Son. In Snapp, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico sought a declaration on behalf of 2,318 Puerto Ri-
can workers that east coast apple growers were violating
the Immigration and Nationality Act in recruiting and
employing H-2 workers while rejecting Puerto Rican
workers, who are considered domestic under the H-2
program. The issue presented to the court was whether
the Commonwealth had standing to bring this chal-
lenge. Despite the denial of employment to over. 2,000
potentially capable Puerto Rican workers, the court de-
nied the Commonwealth standing to sue, finding that,
"[i]n sheer numbers alone, it is clear that relatively few
70. Patterson Orchard v. Marshall, Civil Action No. 77-147, at 6
(D.Vt. 1977).
71. Frederick Cty. Fruit Growers Ass 'n v. Marshall, 436 F.Supp. 218,
225 (W.D.Va. 1977).
72. Presidio V'allev Farmers' Ass'n v. Marshall, No. EP-78-CA-95
(W.D. Tex. 5/26/78).
73. Presidio I'allev Farmers' .-ss'n v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 294 (5th
Cir. 1980).
74. One additional case, which did not entail the court's deci-
sion on the growers' certification appeal but involved several
counterclaims DOL had filed, also described a situation in which
DOL refused to approve the job clearance orders of growers' ap-
plying for H-2 workers and to certify a labor shortage. ll'estern
Colorado Fruit Growers Ass'n v. Marshall, 473 F.Supp. 693 (D. Colo.
1979).
75. Frederick CountY, 436 F.Supp. at 225.
76. Patterson Orchard, Civil Action No. 77-147, at 6. See also
Galan, 411 F.Supp. at 271, 272 (citing the "immediate and irrepa-
rable injury" threatening growers and the "public interest" in
avoiding lost crops and possible bankruptcy of growers); Snapp &
Son, 469 F.Supp. at 929 (noting "the very real danger that certain
... apples would overripen on the trees, thereby greatly dininish-
ing their commercial value.")
77. Semler at 223.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Frederick County, Patterson Orchard, Galan, and Her-
tiadez Flecha, supra.
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residents of Puerto Rico were harmed directly."""
The courts' lack of deference to DOL's administra-
tion and enforcement efforts has been important in
shaping the H-2 program. If the courts deferred to
DOL's market and regulatory expertise in administering
the H-2 program, growers whose certification requests
were denied would be forced to exert gre~ter recruit-
ment effort, offer the minimum terms DOL has re-
quired, and/or offer other improvements in wages and
working conditions. Responsibility for the irreparable
harm resulting from growers' failure to obtain a suffi-
cient work force would not fall on the Department of
Labor but on the grower's incompetence, poor business
judgment, or simple inability to meet the competition.
It is true that once the harvest season is underway,
growers face a heavy time pressure to harvest their
crops before they perish. But while growers may face
unusual emergency situations in some years, as a gen-
eral rule, there is nothing unexpected about the time
pressures involved from year to year; moreover, most
growers who employ H-2 workers do not do so to meet
emergencies, but hire them every season. Many non-
H-2 growers who do not employ H-2 workers face the
same time and market pressures to obtain an adequate
work force. This is simply one factor in the competitive
market that growers face.
The Immigration and Nationality Act cannot be
read to instruct, let alone to compel, the Department of
Labor to save incompetent or uncompetitive growers;
nor can IRCA be so read. Correspondingly, in the
1970s, DOL had interpreted its mandate to protect
farmworkers from the depressive effects of importing
foreign workers, not to protect growers from the mar-
ket. Implicit in this position is the view that domestic
farmworkers have little to gain where growers' eco-
nomic viability is saved by their ability to hire foreign
workers; on the other hand, farmworkers do stand to
benefit when a certification denial forces a grower to en-
hance recruitment efforts and/or improve working con-
ditions to meet the minimum standards imposed by
DOL before any foreign workers can be hired. In any
event, throughout the 1960s and 1970s DOL did not
consider its role to include protecting growers from the
market or from errors in business judgment, such as in-
sufficient domestic recruitment efforts or failure to pro-
vide transportation advances.
A second important development rooted in the ju-
dicial decisions of the 1970s, which has persisted
through the present, was the introduction of "balance"
into the analytic framework used to evaluate H-2 certifi-
cation determinations. Courts have relied on the con-
cept of balance in decisions upholding DOL's discretion
and authority, as well as in those invalidating it.
Implicit in DOL's policy in the 1960s and 1970s
was the decision not to strike its own balance between
the grower interests inherently acknowledged by the
statute and the farmworker interests it affirmatively
sought to protect. Some courts, however, took a differ-
ent view of the balance struck by the statute and DOL's
role in enforcing it. In 1977 the Third Circuit suggested
that the statutory purpose to "strike a balance between
the two [competing] goals" of the regulatory program
"to assure [employers] an adequate labor force on the
one hand and to protect the jobs of citizens on the
other" required DOL to weigh the former in its certifi-
cation decisions. 8 1 Flecha Hernandez affirmed this view,
stating the purpose of the statute and regulations was "to
provide a manageable scheme ... that is fair to both
sides."'8 2 Integral to this development, several courts
have added the "public interest" in growers' solvency
and in preventing lost crops as a factor to be weighed in
the balance sought. The District Court in Frederick
County invoked a public consumer interest in the price of
apples; the Court in Galan similarly raised the public in-
terest in avoiding substantial crop loss and possible
bankruptcy of the grower.
83
It is clear that some balance is inevitably struck, ex-
plicitly or implicitly, in DOL's administration of the reg-
ulatory program. The courts are not wrong to point out
that the statute does envision competing interests and
finding a balance between them. However, DOL had
understood this balance as forbidding the hiring of for-
eign workers when certain minimal standards were vio-
lated. In other words, DOL, through specific guidelines
and criteria described in the H-2 regulations, placed an
absolute "adverse effect" floor beneath farmworkers;
below this floor, growers' interests could not outweigh
farmworkers', no matter how devastating the market
80. Snapp & Son, 469 F.Supp. at 934. In holding that the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico did not have standing, the District
Court applied a standard that "a state may bring suit to protect
the public interest so long as that interest is not so vague and re-
mote as to appear ethereal," id. at 932, and noted that "the magni-
tude of the harm which is caused or threatened" must be
considered. Id. at 933. To justify its standing, the Commonwealth
had asserted "seriously high levels of unemployment" (18.5% of
all Puerto Rican adults in the labor market, reaching 23% in rural
areas, during the season at issue), lost tax revenues, and an inter-
est in the proper application of federal laws mandating a prefer-
ence for Puerto Rican over foreign workers, particularly in light of
the high unemployment rate. Id. at 932. The District Court based
its decision on the fact that the actual number of Puerto Rican
workers affected by the growers' actions was so small compared to
the total Puerto Rican population of 2,712,033 as to render the
harm suffered too small to justify granting standing to the Com-
monwealth. Id. at 934. It may be that the harm suffered by the
2,318 Puerto Rican workers not hired (as well as the potential
harm to future workers who would be likely to suffer the same
harm in subsequent years if the growers' behavior was not
stopped)-most critically their loss of employment-was insuffi-
cient to satisfy the standard for standing; but the Court did not
evaluate the degree or relative significance of this harm. In con-
trast the Court of Appeals, to its credit, while "not passling] on
the merits" of the suit did recognize the "irreparable harm to ft-
ture workers and to citizens in Puerto Rico" alleged and found it
sufficient to grant standing. Snapp, 632 F.2d at 370, afd, 102
S.Ct. 3260.
81. Rogers v. Larson, 563 F.2d 617, 626 (3d Cir. 1977) (Invalidat-
ing Virgin Island statutes found to conflict with the Immigration
and Nationality Act.)
82. Flecha Hernande:, 567 F.2d at 1156.
83. Frederick County, 436 F.Supp. at 225; Galan v. Dunlop, 411
F.Supp. at 272.
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forces or compelling the business interests may have
seemed. The courts in the aforementioned cases at-
tempted to elevate the growers' interests and to pre-
clude DOL from implementing its interpretation of the
proper balance required.
IV. THE CARTER REVISIONS
84
A. BACKGROUND
In the late 1970s, the Department of Labor pro-
posed new regulations for the H-2 program. The pro-
posed revisions, which appeared in the Federal Register
in January 1977, explained that "[i]n the long run, nor-
mal adjustments in wages and working conditions
should bring sufficient United States workers to an oc-
cupation," and suggested a number of substantive revi-
sions to the regulatory program. These revisions held
out the possibility of reinvigorated administrative at-
tempts to reduce the utilization of temporary foreign
contract workers and to alleviate the H-2 program's del-
eterious impact on U.S. farmworkers. This promise,
however, never materialized.
The changes proposed included the establishment
of adverse effect piece rates; submission of recruitment
plans designed to reduce repeat employer-applicants'
dependence on foreign workers; denial of certification
to any employer who had employed undocumented
workers, violated an employment contract with any U.S.
or foreign worker, or failed to comply with any applica-
ble Federal, State or local employment-related laws dur-
ing the previous year; mandatory hiring of domestic
workers who became available through the first half of
the H-2 contract period; free family housing; compensa-
tion for commuting time exceeding thirty minutes each
way; an increase in the percentage of days for which em-
ployers must guarantee work; and offering terms and
conditions of employment at least as favorable as those
offered foreign workers in both the upcoming and previ-
ous seasons.
8 5
The final rule, published in March 1978, affirmed
the policy tenor of the 1977 proposal. In the "Back-
ground" section to the final promulgation, for example,
DOL explained that the employer bears the burden of
proving "that the wages and/or working conditions ...
offered will not adversely affect the wages and working
conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers" and that
the Department would deny certification whenever the
employer had not met that burden.8 6 And while the fi-
nal rule declined to establish adverse effect piece rates,
DOL did adopt an alternative piece rate provision re-
quiring that piece rates keep pace with increases in the
hourly adverse effect wage rate.8 7 This provided critical
protection against H-2 growers' circumventing AEWR
increases through escalating productivity requirements
in lieu of augmenting piece rates.
However, DOL did not adopt many of the other
specific provisions proposed in 1977. In fact, DOL re-
tained only two of the modifications: H-2 employers
would have to hire domestic workers through the first
half of the contract period and would have to offer do-
mestic workers terms and conditions of employment at
least as favorable as those offered to foreign workers in
the previous and the upcoming seasons. Prior regula-
tions only required parity between the terms and condi-
tions of employment offered during the upcoming
season and were silent on the question of how long H-2
growers had to keep positions open for domestic .work-
ers. It seems probable that most growers ceased hiring
domestic workers as soon as certification was granted,
or, at the latest, when the foreign workers had arrived.
In perhaps the most significant setback for
farmworkers, DOL overhauled, and weakened, the af-
firmative recruitment provisions. Henceforth, the only
specific independent effort required of H-2 growers
would be to place two advertisements in local newspa-
pers of general circulation. The primary H-2 recruit-
ment effort required of growers would be to cooperate
with the employment service system. Additionally, the
new regulations required that employers make the
"same kind and degree of efforts to secure U.S., work-
ers" as to secure foreign workers and perform "other
specific recruitment activities specified" by the Regional
Administrator.8 8 These provisions, it turned out,
proved to have little impact on actual recruitment effort
undertaken by H-2 growers.
As noted above, the national Employment Service
system was under harsh fire from farmworker represent-
atives and the federal court in NAACP v. Brennan.89 And
84. The period I have labelled the "Carter Revisions" actually
began with the end of the Ford Administration. This is basically
for convenience, since much of the debate around these proposals
and the changes ultimately adopted occurred during Carter's
Administration. There is no indication that DOL's position on its
H-2 regulatory role varied significantly between the Johnson,
Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations; indeed, its enforcement
activity throughout the 1970s suggests that the Department
maintained essentially the same philosophy. Grouping the
proposed changes initiated during the Ford Administration thus
poses no analytic difficulties for the purposes of this paper.
85. 42 Fed. Reg. 4670-4673 (1/25/77).
86. In support of this position, the Department of Labor
pointed to § 291 of the INA, which places the burden of proof on
the person requesting a visa or other entry document that s/he is
eligible to receive such visa or document. 43 Fed. Reg. 10306 (3/
10/78). DOL's discussion of the burden of proof appeared not in
the new regulation itself, but as part of the "Supplementary Infor-
mation" published to explain the foundation and purpose of the
H-2 Program and the regulatory changes being adopted. As such,
it is not part of DOL's "official" regulatory policy, but is more akin
to a committee report accompanying:a newly-enacted piece of
legislation.
87. 43 Fed. Reg. at 10317 (§ 655.207(c)).
88. Id. at 10316.
89. Supra note 12. A 1971 farmworker complaint filed with the
Department of Labor argued that the Farm Labor Service of
DOL's U.S. Employment Service (replaced later by the Rural
Manpower Administration), "though created to assist farmwork-
ers in finding jobs . . . had become grower dominated, grower
oriented, grower staffed, and totally perverted." Goldfarb,,4 Caste
of Despair, at 63. The complaint detailed "countless specific
abuses, indifferences, discourtesies and discriminations to which
farm workers were subjected ... all over the United States by the
very officials who were paid to provide them with services," and
alleged that Service employees routinely violated farmworkers'
civil rights, referred them to jobs with deplorable conditions, and
.were more interested in: gathering statistics to justify their jobs
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while it is true that DOL was in the process of overhaul-
ing the Service in response to the class action litigation
and its' own in-house review, the potential for meaning-
ful reform was far from certain at the time the final regu-
lations were promulgated in 1978. The Department's
apparent bad faith during NAACP v. Brennan, to give one
small example, had prompted the District Court Judge
overseeing the case to demand that DOL officials ex-
plain why he should not hold them in violation of the
consent decree. 90 In this context, enhanced, indeed pri-
mary, reliance on the interstate clearance system to lo-
cate domestic farmworkers available to fill H-2 growers'
labor demands was troubling indeed.
Finally, in an ominous precursor to the revamping
of the regulatory apparatus in the 1980s, DOL itself be-
gan to incorporate the Larson, Hernandez, Galan, and
Frederick County courts' articulation of the proper balance
between employers' and workers' interests9 into the
regulatory framework, explaining several of the dele-
tions from, and changes to, the January 1977 proposal
as an effbrt to strike this different balance. 92 While this
kind of balance was discussed in a number of judicial
rulings, the March 1978 promulgation was the first time
that DOL explicitly incorporated growers' interests into
its H-2 regulatory purview.
B. PROPOSED REVISIONS OF THE AEWR REGULATIONS
In October 1979 the Department of Labor initi-
ated proceedings to re-examine the methodology used
to calculate annual changes in the adverse effect wage
rates. In adopting a new methodology in January 1981,
the Department of Labor reaffirmed its position "that
the current AEWR methodology ha[d] not successfully
achieved the purpose of preventing wage deflation of
similarly employed U.S. workers." Rather, the current
AEWRs were "substantially below prevailing wages and
sometimes even below the Fair Labor Standards Act
than in serving farmworkers. Id. at 63-64. The complaint referred
to a DOL in-house report which itself disclosed the "perversions
of the foreign labor certification process," violations of Social Se-
curity, minimum wage, Crew Leader Registration, and immigra-
tion laws, as well as various sex and age discriminations. Id. at 64-
66.
Finding DOL's response to its complaint unsatisfactory,
farmworkers took their case to the District Court, which issued a
memorandum opinion finding that rural employment agencies (af-
filiated with the U.S. Farm Labor Service) had discriminated
against farmworkers on the basis of race, sex, age, and national
origin; provided them with substandard facilities and services;
processed improper job orders; referred workers to employers
who violated minimum wage, child labor, Social Security, housing,
and health laws; condoned illegal crew leaders; failed to assist in
INS enforcement; and were generally unresponsive to
farmworkers' complaints. Id. at 67-68. The litigation which en-
sued, until a settlement was finally reached in 1980, reveals that
farmworkers did not perceive substantial improvement in the Ser-
vice's record during the course of the decade. See generally id.
chapter 5.
90. Id. at 109.
91. See supra Section III.
92. For example, DOL stated that requiring free family housing
for all workers would be "costly to many employers" and con-
cluded that in this instance "the costs outweigh the benefits." 43
Fed. Reg. at 10308. Requiring employers to hire U.S. workers
minimum." In particular, DOL found that the AEWRs
in states "using H-2 alien farmworkers [were] generally
well below those not using such workers;" that
"[fr]elative growth rates in wages were also lower in
States using H-2 alien farmworkers; and that "[pliece
rates in areas which heavily use H-2 alien farmworkers
had remained unchanged for long periods and actually
declined substantially in real terms." The problem was
that the AEWRs "were based neither on prevailing wage
levels nor on relevant labor markets," but were pegged
to initial state base rates (set in 1968) that themselves
had been depressed.
93
Of the five methodologies that DOL had consid-
ered adopting, 94 the formula selected was amongst
those most favorable to farmworkers. That method
would have established a single national AEWR based
on the average hourly earnings of piece rate workers in
the previous year. 95 DOL cited two primary reasons for
adopting this method. First, tying the AEWR to earn-
ings of piece-rate workers more accurately reflected the
relevant labor market, since H-2 workers generally work
in jobs which pay by the piece. Moreover, since piece
rate workers consistently have earned more than hourly
workers, DOL found that linking the wage floor to piece
workers' earnings was "essential" to prevent wage de-
pression. Second, the migrant farm labor market is na-
tional in scope. A national minimum AEWR both
reflects the interstate fluidity of migrant workers and di-
lutes the wage depression occurring in particular H-2
user states and areas.
9 6
C. DOL's FINAL RULE ON AEWR CALCULATIONS
DOL promulgated the final methodology on Janu-
ary 16, 1981, days before the Carter Administration left
office. While unquestionably holding out significant
wage improvements for farmworkers, the new regula-
tions also reflected the gradual elevation of "balance"
through the first half of the contract period, but only requiring
that they actively recruit such workers until the H-2s have departed
for thejobsite struck "a reasonable middle course." d. at 10308-
10309.
93. 46 Fed. Reg. 4568, 4569 (1/16/81) (final rule). See also, 45
Fed. Reg. 15914, 15915 (3/11/80) (proposed rule).
94. Five alternatives were suggested for study: (1) A single na-
tional AEWR based on the average hourly earnings of piece rate
farmworkers and the relationship between increases in the earn-
.ings of piece rate and private, non-farm production workers; (2)
National AEWRs by crop activity; (3) Statewide AEWRs, based on
the federal minimum wage, adjusted by the greater of the annual
percentage change in the national and state farm wage for field
workers; (4) A single national AEWR set at 25% above the federal
minimum wage; (5) The existing methodology, indexing each
state's AEWR to increases in the average hourly earnings of field
and livestock workers. 44 Fed. Reg. #201 (10/16/79) (regula-
tions for AEWR methodology).
95. However, the Reagan administration moved to rescind the
new regulations immediately after assuming office, so that the new
methodology was never implemented. See iufra Section V.
96. On the national labor market issue see supra Section I.C;
also see 46 Fed. Reg. at 4571, 4576 (1/16/81) and 45 Fed. Reg. at
15917 (3/11/80). On use of average piece-rate earnings, see 46
Fed. Reg. at 4578-79 (1/16/81) and 45 Fed. Reg. at 15917 (3/11/
80).
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into DOL's interpretation and implementation of its
statutory mandate. DOL explained that its goal was to
"provide a manageable scheme . . .that is fair to both
sides" and "to balance the goals of supplying an ade-
quate labor force and protecting the jobs of citizens."
9 7
A "compromise" paradigm for H-2 regulation and ad-
ministration had begun to emerge.
With regard to agricultural wages, the final rule
was a modified version of an even stronger proposed
rule published the previous March 1980. That proposal
would have attempted to project the average piece-rate
earnings for the upcoming year by adjusting this figure
by the average annual growth in private, non-farm pro-
duction workers' earnings over the previous five years.
In addition to correcting for the year-long time lag be-
tween the AEWR and the actual average earnings on
which it was based, DOL explained that the proposed
methodology
• ..recognizes the fact that earnings in the farm
and nonfarm sectors are not independent of each
other. That is, depending on the movement of rel-
ative wages, workers move from one sector to an-
other... [A]bsent distortions that would be caused
by the importation of foreign labor, DOL would
expect a close statistical relationship (though not
necessarily a one-to-one) between the earnings of
farm and nonfarm workers. 98
However, again reflective of past judicial decisions and
anticipating future administrative developments, DOL
dropped this adjustment provision from the final rule.
It also adopted a three-year time period to phase in the
new AEWR formula. These modifications would render
a formula which "would be easy to understand" and
would "reduce substantially the cost impact" on growers. 9 9
DOL's concern with the financial impact on grow-
ers appears perfectly reasonable. It can even be argued,
at least theoretically, that consideration of the impact on
growers strengthens the overall protection. afforded
workers, since the existence of farmworkers' jobs pre-
supposes the agricultural industry's economic viability;
however, the data on this question and the net impact of
foreign workers remain open.) ° For the regulatory
program, however, the critical question is what does a
"compromise" or "balanced paradigm" mean for the
protection of wages and working conditions for
farmworkers "similarly employed" to H-2s, i.e. those in
the narrow setor of the labor market in which the for-
eign workers are found? It seems fairly certain that
these workers will be worse off if the regulations weigh
the minimum wages and conditions to be required
against their cost to H-2 growers.
This debate is similar to that surrounding any pro-
tective legislation or regulatory program. Minimum
wage laws, health and safety codes, and environmental
standards, for example, all cost money and therefore
carry the potential to raise industry's costs and limit em-
ployment opportunities in the effected industries; set-
ting such floors also bears potential costs to the public
at large, in higher prices, for example, as the Frederick
County court had argued would ensue if apple growers
were denied H-2 workers. Nonetheless, minimum ac-
ceptable standards in these areas have been set-stan-
dards below which cost-benefit and efficiency analysis is
not germane.
This paper has argued that, for almost three de-
cades, the H-2 regulations and DOL's implementation
of them evidenced an interpretation of "adverse effect"
to create such an absolute minimum standard, whic'h, by
definition, cannot be compromised. What is "best" for
workers may be debatable, indeed is hotly debated. But
it seems equally clear that the language and action of
compromise signaled a break with the past. This break
was initiated by the courts, progressed hesitantly with
the new Carter regulations (although farmworker advo-
cates still considered these regulations to represent a
significant net gain for migrant and seasonal
farmworkers), and would become complete during the
Reagan-Bush years.
97. 46 Fed. Reg. at 4569 (l/16/81)'(citation omitted).
98. 45 Fed. Reg. at 15917 (3/11/80).
99. 46 Fed. Reg. at 4571 (1/16/81) (emphasis added). For ex-
ample, had the final rule been in effect during 1980, the increase
in labor costs for the crops employing the largest number of H-2
workers would have been negligible in that year: 0% for apples,
citrus and sugar and less than 1% for tobacco. In contrast, DOL
estimated that the proposed (March 1980) rule would have in-
creased 1980 labor costs by 25.8% in tobacco, 16.2% in apples,
and 19.6% in citrus. 46 Fed. Reg. at 4572 (1/16/81). Below is a
table comparing the AEWRs calculated using the old, March 1980
proposed, andJanuary 1981 final methodologies.
Proposed Final Rule Final Rule
Rule without with Old Methodology*
Phase in Phase in Low Mean High
1980 $4.51 $4.07 $3.67 $3.18 $3.44 $3.79
1981 $4.89 $4.46 $4.23 $3.31 $3.61 $3.93
1982 $5.32 $4.89 $4.80 $3.35 $3.67 $3.98
Source: 46 Fed. Reg. at 4572, 45 Fed. Reg. at 30734 (5/9/80); 47
Fed. Reg. at 37980 (8/27/82), and calculations based on figures
therein.
* As will be explained below, the Reagan Administration moved
quickly to quash the January 1981 methodology, which
consequently never took effect. The "Old Methodology" figures
are the actual AEWRs used during the years in question, and
represent the highest and lowest AEWR applicable in any user
state; the sugar cane rate in Florida is excluded. In each year, the
lowest AEWR was bounded by, i.e. equal to, the federal minimum
wage.
100. For a discussion of the studies done on this question, see
infra Section V.B.2."
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V. THE TEMPORARY FOREIGN WORKER
PROGRAM DURING THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION
Farmworkers never realized the potential wage en-
hancements promised by the AEWR methodology
which was promulgated by the Carter DOL. The new
regulations were to have taken effect February 17, 1981;
but the Reagan Administration moved quickly to quash
them. On February 6, 1981, "in order to allow for a full
and appropriate review" of the pending AEWR method-
ology (which had just emerged from the formal rule-
making process), Reagan's Acting Secretary of Labor
published a notice of deferral of the regulation.' 0 ' On
June 23, 1981 the regulation was formally withdrawn'
0 2
"so that the subject of adverse effect wage rates may be
included in the . . .broader review of [the] policies re-
garding immigration, refugees, and other issues dealing
with the admission of aliens to the United States."'
0 3
The presence of the new Administration was felt
immediately, although it took until July 1989 for the
Reagan H-2A regime to be fully implemented and insti-
tutionalized. For farmworkers, Reagan's inauguration
heralded an administrative assault on their wages-al-
ready among the lowest in the United States-which
proceeded primarily along two lines: (1) the piece rates
which H.-2 growers would be required to offer; (2) the
methodology used to calculate the minimum hourly
AEWRs.
A. PIECE RATE PROVISIONS
Before March 1978, in order to prevent depression
of piece rates, DOL had required that piece rates be
designed to yield (i.e. to enable workers to earn) at least
the AEWR. That March, in response to workers' com-
plaints that growers were increasing productivity re-
quirements instead of augmenting piece rates to keep
pace with the AEWR, the Carter DOL "clarified" its pol-
icy and strengthened the regulations to require, in addi-
tion to the design-to-yield provision, that
[i]n any year in which the applicable [AEWR] is in-
creased, employers shall adjust their piece rates
upward to avoid requiring a worker to increase his
or her productivity over the previous year in order
to earn an amount equal to what the worker would
earn if the worker were paid at the [AEWR].
10 4
In September 1981 DOL, now under the Reagan
Administration, issued General Administrative Letter
46-81 in which it "[re]clarified" the meaning of the
March 1978 provision to require H-2 growers to in-
crease their piece rates only if workers' earnings at the
prior year's rate would fall short of the current year's
AEWR:
In any year in which the applicable wage rate in-
creases to the point where the previous year's ...
piece rate will not enable an average worker[] ...
to earn the new applicable wage rate without re-
quiring the worker to increase his/her productivity
over the previous year . . . [an acceptable ap-
proach is for the employer to adjust the previous
season's piece rate upward to a point where the
employer's average worker in that activity will
make hourly earnings equal to that season's
[AEWR]. i05
In other words, DOL would not require that piece rates
keep pace with the AEWR unless and until the hourly
earnings yielded fell to the actual level of the AEWR-
an interpretation patently inconsistent with the plain
language of the 1978 regulation, still in effect, as well as
with the Department's 1978 explanation accompanying
it.1
0 6
The impact of the Reagan Department's suspect
interpretation of the regulatory provision on productiv-
ity requirements and piece rates was clearly demon-
strated in the West Virginia apple orchards. In 1979
these growers submitted certification applications bas-
ing their piece rates on an expected productivity rate
(90 bushels per day) exceeding that in prior years' appli-
cations (80 bushels per day) by 12.5%. The Carter
DOL refused to certify the applications until the grow-
ers amended them to contain piece rates enabling work-
ers to earn the AEWR based on a productivity of 80
bushels per day. In 1980 and 1981 the growers' applica-
tions offered piece rates consistent with the 80 bushel
per day figure and were approved by DOL. In 1982,
however, the West Virginia growers not only offered a
piece rate which represented a nominal decrease of one
cent per bushel, but also required that workers increase
their productivity in order to earn the AEWR. More-
over, DOL had not published AEWRs for 1982, so the
AEWR used was that applicable for the 1981 season.
The Reagan Department approved the growers'
orders.07
The Department of Labor justified its 1982 ap-
proval by pointing to DOL General Administrative Let-
ter, GAL 46-81. However, farmworkers filed suit
challenging DOL's decision and the judge hearing the
case found that Letter (1) to represent an impermissible
interpretation "directly contrary to the plain meaning"
of the H-2 proportional piece rate provision, and (2)
101. 46 Fed. Reg. 11253 (2/6/81).
102. 46 Fed. Reg. 32437 (6/23/81).
103. 46 Fed. Reg. 32437 (6/23/81).
104. 43 Fed. Reg. at 10309-10, 10317 (3/10/78). This provision
will be referred to as the piece rate proportionality provision.
105. General Administrative Letter No. 46-81, "Procedures for
Reviewing and Processing Applications for Temporary Alien Cer-
tification in Agriculture and Logging" (U.S. Department of Labor:
September 11, 1981), Attachment I, p. 5 (Hereinafter GAL 48-
81).
106. The language of the 1978 provision is clear enough. But in
the introductory notes to the 1978 regulation, DOL also ex-
plained that "in any year in which the adverse effect rate increases,
employers must redesign their piece rates accordingly." 43 Fed.
Reg. at 10310 (3/10/78) (emphasis added).
107. A'ACPv. Donovan, 558 F.Supp. 218 (DDC 1982) (Hereinaf/er
.NAA4CP I).
20
Yale Journal of Law and Liberation, Vol. 3 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjll/vol3/iss1/7
Law and Liberation
"not authoritative" in any case because "for such
agency action to have the force of law there must be ad-
vance notice and public participation." The court en-
joined DOL from granting certification to any grower
not offering a piece rate proportional to the AEWR at
the "standard productivity rate of 80 bushels per day"
established in 1977 (the judge considered the standard
productivity rate to be that existing prior to the 1978
adoption of the piece rate-AEWR proportionality
regulation.) 10s .
Meanwhile, in a related action, Bragg v. Donovan,
migrant farmworkers in Maine, Vermont, and Florida
filed suit to compel DOL to publish AEWRs for
1982.109 The USDA had discontinued its quarterly sur-
vey, upon which the existing methodology pegging
AEWRs to the change in average farm wages had de-
pended, and DOL had taken no action to develop a new
methodology. Bragg was settled with DOL agreeing to
establish AEWRs for the four states implicated in the
case.
But DOL did not establish new AEWRs for 1982
for any other H-2 user states. As a result, farmworkers
filed a third suit, NAACP II, to force DOL to promulgate
revised AEWRs for all states, in order to prevent their
wages from being adversely affected."10 DOL con-
tended that it had no obligation to promulgate annual
AEWRs. The court disagreed, arguing that DOL had
imposed this obligation on itself in the H-2 regulations,
which provided that "the adverse effect ratefor each year
shall be computed by adjusting the prior year's adverse
effect rate.. .,,l "In the past," the court also noted,
"DOL itself has stressed the importance of yearly reas-
sessment of the AEWR . . . [as] necessary 'to reflect
changing labor market conditions,' 12 and it ordered
DOL to publish AEWRs annually until its "obligations
are altered by promulgation of a valid rule."' 13
The Department of Labor, seemingly determined
108. Id. at 222, 226.
109. Bragg v. Donovan, No. 82-2361 (D.D.C. filed August 20,
1982).
110. NAACP v. Donovan, 566 F.Supp. 1202 (D.D.C. 1983) (Here-
inafter AAACP H).
11l. Id. at 1206 (citation omitted, emphasis in opinion).
112. Id. at 1207 (citing 41 Fed. Reg. 25018).
113. Id. at 1210. In its promulgation of four 1982 AEWRs pur-
suant to the Bragg consent decree, DOL had set the rate for one of
the states, West Virginia, significantly lower than the rate yielded
by the AEWR formula then being used; DOL cited "equitable"
considerations, as the 1982 West Virginia rate would have repre-
sented a 17.2% increase over the prior year-"substantially more
than the other three named states." 48 Fed. Reg. 232, 234 (1/4/
83). The court again ruled this a "substantial" and impermissible
"departure from DOL's past practice of uniformly applying its
AER methodology" without "providing a reasoned explanation
for the change." AAACP II at 1205.
114. 48 Fed. Reg. 33684 (7/22/83) (proposed rule); 48 Fed.
Reg. 40168 (9/2/83) (final rule).
115. AAACP v. Donovan, 765 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Herein-
after AAACP III).
116. Id. at 1179, citing 48 Fed. Reg. at 40173 (emphasis in
opinion).
117. Id. at 1185. In a repromulgation of its piece rate rule sev-
eral weeks before the D.C. Circuit Court's A'AACP III decision was
issued, DOI, "elaborated" its reasons behind the rule. While ac-
to enable growers to keep piece rates down, responded
to the NAACP II order in the summer of 1983 by for-
mally amending the regulations to reflect the GAL 46-
81 interpretation (which DOL continued to insist accu-
rately stated the agency's original intent behind the
piece rate proportionality provision).' 1 4 Nearly two
years later, the D.C. Circuit invalidated the new regula-
tion.1 15 The Court noted that DOL's stated policy con-
tinued to be to " 'avoid requiring [piece rate] workers to
increase productivity to earn' the minimum hourly
wage," but that "the amended regulation allows an in-
crease in productivity to substitute for an otherwise
mandatory increase in the piece rate."' 16 The Court
therefore held that, unless and until DOL demonstrated
"by reasoned explanation" that it had considered this
contradiction, the regulation could not stand.''
7
Two years later, DOL emerged with a new piece
rate regulation, in which it proposed to disassociate
piece rates from changes in the AEWRs altogether;
DOL published the proposed and final regulation in
June 1986 and April 1987, respectively. This new rule,
which is now in effect, requires that H-2 growers pay
piece rate workers the rate prevailing for the relevant
crop in the area of intended employment, thus making
the prevailing wage survey the central mechanism to
prevent adverse effect for piece workers for the first
time in the history of the temporary foreign worker pro-
gram. Piece rates' only connection to the AEWR is con-
tained in a new "build up" provision: If, during any pay
period, a particular worker's piece earnings fell below
the amount s/he would have earned at the AEWR (for
the number of hours worked), the employer would be
required to supplement the worker's earnings so that
the AEWR was earned. 118 In other words, each worker
would be guaranteed the AEWR, but DOL would no
longer require the earnings of those workers who picked
faster than necessary to average the adverse effect rate
knowledging that "Generally, when foreign agricultural workers
become dominant in an area, piece rates tend to become artifi-
cially static or depressed, while productivity standards increase,"
DOL explained that it was "not the intent of DOL to impose un-
reasonably high wage standards" on growers. NAACP I and
NAACP 11, it maintained, would have imposed unreasonable
wages, because those decisions "would guarantee to workers
earnings at levels above that determined by DOL as the adverse
effect level. Employers who paid a higher than average piece rate
in 1977 [the year prior to the March 1978 piece rate-AEWR
linkage rule was adopted, which the NAACP court had deter-
mined was the appropriate base year), and whose workers re-
ceived at that time, earnings far above the adverse effect level,
would have been bound to maintain their workers at levels of
earnings above the hourly AEWR required[.]" 50 Fed. Reg.
25705, 25707 (6/21/85). A degree of disingenuousness and de-
ception is also evidenced in theJune 1985 regulation. In support
of its assertion that the court in NAACP I and .\AACP II had inter-
preted the piece rate regulation incorrectly, DOL cited a Fifth Cir-
cuit opinion from 1976 which had found, "Nowhere is there a
requirement that piece rates be in excess of the adverse effect
minimum wage." 50 Fed. Reg. at 25708 (6/21/85), citing ll'illiants
v. Usery, 531 F.2d 305, 308 (5th Cir. 1976). The regulation in
question in NAACP 111, it will be recalled, was adopted in March
1978-two years after the Williants decision was issued.
118. 51 Fed. Reg. 20516 (6/5/86) (proposed rule).
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to increase in proportion to increases in the AEWR; the
earnings of these workers could be eroded until the
AEWR was reached. Meanwhile, each year the slower
workers requiring "build-up" pay generally could be
terminated, as they would not be meeting the productiv-
ity standards prevailing in the area. In essence, growers
could increase productivity requirements in lieu of in-
creasing piece rates to meet the minimum- AEWR guar-
antee until the earnings of the bulk of workers would no
longer exceed the AEWR-precisely the result that
DOL's 1981 General Administrative Letter would have
effected and which the 1978 piece rate provision had
been designed to avoid.
A practical problem for this new rule is the wide-
spread underreporting of hours worked and quantities
of fruits and vegetables picked, a problem which DOL
itself has documented. Wage and hour violations aside,
setting piece rates at the prevailing wage level is particu-
larly problematic for workers in areas with a history of
employing undocumented or H-2 foreign workers,
where wages are most prone to depression. Each
worker, assuming accurate record reporting, would be
guaranteed the AEWR, and at first glance the AEWR
would seem to offer the requisite minimum protection.
But in the past the AEWR had been pegged to in-
creases-not the absolute level of-average earnings of
agricultural workers. If average earnings stagnated due
to the presence of foreign workers, then the AEWR
would have stagnated as well.
Just one month after publishing the proposed
piece rule, DOL itself recognized that piece rates often
are depressed. In rejecting the use of prevailing wage
rates in setting AEWRs, DOL explained:
The use of prevailing wage rates ... [was] rejected
as not being adequate to protect the wages of U.S.
workers. A major problem is that prevailing wage rates
tend to remain static, adversely affected, over a long period
in areas where H-2 workers are employed.' 19
In its introductory comments to the new piece rate rule,
DOL also had noted that it had
determined that similarly employed U.S. workers
have been adversely affected by the employment of
nonimmigrant aliens in agricultural employment.
It has been determined further that employment of
those aliens in a number of States at wages below
specially computed adverse effect wage rates
would adversely affect the wages and working con-
ditions of similarly employed U.S. workers.12t1
It is hard to reconcile these findings and admis-
sions with a decision to place primary reliance for wage
protection on the very (i.e. prevailing) wages which
themselves are depressed. Throughout the history of its
involvement in the program, the Department of Labor
consistently had issued regulations and established
wage minimums "to compensate for past adverse wage
effects."' 2 ' Reconciliation might be found in a decision
to abandon compensating for past depression, which
would amount to a fundamental change in policy. In-
deed, although not yet publicly articulated, DOL was
moving clearly toward a policy of preventing only pro-
spective wage depression.
Farmworkers filed another suit challenging the
new prevailing piece rate rule. Finding the action sub-
ject to a "reasoned explanation" standard of review, the
District Court determined that the Department had not
provided adequate explanation for "seemingly aban-
don[ning] those farmworkers who are paid through the
piece rate and who exceed the AEWR floor." The
Court of Appeals, however, reversed.'
22
DOL argued that the 1978 proportionality rule, as
enforced by the NAACP I court, required grower-by-
grower determination of productivity rates existing
either in 1977 or in the first year a grower utilized the
H-2 program thereafter. According to DOL, this pro-
duced a number of administrative difficulties, inequities
to some growers (due to productivity differences,
weather, and other factors "beyond the control of the
employer"), and posed an obstacle for managerial initia-
tives to improve productivity. 123 Most importantly,
however, DOL asserted that "although one effect of its
prior regulation . . .ha[d] been to enhance piece rates
for all workers each time the AEWR was increased, this
was not more than the incidental result of a policy to
place a [wage] floor under piece-rate workers' earn-
ings."' 2 4 In other words, DOL asserted that it had
never intended to require that piece rates increase un-
less workers' earnings fell below the AEWR; "propor-
tionate increase," it claimed, had only been intended to
ensure a proportionate increase in piece rates when the
hourly earnings produced equalled the minimum
AEWR.
DOL's stance clearly represented a break with past
policy. Nonetheless, given the broad degree of discre-
tion and deference granted administrative agencies, it is
119. 51 Fed. Reg. 24138, 24140 (7/2/86).
120. 52 Fed. Reg. at 11461.
121. AFL-CIO v. Brock, 835 F.2d 912, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (em-
phasis deleted from original). See also, e.g., 50 Fed. Reg. 50311,
50312 (1985) (proposal to enhance AEWR because "[c]ontinued
reliance on the use of undocumented aliens has had a depressing
effect on the wages of similarly employed United States workers")
(emphasis added); 43 Fed. Reg. 10306, 10313 (3/10/78) ("The
Administrator may determine that a wage rate higher than the
prevailing wage rate is the adverse effect rate if the Administrator
determines that the use of aliens has depressed the wages of similarly
employed U.S. workers.") (emphasis added); 41 Fed. Reg. 25017,
25018 (6/22/76) (Secretary of Labor "has constructed . . .
[AEWRs] to reflect and rectify the adverse effect of the importation
of foreign workers.") (emphasis added).
DOL's articulation of its policy to compensate for past wage
depression had been responsive to growers' criticism that the in-
dexing methodology utilized by DOL to adjust the AEWRs annu-
ally imposed a minimum wage requirement on H-2 growers that
was, on average, 20% higher than average agricultural wage in
user states.
122. AFL-CIO v. McLaughlin, 702 F.Supp. 314 (D.D.C. 1988),
rev'd, AFL-CIO v. Dole, 884 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1989).
123. 52 Fed. Reg. 11460, 11465 (4/9/87); 51 Fed. Reg. 20516,
20519-20 (6/5/86) (proposed rule).
124. AFL-CIO v. Dole, 884 F.2d at 601.
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unsurprising that the Court of Appeals reversed the Dis-
trict Court and accepted the Department's explanation
as sufficiently reasoned. After seven years of litigation,
DOL had implemented a new piece rate provision.
B. REDESIGNING THE ADVERSE EFFECT WAGE RATE
The methodology used to calculate the AEWRs
also underwent several metamorphoses before arriving
at its current state. In 1981 the USDA discontinued the
data series to which the AEWR had been pegged since
1968. Consequently, DOL did not publish AEWRs for
1982-leaving the 1981 rates to govern the minimum
hourly guarantee H-2 employers could offert2 5 -until
the court order in NAACP II was issued. Also in re-
sponse to NAACP II, DOL adopted a temporary meth-
odology which pegged changes in the AEWR for each
state to changes in average weekly wages for similarly
employed workers covered by the state's unemployment
insurance program. This formula, which essentially fol-
lowed the 1968 methodology but used the unemploy-
ment data in place of the USDA data, was used for the
1983, 1984, and 1985 AEWRs. 126 Growers filed four
legal challenges to DOL's utilization of this methodol-
ogy, and, although two district courts found for the
growers, four courts of appeals upheld the Depart-
ment's decision as well within the bounds of its discre-
tionary authority. 12 7 Then in 1986, USDA having
resumed its quarterly surveys, DOL returned to pegging
increases in the AEWRs to the USDA data; this time,
however, the AEWRs were indexed to the average farm
earnings of field and livestock workers, not to the earn-
ings of all hired farmworkers.1
2 8
The resumption of the USDA formula proved to
be short lived. In 1986 Congress passed the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act (IRCA), comprehensively
amending the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.
IRCA did not substantively alter the statutory mandate
behind the temporary foreign worker program, how-
ever, and there is no indication in the legislative history
accompanying IRCA that Congress envisioned the pro-
gram undergoing any changes; in essence, IRCA simply
elevated to a statutory level the adverse-effect language
used in the regulations originally promulgated by the
Attorney General pursuant to the INA, and those the
Department of Labor had in turn promulgated pursuant
to the Attorney General's instructions.
1 29
Following IRCA, however, DOL issued compre-
hensive "new" regulations governing the H-2A pro-
gram, pursuant now to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1452, as
amended, rather than to the Attorney General's instruc-
tions.3o The new H-2A guidelines largely paralleled
the then-existing H-2 regulations, although a few signifi-
cant, and some minor, modifications were made. Most
important for the purposes of this paper, DOL took the
opportunity IRCA provided to issue yet another new
AEWR methodology. Published as an "interim final
rule" in June 1987, the new rule established that subse-
quent AEWRs would be set "at a level equal to the previ-
ous year's annual regional average hourly wage rates for
field and livestock workers," rather than being indexed
to the USDA wage.
13
The new methodology effected a substantial re-
duction in the minimum adverse effect wage rate re-
quired of H-2A growers: With the exception of Florida,
the 1987 AEWR for each user state under the new H-2A
proposed methodology would reduce the AEWR as
compared to the existing method by 16% to 24%.132
The AEWRs for non-user states, which DOL proposed
to publish even though they would have no practical im-
pact until some growers in those states applied for H-2A
certification, would not have differed significantly under
the old and new methodologies, although a few would
have been much greater under the old method. In
Georgia, for example, where H-2A workers have just re-
125. 47 Fed. Reg. 37980 (8/27/82) (Continuing 1981 AEWRs
for 1982).
126. 48 Fed. Reg. 40168 (9/2/83); 50 Fed. Reg. 25705 (6/21/
85); 50 Fed. Reg. 33121 (8/16/85).
127. Florida Fruit and Vegetable Ass'n v. Brock, 771 F.2d 1455 (11 th
Cir. 1985); Shoreham Co-op Appple Producers v. Donovan, 764 F.2d
135 (2d. Cir. 1985); Virginia Agr. Growers Ass'n v. Donovan, 774 F.2d
89 (4th 1985), rev'g 597 F.Supp. 45 (W.D.Va. 1984); Production
Farm Management v. Brock, 767 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1985).
128. 51 Fed. Reg. 24138 (7/2/86). The average earnings of field
and livestock workers are generally lower than those of all hired
farmworkers. This became important later when DOL proposed
to set the AEWR at the absolute level of average field and live-
stock earnings. At this point, however, the change from one in-
dexing base to the other did not significantly affect the AEWRs
because the relative growth in each of the two figures (to which the
AEWR is indexed) is approximately the same.
129. See supra Section I.A. On the characterization of the legisla-
tive history, see, e.g., 52 Fed. Reg. 20496, 20502 (6/1/87) ("The
IRCA amendments ... do not change the role and effect of DOL's
policies to protect . . .similarly employed U.S. agricultural work-
ers from... adverse effect."); AFL-CIO v. Brock, 835 F.2d 912, 918
().C. Cir. 1987) ("Congress made absolutely no alteration to the
statutory mandate that underlies AEWRs."); id. at 915 (Congress
"has never paid any attention to the method or policy of calculat-
ing AEWRs. It paid no attention in 1964, and it paid no attention
in 1987... The committee and floor discussion .. .confirms only
Congress' general intent to protect United States workers against
adverse effects from imported labor.")
130. Some commentators have identified IRCA as the critical
turning point in DOL's interpretation, implementation, and en-
forcement of the H-2A program. See, e.g., Overcoming Mootness in the
H-2A Temporary Foreign Farmworker Program, Note, 78 GEORGETOWN
L.J. 197, 203, 207 (1989). This paper suggests that the post-IRCA
changes, at least vis-a-vis the H-2A program, were part and parcel
of a general ideological and programmatic reorientation of the
Reagan Revolution, of which IRCA itself was a part.
131. 52 Fed. Reg. at 20504 (emphasis added).
132. Under the existing methodology, two adverse effect rates
were set for Florida-one for sugar cane workers and the other for
all other crops. Sugar cane workers consistently netted signifi-
cantly higher earnings than farmworkers in other crops, thus the
sugar AEWR was always significantly higher than the general Flor-
ida AEWR. Under the new methodology, only one Florida rate,
including the earnings of both sugar and other farmworkers,
would be calculated. Relative to the general Florida AEWR under
the then-existing methodology, the single Florida rate under the
new method would have increased by 5% in 1987. The enormous
number of sugar cane workers, earning substantially more on av-
erage than other farmworkers, probably accounts for this increase.
The new single AEWR, however, would have been 18% lower
than the rate for sugar cane workers under the existing
methodology.
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cently appeared for the first time, the 1987 AEWR
under the old methodology would have been 59%
higher than that calculated using the proposed method.
1. The Judicial Response to the New AEWR Methodology
Farmworkers predictably responded. to the pro-
posed H-2A regulations by filing suit in the D.C. District
Court, which invalidated the regulations and granted
the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction pending appellate
review.l- 3 The Court of Appeals ultimately reversed
the District Court, finding invalidation of the regulation
inappropriate; the "district court," it believed, "mistak-
enly relied on the familiar notion that Congress is pre-
sumed to be aware of administrative interpretations of a
statute or regulation when it adopts such language in a
statute."' 3 4 Nonetheless, the Court found that DOL's
reversal of a twenty-year policy-a policy which resulted
in minimum wage guarantees consistently above the av-
erage USDA agricultural wage and which had been
based on a consistently asserted recognition that the
presence of foreign workers continued to depress do-
mestic agricultural wages-represented "a significant,
highly redistributive, change in policy" for which the
Department had failed to give reasoned explanation.135
DOL submitted an expanded explanation. to the
District Court in April 1988 and, unsurprisingly, repro-
posed theJune 1987 methodology with an expanded ex-
planation in October 1988.136 In December the District
Court rejected the April explanation as an impermissi-
ble "post-hoc rationalization," which, in any event, did
not constitute a reasoned explanation for the policy re-
versal signaled by the new AEWR methodology. The
court therefore held that the June 1987 interim final
rule was invalid and enjoined its implementation.1
3 7
However, the District Court did not rule on the
October 1988 proposed rule, and the Court of Appeals
granted DOL an indefinite stay of the injunction, pend-
ing appeal. 138 DOL then adopted the October 1988
methodology (the repromulgation of the June 1987
method with an expanded explanation, and on which
the District Court had not ruled) as a final rule in July
1989, thereby setting the AEWRs at the absolute level
of the average regional USDA wage for field and live-
stock workers. Farmworkers filed suit again. And again
the District Court overturned the regulation, finding
that "DOL ha[d] failed in the discharge of its responsi-
bility to, protect this nation's workers," that the AEWR
regulation was not rationally related to the administra-
tive record before it and that DOL had abused its discre-
tion in adopting it.13 9 The District Court enjoined the
Department from further utilizing the final regulation
and reinstituted the AEWR formula in effect prior to
June 1987.140 On appeal, the Court of Appeals found
the choice of methodology to be "a policy decision
taken within the bounds of a rather broad congressional
delegation . . . oblig[ing] [the Department] to balance
the goals of the statute-providing an adequate supply
of labor and protecting the jobs of domestic
workers." 141
2. The Debate.- Was The Department of Labor's Policy
"Reasoned"?
In publishing the final rule, DOL explained that
"the old methodology was not designed to enhance
Statewide average hourly earnings from the USDA sur-
vey... [T]hat the AEWR averaged 20%o above the aver-
age hourly earnings from the USDA survey in the
fourteen 'traditional user States' [was] an unintended re-
sult" of past methodologies. 142 Moreover, the Depart-
ment added, "broad application of the old AEWR
methodology" had yielded "inexplicable and unjustifi-
able ... anomalies," in that four states had AEWRs be-
low the applicable USDA average agricultural wage rate
(at least three of which have "known concentrations of
illegals") and others above it, including six with AEWRs
70% or more above the applicable USDA rate (none of
which "is noted for high concentrations of illegal aliens"
and none of which have historically been H-2 user
states). 143
But these allegedly "inconsistent" and "erratic"
results are not inconsistent or erratic at all with the wage
depression hypothesis; in fact, they support a continued
133. AFL-CIO v. Brock, 668 F.Supp. 31 (D.D.C. 1987).
134. AFL-CIO v. Brock, 835 F.2d 912, 916, n. 6 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
135. Id. at 918. DOL had relied on two explanations: (1) That
IRCA created new circumstances justifying the change, because,
DOL asserted, IRCA would result in the cessation' of undocu-
mented workers and therefore the "source for the alleged wage
depression . . . will cease to exist." Id., quoting DOL's Reply
Brief. (2) That the old methodology caused anomalous disparities
in AEWRs from state to state and was difficult to calculate. Id.; 52
Fed. Reg. at 20504. The Court of Appeals, however, was "unable
to discern the reasonableness" of the regulation "without further
explanation." AFL-CIO v. Brock, 835 F.2d at 919.
136. 53 Fed. Reg. 43722 (10/28/88).
137. AFL-CIO v. McLaughlin, 702 F.Supp. 307 (D.D.C. 1988).
138. AFL-CIO v. McLaughlin, No. 89-5001 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
139. AFL-CIO v. Dole, 745 F.Supp. 18, 22 (D.D.C. 1990).
140. Id., at 23.
141. AFL-CIO v. Dole, 923 F.2d 182, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Consistent with the substantial deference courts ordinarily
accord administrative agencies and in addition to the AEWR and
piece rate battles, DOL consistently has prevailed in challenges to,
its regulations and interpretations of them in the 1980s. See Philips
v. Brock, 652 F.Supp. 1372 (D.Md. 1987) (DOL rationally inter-
preted regulation. stating that "every job offer for U.S. workers"
employed by an H-2 grower "will provide the worker with housing
without charge" as not requiring free housing for local U.S. work-
ers living within commuting distance of the work site); Virginia Agr.
Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Department of Labor, 756 F.2d 1025 (4th Cir.
1985) ("50% rule," requiring that.H-2 growers offer employment
to qualified U.S. workers through 50% of the period of the H-2
contract, was not arbitrary and capricious), rev'g [AGA v. Donovan,
579 F.Supp. 768 (W.D.Va. 1984). For cases upholding DOL's dis-
cretion in the 1970s, see supra n. 58 and Section III. But see Patler-
son Orchard, Frederick Cty. Fruit Growers Ass 'n, and Presidio Valleyv,
discussed supra Section III, in which three district courts invali-
dated DOL's denial of growers' certification requests in the late
1970s. The only subsequent case in which a court's finding a DOL
H-2A action invalid was not reversed is Morrison v. U.S. Dept. of
Labor, 713 F.Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). In Morrison, however,
DOL essentially conceded, on the record, that it had improperly
enforced the regulation at issue.
142. 54 Fed. Reg. at 28040 (7/5/69) (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 28041. On the relationship between the AEWR and
the USDA average agricultural wage rate, see supra Section I.
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finding of wage depression resulting from the presence
of undocumented and H-2A workers. According to the
wage depression hypothesis, agricultural wages in states
without a significant foreign worker presence should not
stagnate. Since the AEWRs for these, as all other, states
are indexed to the USDA rate (they never had been set
equal to the absolute level of the USDA average agricul-
tural wage), the hypothesis would expect the AEWRs in
non-user states also to rise at a non-depressed rate;
thus, the fact that these AEWRs are above the average
state agricultural wage is not inconsistent with wage de-
pression linked to foreign workers.
Finally, DOL claimed its decision-to set the
AEWR equal to the previous year's average hourly wage
for field and livestock workers for each state-was
"based directly on a current average agricultural wage
that is not apparently depressed by the presence of for-
eign workers."' 14 4 This proposition defies common
sense and elementary economic analysis; the introduc-
tion of any additional workers to a labor market neces-
sarily will affect wages.1 45 Nonetheless, DOL read "the
data and literature as inconclusive on the issue of ad-
verse effect or wage depression from the presence of il-
legal alien workers on the USDA data series" 14 6 and
concluded that any "tendency for illegal alien workers
to adversely affect wage rates ... probably has been mi-
nor and localized." 1
4 7
DOL's reading of the literature, however, is ques-
tionable. 148 The Department of Labor, for example,
pointed to the 1986 Economic Report of the President
which reported "mixed" results on the question of wage
depression:
Some studies.., have revealed evidence of ad-
verse wage effects .... Several studies found a re-
duction in the wages of unskilled workers in areas
with high concentrations of unskilled immigrant
workers.
Other studies, however, have shown that
greater concentrations of aliens in labor markets
are associated with higher earnings of native-born
workers. Increased wages have been found both
for broad groups of workers and also for native-
born minority groups with whom immigrants
might compete directly for jobs.
149
In a similar vein, DOL cited a GAO report pre-
pared for the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on. Immi-
gration and Refugee Policy, which, in DOL's words,
"came to . . . [a] qualified and uncertain conclusion:"
Our major finding ... is that illegal aliens do,
in some cases, exert downward pressure on wages
and working conditions with low-wage, low-skilled
jobs in certain labor markets. The four case studies
that supported this finding examined illegal aliens
in competition for the same jobs with legal or na-
tive workers....
In three other sectors and labor markets, the ef-
fects of illegal workers on legal or native workers'
wages . . . could not be determined. The five case
studies on these sectors or markets provided evi-
dence that the increased supply of workers for some
job categories, in some business and industry sec-
tors . . . depressed wages for some native or legal
workers but, at the same time, by stimulating busi-
ness, also expanded employment opportunities
and wages for other legal and native workers in
complementary, usually skilled occupations. None
of these studies, however, permitted an assessment
of net affects. .... 50
The primary point made by these two studies, as
well as by others cited, is that the evidence suggests that
wages of domestic workers in competition with-i.e. substi-
tutes for-the undocumented workers are depressed,
whereas wages of domestic workers in economically com-
plementary occupations, who therefore are not in competi-
tion with the undocumented workers, may even rise,
because job opportunities for these workers increase.
15 1
It is the latter group of domestic workers whose wages
generally are unaffected, or perhaps even bolstered.
Furthermore, it is the overall effect which the studies em-
phasize cannot be conclusively determined. As the Ur-
ban Institute noted in its study, The Fourth Wave.-
California's Newest Immigrants: "In discussing the wage ef-
fects of immigration, a key distinction is the impact of
immigrants on average wage levels in particular occupa-
tions and industries versus their impact on the wages of
individuals within those occupations and industries."1
52
This distinction is apparent in the excerpts above and
others quoted by DOL,' 53 although the Department's
144. 54 Fed. Reg. at 28039 (7/5/89).
145. See supra Section I.C.
146. 54 Fed. Reg. at 28043 (7/5/89).
147. Id. at 28041.
148. As the D.C. District Court had concluded, "the studies cited
[by DOLI do not support a finding that wage depression no
longer exists." AFL-CIO v. VcLaughlin, 702 F.Supp. 314 (D.D.C.
1988).
149. 54 Fed. Reg. at 28041-42 (7/5/89), citing 1986 Economic Re-
port of the President 223 (Government Printing Office: 1986) (em-
phasis supplied by DOL).
150. 54 Fed. Reg. at 28042 (7/5/89), quoting Illegal Aliens: Influ-
ence of Illegal ll'orkers on W1'ages and 1Working Conditions of Legal lVorkers
1-2 (GAO/PEMD-88- 13BR) (March 1988) (emphasis supplied by
1)O1.).
151. Moreover, most of the studies focused on urban labor mar-
kets. It seems likely that the existence of alternative and comple-
mentary jobs will be greater in an urban versus a rural setting,
since urban economies seem likely to have a greater diversity of
industrial, service, retail and other industries and the interdepen-
dencies of these industries seems likely to be greater.
152. Muller, The Fourth ll'ave: California's .Vewest Immigrants 104
(The Urban Institute Press, Washington, DC: 1985). See also the
GAO report, Illegal Aliens: Influence of Illegal Vorkers on Wages and
ll'orking Conditions of Legal llorkers, supra, at 42, which, while noting
the limited scope of the case studies examined, concluded that the
"detailed information from 9 case studies on 7 individual sectors
or industries . . . offer strong[] evidence on wage effects . . . and
highlight the importance of sectoral level analysis." (emphasis added).
153. See 54 Fed. Reg. at 28042-44 (7/5/89).
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reading of the studies clearly ignores it. '54 But the dis-
tinction is critical for purposes of the H-2A program.
DOL's mandate, pursuant both to IRCA and the H-2
regulations preceding it, is not to protect the wages and
working conditions of domestic workers in general; it is
specifically to protect the wages and working conditions
of U.S. workers similarly employed. Whatever uncertainty
regarding the net impact on domestic workers may ex-
ist-and uncertainty clearly does exist-it is irrelevant
for DOL's regulatory responsibilities, if the domestic
farmworkers competing with the H-2A workers, who are
unable or unwilling to obtain other nonagricultural em-
ployment, are harmed.
The other studies relied upon by DOL reinforce
this point. For example, the passage of an Urban Insti-
tute study highlighted by DOL concluded that the influx
of both legal and illegal Mexican immigrants "somewhat
depressed the wages of non-Hispanics working as laborers,
but the impact on wages paid to non-Hispanics in semi-
skilled occupations appears to be negligible."'15 5 What
DOL did not emphasize. is the Institute's conclusion that
the presence of the
Mexicans and, in all likelihood, of other immigrant
groups, reduced the average wages in manufactur-
ing and some services . . . This reduction . . . pri-
marily reflects the increasing share of Hispanics in
the work force, since wages for this group are
lower than for non-Hispanics in similar
occupations. '
56
Even more to the point, in explaining why the wages of
non-Hispanic (in particular black) U.S. unskilled work-
ers were only "somewhat depressed" and the impact on
wages of such semi-skilled U.S. workers "appears to be
negligible," the study stated: "The reason for this, at
least in southern California," on which the study had fo-
cused, "is that there appears to be relatively little direct
competition between Mexican immigrants and native blacks for
the same jobs."1 57 "Unquestionably," however, "there
has been some job competition between low-skill blacks
. . . and immigrants . . . and some blacks (and others)
who are unable to improve their occupational status or
move to areas with less immigrant competition will find
fewer job opportunities as a result of immigration."' 5 8
Finally, "[a]n examination of historical data sug-
gests that the wage gap between skilled and unskilled
labor fluctuated in response... to waves of immigration
to the United States," with unskilled keeping pace with
skilled wages during periods of labor shortage, and
stagnating relative to skilled wages during periods of
significant immigration, primarily of unskilled workers.
In short, the Urban Institute study concluded without
hesitation that "there is evidence of wage depression at-
tributable to immigrants." 159
As noted, one of the reasons the overall impact of
(legal and illegal) immigrants is uncertain is that wages
in some occupations may rise with an influx of labor into
complementary job sectors. If immigrants whose net
impact is uncertain, or even positive, depress wages in
the particular sectorwhere they find jobs, then wage dif-
ferentials between the unskilled workers in that sector
and the skilled workers in complementary sectors
should increase where the immigrants are found. Why?
For the net impact to be negligible, an increase in wages
in the complementary sector would be required to offset
the wage depression in the immigrant sector. Con-
versely, an increase in the wage differential between the
two sectors would support the existence of wage
depression.
The Urban Institute found a "dramatic" decline in
the wages of unskilled workers in the Los Angeles man-
ufacturing sector relative to those of similar unskilled
workers in the United States and other urban centers,
whereas wages of skilled manufacturing workers in Los
Angeles grew at about the national average. The study
concluded,
There can be little doubt that the relative
wage decline characterizing low-skill manufactur-
ing jobs in Los Angeles is related to the presence
of immigrant labor in large numbers, particularly
Mexicans and Central Americans. Because immi-
grant workers tend to be paid less than native workers in
the same industry, a growing preponderance of immigrant
workers lowers the average wage rate received by all work-
ers in the industry...
We conclude that there is evidence of wage
depression attributable to immigrants.
160
Thus, in areas where the determination of wage
depression over time in particularjob categories has not
or cannot be performed, the Urban Institute study sug-
gests that a meaningful barometer of adverse effect is
not the net effect on the labor market as a whole, but
rather the gap between wages in the sector(s) where im-
migrants are employed and those in which they are not,
after controlling for relevant inter-sector variables.'"
Finally, DOL highlighted the non-detectability of
154. For a brief discussion on the economic relationship of com-
plementary versus substitute jobs, see Muller, The Fourth Wave at
93-95, 105-106.
155. 54 Fed. Reg. 28042 (7/5/89), quoting Muller at 123 (em-
phasis supplied by DOL).
156. Id.
i57. The Fourth Wave at 101 (emphasis added). Again, this con-
clusion is not cited by DOL.
158. Id. at 102.
159. Id. at 112.
160. Id. at 110-12 (emphasis added).
161. DOL similarly misinterpreted the significance of the "mixed
and somewhat inconclusive" results of two other studies: (I) Ille-
gal Immigrants and Refugees-Their Economic Adaptation and Impact on
Loca L.S. Labor Varkets: A Review of the Literature (National Com-
mission for Employment Policy: October 1986); and (2) .VBER
Summary Report: Immigration, Trade, and the Labor Varket (National
Bureau of Economic Research: January 1988). Both of these
studies also discuss segmented versus fluid markets-i.e. whether
domestic workers displaced by immigrants are able to move into
other sectors of the economy-and complementary versus substi-
tute labor dynamics. DOL discusses these studies in 54 Fed. Reg.
at 28042 (7/5/89).
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wage depression in the USDA data series. 162 Indeed,
both the GAO report and a study by Philip Martin, an
agricultural economist who has worked extensively on
foreign labor issues, do note that the USDA series may
hide wage depression in particular farm labor mar-
kets.' DOL interprets this observation to mean that
the current USDA average "is not apparently depressed
by the presence of foreign workers."'
1 6 4
But the lack of detectability is not dispositive on the
question of the existence of wage depression. If agricul-
tural wages in general have been depressed as a result of
the employment of foreign workers, the particular im-
pact of wage depression in specific crops and areas
where foreign workers have been concentrated may not
be noticeable at a more general level of aggregation. In
other words, it may be simultaneously true that (1) wage
depression is greatest in specific crops and areas where
foreign workers are concentrated; (2) wages of agricul-
tural wages in general are depressed due to the employ-
ment of foreign workers; but (3) the particular impact of
the former depression on the latter is not reflected in
average national agricultural wages.
More specifically, the detectability of depression in
the wages of field and livestock workers (which is what
DOL proposes to use as the AEWR) is not dispositive
on the question of whether or not wages of piece rate
workers (who constitute the bulk of U.S. workers in
competition with H-2 and other immigrant farm-
workers) have been depressed. Piece rate workers tradi-
tionally have earned more than all field and livestock
workers combined, although the gap is narrowing. If
piece rates have been, and continue to be, depressed by
foreign workers, setting the AEWR equal to the USDA
average wage for field and livestock workers may pro-
vide a floor below which the depressed earnings of piece
rate workers cannot fall; but it does not prevent such
slippage in piece rates until that floor is reached.165
Thus, even if DOL were correct that the USDA average
wage for field and livestock workers is not depressed by
the presence of foreign workers (an assertion which is
162. See, e.g., 54 Fed. Reg. at 28043 ("Even if there may have
been adverse effects on agricultural wages . . . they apparently
have been so concentrated in specific crops, activities, and areas
that such effects do not appear to be reflected to any significant
degree in the USDA data series...").
163. Illegal Aliens: Influence of Illegal Workers on Wages and Working
Conditions of Legal Workers, supra, at 10 ("Our experience ... sug-
gested that wage depression is harder and harder to detect at
levels of analysis beyond or above a highly localized and occupa-
tion-specific labor market."); Martin, IRCA and the U.S. Farm Labor
.larket (February 1988), p. 14 ("Farm wages should rise as IRCA
eliminates illegal alien farmworkers, but it may be hard to observe
such wage increases in regularly-published data [such as USDA's
Farm Labor] because illegal alien workers are concentrated on a
few farms growing a few commodities in a few states.").
164. 54 Fed. Reg. at 28039 (7/5/89).
165. Compounding this problem, DOL has selected the average
earnings computed by USDA for field and livestock workers. This
is the lowest rate DOL could have chosen-lower not only than
piece workers' average hourly earnings, as estimated by USDA,
but also lower than the average wage of all hired farmworkers
combined as well as that of field workers alone.
166. The H-24 Program: Protections for U.S. Farmworkers 63 (GAO/
debatable), this would support indexing the AEWR to
changes in that wage rate, as had been done prior to the
post-IRCA regulations, not to setting the AEWR at its
absolute level, as the new regulations do.
An October 1988 GAO report on the H-2A pro-
gram, not discussed by DOL, noted "that to the extent
that general farm wages are also depressed-the pene-
tration of undocumented and H-2A workers in the
USDA sample is unknown-. . . general farm wages
would be a less useful indicator of a nondepressed wage
among seasonal workers."' 16 6 Martin supports this sug-
gestion: "[I]llegal aliens have been an integral part of
some farm work forces for so long that extant data can-
not portray farm. labor markets in some commodities
and areas which are not influenced by illegal aliens;" in
other words, it may be impossible to detect how much
wage depression has occurred "because the presence of
illegal alien workers has tainted existing wage data."'
6 7
3. Alternative Approaches
Concededly, the analytic issues discussed above
render DOL's already difficult task of determining a
non-depressed wage even more formidable. The solu-
tion, however, cannot be to ignore the fact of wage de-
pression. If wage depression cannot be detected, DOL
could look to the wage gap between various sectors
where foreign workers are concentrated and a sector
where they are not-for example, manufacturing wages
or agricultural wages in a state relatively free of immi-
grant labor. Beginning with a base wage rate pre-dating
the influx of immigrant labor to a particular state, the
AEWR could then be indexed to increases in the "un-
tainted" wage.
Alternatively, DOL could determine, as a policy
matter, what relationship between agricultural and, say,
manufacturing wages would be acceptable. In addition
to the earning power of agricultural versus manufactur-
ing workers, DOL might consider other factors-such as
the degree of international competition faced by the in-
dustry, the magnitude of labor costs as a percentage, on
PEMD-89-3) (October 1988). This report also questioned the
general appropriateness and potential effectiveness of the USDA
field and livestock data to provide wage protection to U.S. workers
employed similarly to H-2A workers. The primary doubts the
GAO raised were the following: (1) The USDA survey may under-
represent seasonal and temporary workers (the only ones H-2As
can directly replace) for two main reasons. First, the surveys are
not performed at the peak seasonal employment periods. Second,
the surveys exclude a large category of "agricultural service work-
ers" because they are employed through a farm labor contractor
(or "crew leader"), but many of whom perform seasonal labor of
the type performed by H-2As. (2) The USDA estimates for field
and livestock workers underestimates the wages of U.S. workers in
the same occupations as H-2A workers to the extent that H-2A
workers are employed in jobs paying by the piece (an observation
also made uniformly by every attorney representing farmworkers
and other advocates with whom I spoke), since piece rate workers
earn substantially more than field and livestock workers in gen-
eral. In short, the GAO found that DOL had failed to explain the
relationship between the USDA wage and the wages of U.S. work-
ers in jobs similar to H-2As. Id. at 58-59.
167. Martin, IRCA and the U.S. Farm Labor .larket at 1-2.
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average, of growers' total costs, and the overall eco-
nomic viability of the industry and its importance to the
economy at large-in determining the desired relation-
ship. The point of either approach would be to link the
AEWR determination to some independent wage base
relatively free of the presence of foreign workers.
In comments submitted to DOL on the proposed
AEWR methodology, West Virginia Legal Services com-
pared manufacturing to USDA wage data. Citing the
GAO H-2A Program report, Legal Services argued that
such a comparison provides a proxy by which to mea-
sure general wage depression in agriculture. From the
data submitted, reproduced below, Legal Services
pointed out that agricultural wage rates in 33 of the 48
contiguous states increased more slowly than manufac-
turing rates between 1974 and 1987. The three states
where agricultural wage rates increased most slowly rel-
ative to manufacturing wages (more than 40% less) have
a long history of employing H-2 and undocumented
workers. In twelve other states, including California
and five H-2 user states, the USDA field and livestock
wage fell between 20% and 40% relative to manufactur-
ing wages. In another 13 states, including Florida and
all but one of the remaining H-2 user states, the discrep-
ancy ranged between 10% and 20%.168
TABLE I
RATES OF CHANGE IN USDA AVERAGE FIELD AND LIVESTOCK WORKER WAGES


























































































































































168. Comments submitted by West Virginia Legal Services to the U.S. Department of Labor regarding the Proposed Adverse















































































USDA r, Change Manuf r Change Diff in
State Rate 1974-1987 Rate 1974-1987 re Changes
NM 1974: $1.72 150.00% 1974: $ 3.31 164.05% -14.05%
1987: $4.30 1987: $ 8.74
NE 1974: $2.06 111.17% 1974: $ 4.15 125.06% -13.89%
1987: $4.35 1987: $ 9.34
OK 1974: $1.87 139.04% 1974: $ 4.01 152.87% - 13.83%
1987: $4.47 1987: $10.14
WA 1974: $2.51 109.56% 1974: $ 5.24 123.28% -13.72%
1987: $5.26 1987: $11.70
CO 1974: $2.66** 61.28% 1974: $ 5.80** 74.31% -13.03%
1987: $4.29 1987: $10.11
NY 1974: $2.06 109.71% 1974: $ 4.53 122.74% -13.03%
1987: $4.32 1987: $10.09
RI 1974: $2.02 113.86% 1974: $ 3.62 126.24% -12.38%
1987: $4.32 1987: $ 8.19
IL 1974: $2.23 106.28% 1974: $ 4.97 118.31% -12.03%
1987: $4.60 1987: $10.85
MT 1974: $1.98 99.49% 1974: $ 5.05 110.10% -10.61%
1987: $3.95 1987: $10.61
Wv 1974: $1.75 122.86% 1974: $ 4.53 133.11% -10.25%
1987: $3.90 1987: $10.56
MI 1974: $2.32* 81.90% 1974: $ 6.81* 90.46% -8.56%
1987: $4.22 1987: $12.97
NC 1974: $1.81 130.39% 1974: $ 3.28 138.72% -8.33%
1987: $4.17 1987: $ 7.83
AL 1974: $1.70 128.24% 1974: $ 3.73 134.85% -6.61%
1987: $3.88 1987: $ 8.76
US 1974: $2.09 118.66% 1974: $ 4.42 124.21% -5.55%
1987: $4.57 1987: $ 9.91
MO 1974: $1.90 123.68% 1974: $ 4.39 127.56% -3.88%
1987: $4.25 1987: $ 9.99
NJ 1974: $2.13 126.76% 1974: $ 4.57 128.01% -1.25%
1987: $4.83 1987: $10.42
KY 1974: $1.68 132.14% 1974: $ 4.36 130.28% 1.86%
1987: $3.90 1987: $10.04
WY 1974: $1.81 118.23% 1974: $ 4.52 116.37% 1.86%
1987: $3.95 1987: $ 9.78
TX 1974: $2.23* 100.45% 1974: $ 4.98* 97.79% 2.66%
1987: $4.47 1987: $ 9.85
OH 1974: $1.97 133.50% 1974: $ 5.13 128.65% 4.85%
1987: $4.60 1987: $11.73
IN 1974: $2.04 125.49% 1974: $ 5.04 119.44% 6.05%
1987: $4.60 1987: $11.06
SC 1974: $1.53 153.59% 1974: $ 3.32 143.98% 9.61%
1987: $3.88 1987: $ 8.10
MS 1974: $1.57 149.04% 1974: $ 3.19 137.93% 11.11%
1987: $3.91 1987: $ 7.59
PA 1974: $2.07 133.33% 1974: $ 4.57 118.38% 14.95%
1987: $4.83 1987: $ 9.98
WI 1974: $1.79 135.75% 1974: $ 4.81 119.33% 16.42%
1987: $4.22 1987: $10.55
MD 1974: $2.05 135.61% 1974: $ 4.62 118.18% 17.43%
1987: $4.83 1987: $10.08
SD 1974: $1.84 136.41% 1974: $ 3.77 110.61% 25.80%
1987: $4.35 1987: $ 7.94
OR 1974: $2.16 143.52% 1974: $ 5.01 110.58% 32.94%
1987: $5.26 1987: $10.55
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* Rates are from 1976, as that is the earliest manufacturing wage data available.
** Rates are from 1977, as that is the earliest manufacturing wage data available.
* Rates are from 1979, as that is the earliest manufacturing wage data available.
[Source: USDOL, BLS, Statistics Labstat Series Report of 11/21/88, Series # SAU 0100030000056 for state and area
industrial employment, hours and earnings, manufacturing averages; Crop Reporting Board, ESS, USDA, Annual
Average Wage Rates for Field and Livestock Workers Combined, by States, Standard Federal Regions and United
States, 1974-1980; Farm Labor, Annual Average Wage Rates for Hired Workers, by States and Regions, 1987 (Feb.
1988)]
Of the H-2 user states, the table shows that only
Texas and Maryland experienced agricultural wage
growth exceeding that of the state's manufacturing
wage. Legal Services suggested that the "Texas
anomaly" resulted from the fact that Texas has been so
inundated with undocumented workers crossing the
border from Mexico ,that it is likely that manufacturing
wages have also suffered in that state; growth in Texas
manufacturing wages during the time period under
consideration (1974-87) ranked 43rd compared to the
other states.
t 69
Finally, West Virginia Legal Services addressed a
second type of "anomaly": that applying the old
methodology to some non-H-2 user states yielded
AEWRs which exceeded the applicable USDA average
farm wage rate. The fact that agricultural wages have
kept pace with manufacturing wages in some cases,
Legal Services attorneys argued, only provides "an
indication of what would have happened in other states
but for the presence of undocumented' workers."' 70 In
other words, this phenomenon in non-user states is an
unsurprising corollary of agricultural wage depression
in user-states.
Despite the questionability of DOL's
interpretation of the various studies and its lack of any
firm data affirmatively supporting the absence of wage
depression, the Court of Appeals found DOL's
interpretation reasonable. Reinforcing the new
"balance" approach to DOL's administration of the
program, the Court, as noted above, found the balance
DOL had struck to be within its broad range of
discretion and upheld the regulation.'71
In the final part of this paper, the prevailing wages
paid to piece rate workers in discrete crops and areas in
which H-2 workers have been employed will be
examined. Three case studies are presented. The first
is based on wage data for apple pickers in the greater
Shenandoah Valley area. The second compares wage
data in Maryland for years in which H-2 workers were
and were not employed by Maryland growers. The third
examines data on apple pickers in Hudson Valley, New
York.
VI. CASE STUDIES
As discussed above, any conclusions drawn from
existing agricultural wage data are limited by the paucity
and questionable reliability of the data that exists. The
few studies which have been done, discussed above in
relation to the new AEWR regulations, support the hy-
pothesis that the importation of temporary foreign
workers has depressed agricultural wages, and will con-
tinue to do so. In the following sections I will examine
the apple harvests in three areas for evidence of wage
depression: (1) The four states surrounding the Shen-
169. Id. at 3. West Virginia Legal Services also explained the
"Texas anomaly" as resulting from USDA's post-1980 practice of
combining Texas with Oklahoma and reporting a single rate for
this "Southern Plains" region. In 1980, USDA published both
separate wage findings for these two states as well as the regional
finding. The Texas average was $3.13 per hour; Oklahoma's was
$3.56. The combined average for the Southern Plains was $3.20.
The increase in average agricultural wages in Texas only narrowly
exceeded that in manufacturing wages (2.66%); thus, the
combined Southern Plain rate may have increased the agricultural
wage used for Texas (i.e. the Southern Plains wage) sufficiently to
tip the relationship between its farm and manufacturing wages.
Id.
West Virginia Legal' Services noted similar factors in
explaining another seemingly anomalous state in the data,
Oregon. And, while the Legal Services did not discuss Maryland,
where agricultural wages grew 17% faster than manufacturing
wages, USDA now reports a single rate for Northeast II, which
includes Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Of
those states, only Maryland has a history of employing H-2
workers; and none of the states is noted for a concentration of
undocumented workers, although undoubtedly some illegal
foreign workers could be found in each. Thus, a similar dynamic
to that at work in Texas may also have been present in Maryland.
170. Id. at 4.
171, AFL-CIO v. Dole, 923 F.2d 182.
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andoah Valley-Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, and
West Virginia; (2) Maryland; (3) The Hudson Valley in
New York. Much of the data analyzed is drawn from
wage surveys and reports which the U.S. Department of
Labor requires that states perform and, ultimately, are
performed under DOL's direction; other data was com-
piled by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. To the ex-
tent that DOL's own data suggests wage depression,
further doubt is cast upon the "reasoned basis" under-
lying its recent regulatory decisions.
A. THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY: PENNSYLVANIA,
VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, WEST VIRGINIA
Apple growers operate in four states in the Shen-
andoah Valley-Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and
West Virginia. The relative proximity of these growers
to each other results in their facing relatively similar
conditions in cultivating, harvesting, and marketing
their produce. In addition, H-2A apple workers are not
new to the Valley; apple growers in Virginia and West
Virginia have hired temporary foreign workers at least
since the 1960s. Pennsylvania apple growers, however,
have never used H-2A workers, and Maryland growers
did not employ H-2s before 1973, nor after 1986. Un-
fortunately, wage surveys for Pennsylvania were not per-
formed for many years and records were not kept for
many others. But for the years for which Pennsylvania
records do exist, as well as for the years in which Mary-
land apple growers did not employ H-2A workers, com-
parisons between the wages in the H-2A and non-H-2A
Shenandoah area states cast some light on the question
of wage depression.
Virginia has performed wage surveys for apples in
three distinct geographic regions: Winchester, Roa-
noke, and Marion-Galax. As shown in Table 1, the vast
majority of H-2A apple workers in Virginia have been
employed in only one of these areas-Winchester.
Winchester is the Virginia area which borders the Shen-
andoah Valley, making wage comparisons between it
and Pennsylvania and Maryland growers, as well as be-
tween it and the Roanoke and Marion-Galax growers
(whose orchards do not directly border the Valley), in-
structive. Again, it is unfortunate that a limited number
of the Virginia and West Virginia surveys have been
saved; but comparisons for recent years can be made.
Of course, as is inevitable, there are factors which
tend to confound any such wage comparisons. First,
farmworker advocates and agricultural economists alike
repeatedly have attacked the reliability of many of
DOL's wage surveys. They have questioned, for exam-
ple, the sufficiency and random nature of the survey
sample chosen, the impartiality and training of the sur-
vey interviewers, and the common practice of collecting
information only from growers.17 2 In addition, the
growers may face certain conditions peculiar to their
state-state taxes, for example-which may affect their
production costs and alter their demand curve for labor.
Nonetheless, particularly in a context of limited wage
data for H-2A crops and areas, the Shenandoah apple
orchards offer relatively fertile ground for making
meaningful comparisons between H-2A and non-H-2A
wages.
The number of foreign and domestic apple pickers
employed by Virginia growers in each of these areas for
each survey year are shown in Table 1. During the years
in question, the percent of the total workforce consti-
tuted by H-2A workers ranged from 26% to 51 % in
Winchester, from zero to 7% in Roanoke, and from zero
to 16% in Marion-Galax. In both absolute numbers and
as a percentage of all workers employed, the presence of
H-2A workers in Winchester has far outweighed the
number of H-2A workers in the Marion-Galax and Roa-
noke reporting areas.
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC WORKERS IN VIRGINIA APPLES
17 3
Winchester Roanoke Marion-Galax
# of % of Number of Number of % of Number of Number of % of Number of
H-2As total domestics H-2As total Domestics H-2As total Domestic
1986 710 51% 675 6 4% 146 3 2% 146
1987 475 35% 875 30 7% 425 30 16% 158
1988 301 26% 875 0 0% 275 12# 7% 160
1989 * 515 * 175 0 0% 104
• Number not recorded on survey.
# A handwritten note on the survey record suggests that perhaps no H-2A workers were employed in Marion-Galax in 1988.
Source: Prevailing Wage Surveys, ETA 232 for Virginia, Virginia Department of Employment Security.
As an initial matter in comparing the use and im-
pact of foreign workers in the Shenandoah region, the
172. The prevailing wage surveys do include a section for data
collected through interviewing workers, but frequently these in-
terviews either are not conducted or the information obtained
through them is ignored in the prevailing wage determination.
173. Some of the same workers could be employed at different
fact that no growers in Pennsylvania have ever sought
H-2A pickers, and very few in Roanoke or Marion-Galax
times in more than one of the three areas listed. This possibility
and the fact that these numbers are estimates may account for the
disparity between these estimates and the number of certifications
granted as reported in the U.S. DOL's .nnual Reporis, discussed
below.
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have done so, while growers in Winchester, West Vir-
ginia, and Maryland have hired significant numbers of
such workers, coupled with the fact that farmworkers
frequently travel across state lines to work, casts sub-
stantial doubt on the veracity of the alleged domestic la-
bor shortage faced by the H-2A growers.1
74
TABLE 3





















* As estimated by the various state labor departments.
** The In-Season Wage Report for Virginia did not specify the number of foreign workers hired in
1989. This figure is derived from the U.S. DOL's 1989 Annual Report: Labor Certifications for Temporary
Foreign Agricultural Workers (H-2A Program), which reports the number of foreign certifications (i.e.
the maximum number of permissible hires). Thus, the figure in the table may be somewhat high
(since growers need not fill all positions certified). However, this does not change the analysis.
N.A. Not Available.
Source: Domestic Agriculture In-Season Wage Reports.
Comparisons between the rates paid to apple pick-
ers in Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia, and Vir-
ginia suggest a strong connection between the wages
paid to apple pickers and the presence of no, or very
TA












few, H-2A workers. Tables 3 and 4 show the wages in
each such area in the Shenandoah Valley for the years
for which data exists.
LBLE 4
















* Where an end of season bonus (EOSB) is offered, it is included in the piece rate listed. An EOSB is a fixed sum, usually between two
and five cents for apples, paid at the end of the season, for each bushel (or other unit) picked during the course of the season. Workers
who quit or are fired before the season is over do not receive the bonus.
* The 1988 and 1989 Winchester surveys distinguished between picking apples for the fresh and processing markets. In 1989 these rates
were 42.5c and 40.7c, and in 1988, 41.84 and 404, per bushel. The percentage of workers picking for each market is not known. Accord-
ingly, the figure in the table represents the simple average of the two rates in each of the two years.
** Western Maryland did have 94 out of 365 temporary foreign workers in 1986, but as is the case with Roanoke and Marion-Galax, this
number is far fewer than the numbers in Winchester and West Virginia, and so it is listed as a non-user area in 1986; Maryland employed
no H-2s in the subsequent years.
N.A. Not Available.
174. The most obvious explanation, that the labor needs of
Pennsylvania growers are significantly smaller, is not borne out by
the facts. As shown in Table 2, Pennsylvania growers hire a com-
parable or greater number of apple pickers than growers in the
other three states. Nor can the difference in hiring patterns be
explained by the presence of a much larger number of local work-
ers in Pennsylvania. Out of the total 1,566 hires made by Penn-
sylvania apple growers in 1989, 1,403 (89%) were out-of-state
workers. In 1988, only the survey for one of the two Pennsylvania
counties broke down domestic workers into instate and interstate
hires. In that county (Franklin), 551 out of 634 (87%) workers
hired were from out-of-state. In 1988 and 1989, Winchester
growers hired 775 and 439 interstate workers, respectively; West
Virginia growers hired 850 and 490, respectively.
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PREVAILING WAGES FOR APPLE PICKERS IN H-2A USER AND NON-USER
AREAS CENTS PER BUSHELO
1978-1981
Non-User Areas User Areas
Southeastern* Winchester
Pennsylvania Maryland** Virginia
1981 48 40 38
1980 45 37 36
1979 42 35 39
1978 42 29.6 32
* Note that the Southeastern crop reporting area of Pennsylvania is to the east of the
Shenandoah Valley area, and thus may face crop and market conditions which differ to a
somewhat greater extent from the other Shenandoah apple areas than Pennsylvania's
Franklin and Adams counties. However, the rather large differential between the non-
user versus user areas in the table suggests the likelihood that at least some of the differ-
ence in wage rates is attributable to the presence of H-2A workers.
** Maryland last used H-2A workers in 1986.
* Data for Winchester for these years comes from a memorandum, "Summary of Pre-
vailing Wage Rates," written by attorney Edward J. Tuddenham, Migrant Legal Action
Program, MLAP file 20.9.1 (October 19, 1988).
In 1989, piece rates per bushel in the non-user ar-
eas exceeded those in the user areas by a margin of 6.24
to 10.44, or by 15% to 25%; in 1988 the margin ranged
from .14 to 154 per bushel, yielding wage differentials
that were negligible as between non-user Franklin
County and user Winchester up to a differential of
37.5% between West Virginia and the non-user areas of
Western Maryland, Marion-Galax, and Roanoke. In
1987 and 1986, the per bushel rate in the non-user ar-
eas exceeded that in the user areas by at least 104, or
25%. The average piece rate in the non-user areas ex-
ceeded that in the user areas by 8.74 (21%) in 1989, and
7.54 (18%), 11.74 (29%), and 11.84 (30%) in 1988,
1987, and 1986, respectively. Comparisons between
non-user Southeastern Pennsylvania and users Mary-
land and Winchester between 1978 and 1981 show simi-
larly significant differences in the piece rates for apple
pickers. Per bushel rates in Pennsylvania during those
years exceeded those in Maryland by 84 to 12.44 (20%
to 42%) and those in Winchester by 34 to 104 (8% to
31%).
Finally, comparing the differences between wage
rates in user versus non-user areas in Virginia offers
perhaps the strongest evidence of a positive correlation
between H-2A workers and wage depression. A 1972
U.S. Department of Labor Rural Manpower Service Re-
port compared wages paid by Winchester growers, who
have been employing foreign workers since the early
1960s, and Roanoke growers, who, as noted above, it
appears never employed H-2A workers until 1986, and
then only in small numbers. Between 1964 and 1969,
the Report found, the piece rate for picking apples in
Winchester increased by 33%, from 154 to 204 per box,
while in Roanoke the piece rate increased by 80%, from
15 to 274 per box-almost two and one-half times the
wage increase in Winchester over the course of five
years; 175 in 1969 the Roanoke rate was 35% higher than
that in neighboring Winchester. As can be seen in Ta-
ble 3 above, this trend has persisted to the presenit time.
In 1986 the piece rates in Roanoke and Marion-Galax
(where relatively few H-2A workers were still to be
found) were 15.24 and 10.24 per bushel (38.2% and
25,6%) higher than the rate in Winchester. By 1989 the
gap had narrowed somewhat, but was still significant,
with the piece rates per bushel for Marion-Galax and
Roanoke measuring 8.4q (20%) and 10.44 (25%) higher
than that in Winchester.
It should be noted that the correlation between the
absence of H-2A workers and higher wages is not per-
fect. Significant wage differentials between the user and
non-user areas do not exist for each such area in every
year; the 1988 wage in non-user Franklin County, Penn-
sylvania, for example, is barely higher (. 14 per bushel)
than that in user Winchester. This may reflect that not
all variables affecting the labor market are constant from
area to area, or it may reflect some unexpected develop-
ment experienced by a few large, growers in one area.
In the case of Adams and Franklin counties in iPenn-
sylvania, data for only two years is available, making it
difficult to analyze, for example, why the difference be-
tween the Franklin and Winchester wages in 1988 is
negligible, or whether it might be anomalous. As dis-
cussed above, the force of conclusions one can draw
from the data is limited. Nonetheless, the overall pic-
ture painted by the data in Tables 3 and 4 clearly does
support the wage depression hypothesis.
It also is interesting to note that the piece r.ates of-
fered in non-user areas evidence a much greater range
than those in the user areas. In 1988, for example, the
rates in the non-user Shenandoah regions ranged from
414 to 554 per bushel, while the rates in the two user
areas were only .94 per bushel apart. While there is in-
175. U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Administration, Re-
viewe of the Rural .anpower Sen'ice (1972), 34,
One box equals approximately 1 and 1/8 bushels.
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sufficient data upon which to reach any decisive conclu-
sions, this pattern suggests that in user areas the wage
offered by H-2A growers to H-2A workers (and to do-
mestic workers in the employ of H-2A growers) comes
to dominate the "equilibrium" wage. That is, the wage
offered to all apple pickers in the area gravitates toward
the H-2A wage, while in the non-user areas wages con-
tinue to be influenced by a variety of factors. In other
words, in user areas the market as a medium of wage
determination is displaced by a single wage rate-the
prevailing wage, as determined by DOL. H-2A growers
all typically offer the same wage, so that in crop report-
ing areas where they predominate, the prevailing wage
will be the rate these growers pay. To be sure, DOL
must certify this rate, but prospectively, it will be im-
mune to market pressures that would push it up in a
pure domestic setting. This is because growers can ob-
tain as much foreign (exogenous) labor as .they need at
the certified rate; any domestic workers willing to work,
but asking a higher wage, are considered unavailable for
work and need not be hired.' 76 In this way, the prevail-
ing wage finding-which, to be consistent with the statu-
tory and regulatory purpose of the temporary foreign
worker program, should establish a wage floor to pro-
tect domestic workers-actually becomes a wage ceil-
ing.' 77 This theory would help to explain the diversity
of piece rates within non-user areas as opposed to the
more uniform and lower wages in the user areas. As dis-
cussed below, the prevailing wage surveys for apple
pickers in New York's Hudson Valley offer additional,
stronger evidence of the tendency for wages paid by
H-2A growers to cluster below the rates offered by most
non-user growers and to span a much narrower range
than non-H-2A wages.
B. MARYLAND
The Maryland Department of Economic and Em-
ployment Development has retained prevailing wage
surveys for Maryland's apple harvests since 1968. The
surveys indicate that Maryland apple growers hired their
first H-2 workers in 1973, and continued to employ such
workers until 1987. The Maryland surveys offer the po-
tential to measure the.growth (or stagnation) of the pre-
vailing apple wage -against other wage indices. This
section will compare the Maryland apple wage to the fol-
lowing wage indices: the average hourly wage paid to
Maryland farmwo rkers during a given year, the average
hourly wage paid to Maryland farmworkers in October
of each year (the prevailing wage surveys are conducted
annually in October), the average manufacturing wage
176. Once DOL has certified a wage, a grower's labor shortage
is, by definition, equal to the total number of workers needed less
the number of domestic workers available and willing to work at
the certified wage. See supra Section I.A.
177. For additional discussion on this see supra Section I.C. See
also, Flecha v. Quiros, 567 F.2d 1154 (1st Cir. 1977). If wages are
higher than the market equilibrium, there is nothing preventing
growers fi'om offering less, as would be expected in a free market.
178. It might seem more appropriate to divide the years into two
groups from 1968-72 and 1973-86, since 1973 was the first year in
which H-2s were hired. However, the USDA dramatically
in Maryland in October, and the national average farm
wage for all hired farmworkers during a given year and
in October of each year.
The wage depression hypothesis to be tested is as
follows: The presence of H-2A workers should have a
smaller impact on the various wage indices than on
Maryland apple wages either because the concentration
of H-2A workers is diluted in a larger pool of labor sur-
veyed (as is the case for the USDA surveys of all Mary-
land and all U.S. farmworkers) or because the number
of H-2A workers in the relevant labor pool is zero and
therefore any H-2A impact would be indirect and atten-
uated (as is the case for the manufacturing sector). If
the presence of H-2 workers caused wage depression,
we would expect two trends. First, we would expect that
during the years in which Maryland orchards hired H-2
workers, growth in the apple wage should have stag-
nated relative to growth in the other wage indices. Sec-
ond, we would expect that during the years before H-2
workers were hired, the Maryland apple wage would
have fared better relative to the other wage indices than
during the H-2 years.
Before probing the available data for evidence of
wage stagnation and depression, a few preliminary
notes are in order. It is worth reemphasizing that, while
the wage comparisons below may provide evidence of
wage depression in H-2A crops, no hard and fast con-
clusions are possible. The prevailing wage surveys sel-
dom meet rigorous scientific standards or utilize
sufficiently random sampling methods, diminishing
their reliability. In addition, there simply are too many
other variables which affect the wages in any particular
segment of the labor market, and which cannot be held
constant, to allow for a conclusive reading of the data.
Moreover, as will be seen below, the correlation be-
tween temporary foreign agricultural workers and rela-
tive wage stagnation in Maryland is not without
exceptions. And while logical, convincing explanations
for these variances exist, they nonetheless underscore
the lack of precision and certainty feasible in interpret-
ing the data.
Turning to the question of wage depression in
Maryland apples, two sets of wage comparisons will be
made: 1) comparisons regarding the growth in the vari-
ous wage indices between 1968 and 1973, before Mary-
land orchards began employing H-2 workers; 2) similar
comparisons between 1974 and 1986, during which
time Maryland orchards were employing H-2A work-
ers.1 7 8 The pertinent data is shown in Table 5. Tables
6 and 7 show the growth in the various wage rates dur-
changed its survey method in 1974. In that year, USDA imple-
mented for the first time a probability survey method, and began
conducting such surveys four times per year. Prior to 1974, the
USDA had relied on agricultural employers' voluntary submission
of wage, hour, and other employment information. As the USDA
itself has noted, the comparability of the two sets of data is sus-
pect. Farm Labor, U.S.D.A. (1/74). From this perspective, com-
parisons within each of the two periods (1968-73 and 1974-86)
will be more meaningful than comparisons between the two
periods.
In addition, there is a time lag between the time H-2 work-
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ing the non-H-2 and H-2 periods, respectively. During
the non-H-2 years (1968-73), the prevailing piece rate
paid to apple pickers in Maryland increased in nominal
terms by 25%. During the same time, the other farm
and manufacturing wage indices each increased by be-
tween 36% to 56%-roughly 1 i/2 to 21/4 times as fast as
the growth in the apple wage. The group of all
farmworkers hired in Maryland during the month of Oc-
tober is perhaps the group of workers most similar to
the apple pickers vis-a-vis the labor market; thus, the
earnings of these workers may provide the best yardstick
for measuring wage depression in apples. October
earnings of hired Maryland farmworkers increased by
46% between 1968 and 1973-1.8 times as great as the
increase in the apple wage.
Beginning in 1974, the prevailing apple wage stag-
nated, remaining constant in nominal terms until 1978,
when it declined slightly by 1%. During the same pe-
riod, from 1974 to 1978, the various other hourly-earn-
ings indices each increased between 32% to 40%, a
growth rate 32 to 40 times that in the prevailing apple
wage and far greater than the 11/2 to 21/4 differential
prior to 1973; the average October hourly earnings for
all hired farmworkers in Maryland during this period in-
creased by 34%. The prevailing apple wage began to
rise after 1978, reaching a 1980 level 19% higher than
that in 1974. Between 1974 and 1980, increases in the
other hourly earnings figures ranged from 50% to 66%,
yielding growth rates in the control indices 21/2 to 311, as
fast as the nominal increase in the prevailing apple wage
during these years.
TABLE 6


















































bu = standard U.S. bushel.
N.A. Not Available
* USDA ceased publishing Maryland figures in 1980. After 1980, USDA began publishing average wages on a regional basis. Data from
Maryland began to be included in a region extending from Maine to West Virginia, although for a few years even the regional figures are
not available.
Sources: Domestic In-Season Agricultural Wage Reports, Maryland Department of Employment Security; Farm Labor, USDA; Employment
and Earnings, U.S. Department of Labor.
TABLE 7
GROWTH RATES IN WAGES OF MARYLAND APPLE PICKERS, AVERAGE HOURLY OCTOBER































ers first enter the domestic labor market and when the depressive
eflect of their presence will be felt. That the market will need
some time to adjust to a sudden change makes sense as an intui-
tive matter. More importantly, the operation of the regulatory
program builds in a one-year time lag, as the wages required of an
H-2A grower in any particular year are determined by the prevail-
ing wage finding in the previous year; thus it is not until 1974 that
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TABLE 8
GROWTH IN WAGE RATES OF MARYLAND APPLE PICKERS AND AVERAGE HOURLY OCTOBER
AND ANNUAL EARNINGS OF ALL HIRED FARMWORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES







Three summary points can be noted thus far: (1)
The prevailing wage paid to domestic apple pickers
stagnated (and actually declined by 20% in real terms
between 1973 and 1978) in the years immediately
following the introduction of H-2 workers into
Maryland's orchards; (2) In the first six years following
that introduction, the prevailing piece rate paid to
Maryland's domestic apple pickers grew substantially
slower both than average hourly earnings of all
farmworkers in Maryland and the United States at large
as well as than those of manufacturing workers in
Maryland; (3) While the prevailing apple rate also grew
more slowly than the control indices prior to the
introduction of H-2 apple workers in Maryland, that rate
fared significantly better in comparison to the other
indices during the pre- than the post-H-2 years.
Wages and average hourly earnings during the
1980-1986 period, however, paint a somewhat murkier
picture. Reversing the earlier pattern, the growth in the
prevailing nominal piece rate paid to Maryland's
domestic apple pickers exceeded the growth in three of
the five control indices. Between 1980 and 1986, the
prevailing apple wage increased by 40%; the average
October manufacturing wage in Maryland increased by
27%; the national average hourly earnings for all hired
farmworkers and the national October average
increased by 29% and 25%, respectively.
The relationship between the growth "of the
prevailing wage and the average earnings of all hired
Maryland farmworkers cannot be determined, as data
on the latter have not been published.' 7 9 This impedes
analyzing the possible explanations for the reversal. For
example, if the average wages of all Maryland
farmworkers increased substantially more than the other
control indices, it would seem safe to conclude that
something unrelated to the Maryland apple harvest was
pushing the apple wage up.
Nonetheless, the data does not necessarily defeat
the wage depression hypothesis for Maryland's apple
orchards. First, if real wages and earnings are
examined, the 1980-1986 wage patterns seem less
dramatic. As Table 8 shows, the prevailing apples wage
remained practically constant in real terms, increasing
by .4%, during the period in question. Between 1980
and 1986, real manufacturing wages in Maryland during
October declined slightly, by 3.5% (from $5.70 to $5.45
per hour); average hourly earnings for all hired
farmworkers in the United States also fell slightly by 3%
(from $2.68 to $2.60 per hour), as did average hourly
October earnings for all U.S. farmworkers, which fell by
2.5% (from $2.68 to $2.13 per hour).18 0
TABLE 9
WAGES AND EARNINGS OF APPLE WORKERS IN MARYLAND IN REAL TERMS
(1977 Dollars)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Prevailing Wage
(¢/bu) 27.2 26.6 25.1 27.4 26.2 28.1
Changes in the H-2 regulations also help to
explain (he rapid increase in nominal apple piece rates
relative to the stagnation in earlier years. Prior to 1978,
the H-2 regulations had required employers to set piece
27.6
rates to enable workers to. earn the amount they would
have earned had they been paid the AEWR. Farmworker
advocates had argued that when the AEWRs increased,
employers did not adjust their piece rates accordingly,
179. In 1980 the Department of Agriculture began publishing
the Far,,i Labor report far less frequently and stopped publishing
average farm earnings for each state altogether. Each report
contained far less comprehensive agricultural wage and
employment information; and USDA began aggregating that data
which was collected and published on a regional, as opposed to a
state-by-state, basis. The average earnings of Maryland
farmworkers are now lumped together with those of farmworkers
from New England, the mid-Atlantic states, Virginia, and West
Virginia.
180. Of course, measuring real wages versus nominal figures
does not alter the relative changes in the various wage rates and
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but simply increased productivity requirements in order
to meet the AEWR-equivalence requirement. Indeed,
the Maryland surveys reflect precisely this pattern: in
the first four years after H-2 workers were introduced,
the prevailing nominal piece rate did not change from
its 1974 level of 30¢ per bushel. In March 1978 DOL,
.recogniz[ing] the possibilities of abuses," adopted a
rule requiring H-2 employers to increase piece rates in
proportion to increases in the AEWR effective in their
state. 181
The new 1978 piece rate proportionality provision
meant that the piece rate paid by H-2 orchards would
have to jncrease at least in proportion to increases in the
AEWR.' Consistent with this requirement, in 1979 the
nominal prevailing piece rate for Maryland apples did
rise for the first time since 1974.182 In 1983. DOL
began weakening the potential wage protection afforded
by the rule, allowing employers to increase productivity
requirements as long as the average domestic worker's
hourly earnings had equalled or exceeded the prior
year's AEWR. t8 3 The prevailing nominal wage did not
change between 1983 and 1984, nor between 1985 and
1986 (the last year in which Maryland growers employed
H-2 workers). The prevailing wage did increase by 11%
between the 1984 and 1985 seasons, and this may
weaken somewhat the evidentiary basis of the wage
depression hypothesis. However, the mid-1980s was
marked by considerable uncertainty as to what the
regulations would require.184  Changes in, and
uncertainty regarding, the regulations may explain part
of the prevailing piece rates' somewhat erratic pattern.
In addition, while the availability of H-2 growers and the,
regulatory program do shelter H-2 growers from market
pressures to increase wages, they cannot be completely
immune from such pressures. Undoubtedly they must
respond, however mutedly, to some labor market forces.
For example, most H-2 growers employ both domestic
and foreign workers, and it is possible that an expected
supply of domestic labor may have dried up on short
notice, forcing wages up, at least in the short term, to
attract more U.S. workers. Table 9 compares the
percent change in Maryland's AEWR and the prevailing
apple wage from 1974 through 1990.
TABLE 10
CHANGES IN THE MARYLAND ADVERSE EFFECT WAGE RATE AND THE

























































181. 43 Fed. Reg. 10306, 10309 10317 (3/10/78). See also supra,
Section V.A.
182. It is interesting to note that since 1968-the first year for
which Maryland prevailing wage surveys are available-every
Maryland apple grower surveyed, except an occasional handful
who paid by the hour, had paid by the bushel. In 1978, the first
year in which the new piece rate proportionality rule was in effect,
the employers of the vast majority of domestic workers counted in
the survey (100 out of 139) paid by the box. It is impossible to
prove, but it seems highly probable that the growers who switched
units were those who hired foreign workers. The survey shows
that all of the growers who paid by the box paid the same rate
(33¢); in addition the survey states that 96% of the foreign
workers also received the prevailing wage, which equalled the 33c
per box wage. As discussed above, H-2 apple growers in each
wage area tend to offer the same wage. Moreover, as a general
rule, those growers who hire the most foreign workers tend to be
amongst the largest concerns, and hire the most domestic workers
as well. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that the H-2 growers
switched, en masse, to a per box rate. The question is, why? The
per box rate paid, 33C/box is equivalent to a per bushel rate of
29.64/bushel-.4€ less than the prior four years' prevailing wage
of 304/bushel. It seems plausible that the move to a per box rate
was intended to circumvent the 1978 proportionality rule.
183. 48 Fed. Reg. 40168, 40175 (9/2/83). DOL had been trying
to reverse the proportionality rule from the beginning of Reagan's
Administration. See supra Section V.A.
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C.. HUDSON VALLEY, NEW YORK
New York apple growers began importing tempo-
rary foreign workers no later than the early 1960s. At
least since the early 1970s, the clear majority of apple
growers in New York's Hudson Valley have employed
such workers; 18 5 as a. group, these growers also have
employed more domestic workers each year than the
growers who hire exclusively domestic labor. And since
1979, more than half of the apple pickers in any season
have had H-2 status.1 86 In short, it is fair to say that in
this region, growers who employ H-2A workers domi-
nate the labor market for apple pickers. If the presence
of temporary foreign workers has a depressive wage im-
pact, it should be discernable in the Hudson Valley area.
Tables 10 and I I illustrate the general pattern of
prevailing wage findings for picking Hudson Valley ap-
ples for the fresh market. Table 10 shows the prevailing
nominal wage, which has increased gradually over the
years in a step-like fashion, between 1971 and 1989.
Prevailing Wage
(4 per 1-'/8 bu)
Table 11 shows the real prevailing wage in selected
years. Nothing different is learned from examining real
versus nominal apple wages, and the analysis that fol-
lows looks only at the latter. The enormous erosion in
Hudson Valley apple pickers' absolute earning power
(as opposed to their earning power relative to other
groups of agricultural or manufacturing workers) during
the last twenty years, however, is more starkly demon-
strated by looking at real wages; it is difficult to grasp
intuitively the magnitude of the erosion by looking at
the trend in nominal wages, which do rise. Real wages
are shown simply to demonstrate the dramatic decline
in these farmworkers' earning power. As can be seen,
real piece rates paid for picking apples in the Hudson
Valley had declined steadily for years, falling by 37%
between 1971 and 1985, before recovering slightly to
65% of the 1971 level in 1989.
TABLE 11
NOMINAL PREVAILING WAGE FOR FRESH-MARKET APPLES IN THE HUDSON VALLEY
1971-1989 \
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
30 30 35 35 35 35 38 38 40 43
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Prevailing Wage
(4 per 1-1/8 bu) 43 46
* $4.56/hour.
NA Not Available.
Source: Hudson Valley Prevailing Wage Surveys
60 60 60
TABLE 12




(4 per 1-1/8 bu.) 36.6
Source: Hudson Valley Prevailing Wage Surveys
185. Surveys for the following seasons were available: 1977,
1979-1982, 1986, and 1989. Copies of Hudson Valley surveys
conducted in seasons prior to 1977 and in 1983-1985, 1987, and
1990 were not available. Some information on the survey results
for 1976, 1985, and 1987 is reported on the following year's sur-
vev report (i.e. the reports for 1977, 1986, and 1988).
186. During the decade between 1972 and 1982, the absolute
number of foreign workers employed in picking Hudson Valley
apples for the fresh market peaked at 1,618 in 1982, constituting
61% of the total workforce. The proportion of foreign workers
peaked in 1981 with 1,388 foreign workers, constituting 66% of
the total labor force. Similar data for the Hudson Valley is not
available for 1983-1985, nor for 1987. Because of the way in
which the data from these later surveys is broken down and re-
corded, it is not possible to be certain of the precise total number
of domestic workers employed during the 1986, 1988, and 1989
seasons. However, one can derive a maximum total of domestic
workers employed, thereby enabling a calculation of the minimum
percent of the total workforce occupied by H-2As; for 1986, 1988,
and 1989, the minimum percent of the total represented by for-
eign workers is 60%, 62%, and 51%, respectively.
On the number of user versus non-user orchards in the
Hudson Valley, between 1977 and 1982 (excluding 1978), the
proportion of user to non-user employers peaked in 1981 at 43 to
13, and reached its lowest, at 51 to 39, in 1977. By 1986, the
number of user and non-user employers had evened out, but the
size of the former, and the number of domestic workers employed
by them, continued to exceed that of the latter. Again, exact num-
bers cannot be derived from the later surveys. The 1988 survey
gives no indication of the number of U.S. workers employed on
user versus non-user orchards, but the 1986 and 1989 surveys
clearly support the assertion that H-2 orchards employ a greater
number of domestic workers than non-user orchards; while not
providing an exact breakdown, those survey reports do break
down the user and non-user orchards into four categories, accord-
ing to the number of domestic workers employed during the sur-
vey week (1: 60 or more; II: 30 to 59; III: 10 to 29; and IV: I to
9). The tables below will help to illustrate and clarify the informa-
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Comparing the increase in the prevailing apple
wage with the increase in the same five wage indices
used in the Maryland analysis 18 7 supports the wage de-
pression theory in the Hudson Valley. Table 12 shows
the prevailing wage and the various wage indices for se-
lected years between 1974 and 1989; Table 13 shows
the percent growth in each wage, using 1974 as the base
year. I have chosen 1974 rather than 1971, the first year
for which the prevailing wage determination is known,
as the base year because, as noted above, the USDA dra-
matically changed its survey method in that year.1 8 As
Table 13 shows, growth in the prevailing wage for Hud-
son Valley apples measured 13 to 37 percent less than
the growth in each of the other wage indices between
1974 and 1980. This trend, relative to the indices for
which there is data, continued through the 1980s, with
growth in the nominal prevailing Wage lagging substan-
tially behind that in the New York manufacturing and
national agricultural wages for all hired farmworkers.
TABLE 13
PREVAILING WAGE AND WAGE INDICES FOR SELECTED YEARS
1974-1989









* USDA stopped publishing these figures in 1980.
NA Not Available.













































Source: Hudson Valley Prevailing Wage Surveys
The Hudson Valley surveys for the 1977-1982
seasons disaggregate the data for wages paid to
domestic workers employed on "user farms" versus
"non-user farms."' 89  This provides an unusual
opportunity to see whether the H-2 growers have paid
wages comparable to those prevailing on the "pure
domestic market" (consisting only of the domestic
workers hired by non-user orchards) or whether these
growers' piece rates fall short of such a pure market
wage, thereby pulling the overall domestic wage
down. 190 These surveys thus suggest one model of the
type of wage survey DOL could implement were it
seriously to examine the question of wage depression
and the H-2A program.
Table 14 shows three wage rates over the 1977-
1982 period: (1) The prevailing piece rate found when
187. The five indices are (1) The average hourly earnings of all
hired farmworkers in New York in October; (2) The average
hourly earnings of all hired farmworkers in New York over the
course of a year; (3) The average hourly earnings of production
workers on manufacturing payrolls in New York during October;
(4) The average hourly earnings of all hired farmworkers in the
United States in October; (5) The annual average hourly earnings
of all hired farmworkers in the United States.
188. See supra, note 178.
189. [he wages paid by orchards employing only H-2A workers
do not appear in the survey, which theoretically protects the
domestic wage by requiring user growers to offer the prevailing
wage determined in a labor market of domestic workers only.
However, this theory erroneously assumes that the wages an H-2A
grower pays to domestic and foreign workers are independent.
190. Of course, there cannot be a truly "pure domestic labor
market," immune from the impact of H-2 employers. Since, at
any point, non-user growers' demand for domestic labor is fixed,
user growers' importing foreign workers into the area necessarily
increases the supply of domestic labor relative to the non-user
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all domestic workers, employed on both user and non-
user orchards, are surveyed; this is the prevailing rate
which determines the minimum H-2A growers must
offer both domestic and foreign workers' in the
following year. (2) The prevailing rate found when only
non-user orchards are included in the survey; this is the
"pure" domestic prevailing wage. (3) The prevailing
rate paid to domestic workers on user orchards. Table
15 shows the number of domestic and foreign workers
employed on all orchards each year between 1972 and
1989. Table 16 shows the number and percentage of
domestic workers employed on user versus non-user
farms between 1977 and 1982. Table 17 illustrates the
distribution of domestic workers receiving each of the
various piece rates paid by user and non-user orchards
each year between 1977 and 1982 (excluding 1978, as
the survey for this year was unavailable).
TABLE 15
WAGES FOR PICKING APPLES FOR THE FRESH MARKET IN HUDSON VALLEY,
NEW YORK




























* As reported in surveys for the 1979 and 1977 harvests.
t One l-Is bushel is equivalent to one Eastern Standard Box.
Source: Hudson Valley Prevailing Wage Surveys.
TABLE 16














































































* The exact number of domestic workers cannot be determined from the survey data as reported in
these years. The numbers listed here represent the maximum number of domestic workers, and thus
may understate the percent of the total workforce which is foreign during these years.






























NUMBER OF DOMESTIC WORKERS EMPLOYED ON USER AND NON-USER ORCHARDS IN HUDSON VALLEY
U.S. Wlorkers on
,Non-User Forms




























40 + 5 EOSB
40 + 3 EOSB
38 + 5 EOSB
40 + 2 EOSB
37 + 5 EOSB
"1NU 40
38 + 2 EOSB
35 + 5 EOSB
30 + 10 EOSB
38
35 + 3 EOSB
33 + 5 EOSB







45 + 5 EOSB
I'MU 45
40 + 5 EOSB
42
40 + 2 EOSB
40
38
















































































































TOTALS 36 62 528 100 751 100
EOSB: End of Season Bonus. For example, a wage equal to "35 + 5 EOSB" means that a worker receives a base wage of 354 at the time
of picking and 5e at the end of the season (if s/he stays to the end) for each 1 'I bushel picked. The wage used for comparative purposes is
the sum of the base wage and the EOSB. So the "35 + 5 EOSB" wage will be treated as 404 per 1 '/s bushel, even though workers who do
not remain until the end of the seasons will only receive the base wage of 35c.
Bold face type indicates the prevailing wage for all domestic workers.
PNU indicates the prevailing wage paid on non-user orchards.
TABLE 18
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50 + 5 EOSB
40 + 15 EOSB
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I 50
45 + 5 EOSB
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TOTALS 30 41 426
Bold. face type indicates the prevailing wage for all domestic workers.
PNU indicates the prevailing wage paid on non-user orchards.
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Several patterns emerge from these tables. First,
between 1976 and 1982, user employers paid signifi-
cantly lower wages than non-users in every year except
1976, during which the prevailing rate on user and non-
user orchards was the same. 1 1" From 1977 to 1982, the
prevailing wage paid to domestic workers employed on
non-user farms ranged from 5.3% to 12.5% more than
that paid to domestic workers on user farms.
192
Second, the overwhelming majority of user grow-
ers pay the same rate to the overwhelming majority of
domestic workers employed on those orchards; between
1977 and 1982, 87 to 95 percent of the user orchards
paid the same rate. In addition, as can be seen in Table
17, the prevailing user rate consistently has been at or
near the bottom of the wage range spanned by all apple
growers surveyed in the area. The piece rates offered by
non-user orchards, in contrast, span a larger range, and
are much more evenly distributed throughout that
range. In 1982, for example, 30 non-user growers paid
eleven different piece rates, ranging from 40q to 604
per 1-1/8 bushel, to workers on their orchards; ten
(33%) of these 30 non-user growers paid the modal rate
(50q per 1-1/8 bushel) to 113 of the 426 (26%) domestic
workers employed on all non-user orchards. In con-
trast, the 41 user growers paid only four different rates,
ranging from 464 to 514 per 1-1/8 bushel (including, in
some cases, an end-of-season bonus); 38 of these 41
(93%) user growers paid the modal user wage (464 per
1-1/8 bushel) to 529 of the 603 (84%) domestic workers
employed on all user farms.
Finally, in every year during the 1977-1982 period,
the prevailing wage paid to all domestic workers, em-
ployed on both user and non-user orchards, was the
same as the prevailing rate paid when only those em-
ployed on user farms were considered, suggesting that
the H-2A growers exert a dominating force in the Hud-
son Valley labor market for apple pickers.
The Hudson Valley surveys depict a clear picture:
rather than providing a floor below which the wages
paid workers cannot fall, the prevailing wage determina-
tion functions as a wage ceiling, which H-2A employers
need not exceed in order to obtain a sufficient number
of workers.' 9 3 The wage that foreign workers will ac-
cept is determined by the labor market in their home
countries, which inevitably suffer substantially higher
underemployment and unemployment rates and a sig-
nificantly lower market equilibrium wage than the
United States; in other words, the minimum wage re-
quired of U.S. growers by U.S. law invariably exceeds
the level sufficient to attract foreign workers. Because
underemployment and unemployment are quite high in
the labor supply countries, U.S. employers of tempo-
rary foreign workers essentially face an infinite labor
supply at the DOL-certified wage. Nor are the foreign
workers likely to complain about wages and working
conditions or to leave before the season's end, an occur-
rence which otherwise might force a grower to improve
wages and working conditions, either to keep the for-
eigners from quitting or to locate additional domestic
workers. U.S. workers unwilling to work at the certified
rate are not considered "available" for purposes of for-
eign worker certification. Thus, an H-2 employer need
not increase wages above the DOL-approved level in or-
der to meet shortages of domestic labor; as s/he can ob-
tain a sufficient number of foreign workers at that wage,
there is no need for the H-2A employer to offer
more. 194
Specific, direct evidence of precisely this wage-ceil-
ing dynamic is found in the Hudson Valley survey for
1986. Official comments made on this survey explained
that spring freezes and summer hail, coupled with early
maturity and restriction on the use of Alar, resulted in a
heavy demand for labor. Consequently, as basic supply
and demand analysis would expect, the piece rate
showed a substantial increase over 1985; the prevailing
piece rate for fresh market standard apples, for exam-
ple, increased by 25%, from 484 to 604 per Eastern
Standard Box. However, only a limited number of
smaller growers paid workers by the piece in 1986. At
least since 1971 the vast majority (if not all) of the apple
growers had paid workers by the piece. In 1986 most of
the domestic workers employed on non-user farms were
paid by the piece, and their wages did increase that sea-
son. However, the "majority of growers, especially the
larger ones that obtain certificationforforeign labor, paid work-
ers at an hourly wage rate, rather than a piece rate this
year."'19 5 Furthermore, almost all the domestic workers
paid by the hour were paid the AEWR then in effect for
New York-the minimum hourly wage permissible
under the regulations for any growers seeking H-2
workers; indeed, only 8 of 319 domestic workers picking
standard tree apples and 41 of 204 picking dwarf tree
apples were paid an hourly rate above the AEWR. Had
the H-2 growers paid by the piece, as they consistently
had done in the past, they would have had to pay the
heightened prevailing rate. But DOL certified two pre-
vailing wage rates in 1986-the prevailing hourly and
the prevailing piece rates. Because the H-2 growers em-
ployed far more of the hourly domestic workers than the
non-user growers, the prevailing hourly wage was deter-
mined by the wages offered by H-2 growers themselves.
And because DOL had certified that wage (rather than
191. Because the survey for 1976 is not available, it is difficult to
determine the significance of this apparent exception, or what
other factors, besides a lack of wage depression, may explain it.
192. The survey for 1989 similarly noted that the prevailing
piece rate on non-user orchards ran 54 per 1-1/8 bushel higher
than the prevailing rate on user orchards. But in general, the
post-1982 surveys available unfortunately do not break the data
between user and non-user orchards down as the earlier surveys
did. As with the 1989 survey, several comments on the various
reports were recorded which provide further evidentiary support
for wage depression and are discussed below, but the systematic
analysis possible for the earlier surveys cannot be done for more
recent years.
193. Of course, if the prevailing wage were to yield hourly earn-
ings below the AEWR, H-2A growers must pay the latter, in which
case it is the AEWR, not the prevailing wage determination, which
operates as a wage ceiling.
194. See supra Sections IA, I.C.
195. Domestic Agricultural In-Season Wage Report, #33-96-FH-02,
Hudson Valley, 1986 Apple Crop (2/11/87) (emphasis added).
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certifying only the prevailing piece rate paid to domestic
workers on non-user orchards), the H-2 growers could
meet any labor shortage experienced at the AEWR by
requesting additional H-2 workers, rather than increas-
ing wages.'" Thus, while most non-user growers re-
sponded to the season's market pressures by paying a
higher wage, the bulk of H-2 growers circumvented the
hike in the market wage by offering the hourly
AEWR. 19 7
It is highly unlikely that the AEWR itself reflected
a higher wage resulting from the increased demand for
labor in 1986. The 1977-1981 surveys report average
hourly earnings of the surveyed domestic workers (all of
whom were paid by the piece) which exceed the hourly
adverse effect rate by 42 to 76 percent. These figures
are shown in Table 18. Average productivity or earn-
ings figures for surveys after 1981 are not recorded,
preventing similar comparisons for the years immedi-
ately preceding the 1986 shift to an hourly rate. How-
ever, it seems likely that the pattern of piece rate
workers' average hourly earnings exceeding the AEWR
would have persisted; as noted elsewhere in this paper,
numerous farmworker advocates and observers have
found this to be the case. Thus, not only did the H-2
growers circumvent the short-term rise in the 1986 mar-
ket wage for domestic workers by shifting to an hourly
rate, it is probable that they also reduced their labor
costs, as well as the earnings their workers received, by a
significant margin.
TABLE 19
AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS OF PIECE RATE WORKERS PICKING APPLES FOR THE FRESH MARKET IN THE HUDSON
VALLEY COMPARED TO THE NEW YORK ADVERSE EFFECT WAGE RATE
1977-1981
1977
Adverse Effect Wage Rate 2.70
Average Hourly Earnings of
Domestic Piece-Rate Workers 4.76
Average Hourly Earnings
as a Percent of the AEWR 176%
N.A. Not Available
Sources: Hudson Valley Prevailing Wage Surveys; Federal Register
In contrast to the user grower, the non-H-2A
employer must offer a wage sufficient to maintain a
steady domestic workforce, and therefore must be
responsive to varying crop conditions and adapt to
changing market forces. Two of the Hudson Valley
wage surveys noted, "There is some variation in piece
rates based on apple varieties, size of trees and
composition of the work force."' l9 8 One added that the
type of picking desired by the employer may effect the
rate.1)9 Another suggested that poor weather and crop
conditions "may have had some effect on the increase in
the rate paid to instate workers," and yet another that
"[e]mployers not using H-2A workers paid somewhat
higher piece rates to harvest their apples mainly due to
the shortage of seasonal workers. Our finding ran $.05
higher per 1 + /s bu[shel] on non-user farms than on
user farms." 20 0 As noted above, the range of wages
paid by different non-user growers was substantially
wider than the range paid by user growers.
A non-user employer, who does not face an
infinitely elastic labor supply at the certified wage, must
offer higher rates for apples that are harder to pick or
less densely packed on the trees, for work on orchards

















of picking. But because DOL certifies a single piece rate
at which H-2A growers can fill any labor "shortage"
with foreign workers, they need not (although at times
they may for incentive purposes) offer varying rates
which reflect different crop or weather conditions or
other economic developments.
In summary, the combination of the three wage
patterns that emerge from the 1977-1982 Hudson
Valley surveys and which are discussed above-i.e. the
consistently lower level of the piece rates paid by H-2A
growers, the concentration of those growers' rates at a
single wage level at or near the bottom of the range paid
by all growers, and the equality of the prevailing wage
paid U.S. workers employed on user orchards and that
paid domestic workers employed on all orchards-
strongly suggests that, at least when H-2A growers
account for the majority or a substantial portion of the
demand for workers in a particular labor market, they
are able to effectively control the wage they will pay.
The Department of Labor's prevailing wage surveys do
not provide an effective floor to lift wages from
otherwise depressed levels, because the prevailing wage
is not determined in a market free from the
oligopsonistic influence of the H-2 growers.
2 t0
196. Once DOL had certified a wage, a grower's labor shortage
is, by definition, equal to the total number of workers needed less
the number of domestic workers available and willing to work at
the certified wage.
197. The AEWR, it should be recalled, is the minimum hourly
rate permitted by the H-2 regulations, unless a wage survey is per-
formed and a prevailing wage yielding higher earnings is found.
198. Hudson Valley Wage Surveys for 1982 and 1980.
199. Hudson Valley Wage Survey for 1977.
200. Hudson Valley Wage Surveys for 1989 and 1988.
201. "Oligopsonistic" describes a market in which the number of
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It would seem critical to protecting domestic
wages against adverse effect that the prevailing wage be
determined with reference to a labor market insulated
to the greatest degree feasible from the influence of
growers using foreign workers.2 0 2 Instead, the surveys
suggest that the H-2A apple growers in the Hudson
Valley have come to dominate and control the very
market against which their wage offers are tested. Far
from protecting the domestic labor market from adverse
effect, the H-2A program in essence has served to
insulate H-2A growers from various market pressures
that otherwise would push up the wages they would
have to offer. This, in turn, inevitably increases the
competitive pressure on, often smaller, non-H-2A
orchards to lower their wages, thereby depressing wages
throughout the agricultural labor market.
CONCLUSION
The H-2A temporary foreign worker program rec-
ognizes and attempts to accommodate growers' inter-
ests in obtaining foreign workers. Farmworkers dispute
whether that interest reflects a genuine labor shortage
or simply a managerial, profit-driven preference for
cheaper, more reliable, and more controllable workers.
But by virtue of their existence, the regulatory program
and the statute enabling it presuppose a Congressional
determination that at least some of the growers' interest
in this regard is legitimate.
Thus, the regulatory program necessarily is pre-
mised on the existence of competing sets of interests.
However, governmental protection of growers from the
vicissitudes of a competitive domestic labor market and
the risks inherent in producing a perishable product
does not necessarily follow from the recognition of
growers' needs to meet their demand for labor. More-
over, that an interest is a premise does not necessarily
make it a purpose of the statutory mandate. Until 1981
DOL had construed its role in developing and enforcing
the H-2 regulatory guidelines as counterbalancing the
inevitably depressive effect that an influx of temporary
workers would have on wages and working conditions in
a given area. Thus, the regulations were developed pri-
marily with the protection of farmworkers' interests in
mind. As designed and operated today, the H-2A pro-
gram ostensibly gives equal weight to farmworkers' and
growers' interests, balancing these conflicting interests
to reach a "fair" resolution. Under this apparently rea-
sonable guise, the program has come to function funda-
mentally as a mechanism to assist growers in obtaining
foreign labor. Whereas the absolute number of certifi-
cations had been declining steadily throughout the
1960s and 1970s, that number increased considerably
during the 1980s.
Does the employment of H-2A workers depress
wages and other working conditions? This is a difficult
question to answer. In the regulatory framework devel-
oped by DOL in the 1960s and 1970s, growers bore the
burden of demonstrating that adverse effect would not
result from their employing H-2 workers. With the in-
auguration of the Reagan Administration, however,
DOL's position changed, and growers' interests gained
a new centrality. With this change came a new alloca-
tion of the costs of uncertainty: If wage depression can-
not be conclusively demonstrated, the minimum wage
and working conditions imposed on H-2A growers will
not be heightened to ensure against such possible de-
pression. Rather than providing a protective floor, the
H-2A regulations, following this approach, actually
function as a ceiling on the wages and working condi-
tions of farmworkers.
Has the Department of Labor innapropriately
placed the burden of uncertainty on farmworkers?
Proving adverse affect is a difficult, if not impossible,
task. Farmworkers, with scant resources, are not in a
position to meet this task. The burden is far more ap-
propriately borne, as it once was, by growers, who have
more resources and access to pertinent wage and em-
ployment information, and who are in a far superior po-
sition to minimize the uncertainty and absorb its costs.
buyers is sufficiently small that the normal free market assumption
of competitive buying cannot be maintained. Such a market is
called an oligopsony; it is the demand-side equivalent to an
oligopoly. Henderson and Quandt, Alicroeconowic Theory: .4
lathematical Approach (1986), 212.
202. It would be practically impossible, for example, to carve out
a domestic labor market completely free from the impact of
foreign workers, since the presence of those workers necessarily
changes the relationship of the labor supply and demand in the
non-user market.
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